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Abstract 
Building is consistently identified as one of the key sectors for sustainable development in 
general and for energy savings in particular (IPCC, 2007).  The use of energy in buildings has 
been shown to account for around 40% of UK energy usage and improvements in building 
energy use and efficiency have become a significant focus of attention. This has resulted in 
the incorporation of innovative energy saving and renewable technologies into buildings.  
Worryingly, technological innovations for buildings consistently fail to deliver on their 
promises of improved efficiency and energy savings.  There is a widespread assumption that 
the adoption of an innovative technology is mainly to do with the conditions of the market 
and technical effectiveness of the innovation.  Given the complex nature of construction 
projects this assumption about adoption appears simplistic - many innovative technologies 
have to be accommodated within the fabric of the building and many project actors are 
involved in its incorporation.  This research explores the process of building level adoption 
and asks what happens when an innovative integrated technology (BIPV) is incorporated into 
a building and in what ways this might explain the failure of the technology to deliver its 
potential.  The research thus contributes to an understanding of the implications of the 
adoption of BIPV and other sustainable technologies in buildings. The Social Construction of 
Technology approach (SCOT) is used to study three UK commercial construction projects 
which include BIPV.  Issues examined include: the changing interests of the actors; the 
network of problems and possible solutions; and the knock-on effects of the chosen solution 
on the rest of the project.  The SCOT analysis of actors’ interests and their changing 
relationship with the artefacts provides a way to explore the co-development of the 
technology and the building, and the adoption process.  Interests of actors include: generation 
maximisation, aesthetic concerns, design optimisation and green guardianship.  The SCOT 
approach is used to focus on design decisions taken over the course of the building project 
and the influence of different actor interests on these.   
The research draws out different types of co-development and technology related decision-
making which occurred during the projects and follows the effect these had on adoption.  
Rather than using formal roles (architect, designer, project manager etc.) and project stages 
(initial design, tender, detail design etc.) to explain adoption, the research found that the 
interests of the groups shifted and changed: sometimes they followed the standard project 
stages, but sometimes followed different logics.  Decision-making was found to be affected 
by the alignment of technological frames being mobilised by actors and could be dominated 
by a particular frame at different times.  It was not always the seemingly obvious groups 
which dominated decision-making and shaped the technology.  The effect of social artefacts 
in decision-making was explored.  This research develops an understanding of the dynamic 
process of adoption and concludes with practical implications for standard construction 
project procurement processes in the adoption of complex innovation.   
 
Keywords: BIPV, Co-development, Social Construction of Technology, Innovation, Adoption, 
Project management, Performance Gap, Decision making 
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 Introduction Chapter 1:
1.1 Background to the research 
New sustainable technologies are increasingly included on building projects to reduce energy 
consumption but the adoption of these technologies is complex.  For sustainable technologies 
to make a real contribution to the reduction of energy consumption in buildings it is important 
that the process of their inclusion on building projects is understood.  This research examines 
what happened on three commercial building projects as a sustainable technology was 
adopted. 
Building is consistently identified as one of the key sectors for sustainable development 
(Parry et al. 2007) in general and for energy savings in particular.  Buildings have been shown 
to account for around 40% of UK energy usage and around 33% of the greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission (DECC 2014).  Within the climate of national and international energy reduction 
agenda, improvements in building energy usage and efficiency have become a significant 
focus of attention for governments, practitioners and researchers.  This importance has led to 
a raft of policies at all levels of government.  In Europe, governments have been called upon 
to contribute to an overall reduction of GHG emissions by 20% and increase in energy 
efficiency and renewable energy each by 20%.  Similarly, the (recast) 2010 Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) calls on national governments to ensure that all 
new buildings are “nearly zero energy” by 2020.  Both sets of goals depend on the 
incorporation of energy saving and renewable technologies into buildings.  Photovoltaic 
technology has been deployed on over half a million buildings in the UK, with total installed 
capacity in 2018 set to exceed 4 Gigawatts (GW) (Department of Energy & Climate Change 
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2014).  Building integrated photovoltaic technology (BIPV) is an example of a complex 
photovoltaic technology which is increasingly installed on commercial buildings and its 
adoption is an important part of energy reduction strategies.  In 2011 installed global BIPV 
capacity was 1201 MW rising to 11,500 MW in 2015 (Renewable Energy World, 2011) and 
is projected to exceed 11 GW by 2020 (Global Industry Analysts 2015).   
In the UK planning policies and building certification schemes have been put in place to 
promote the use of energy saving technologies in both domestic and commercial buildings.  
These policies, together with other factors such as improvements in technologies and an 
increased desire of firms to demonstrate a commitment to sustainability, have resulted in the 
increased use of renewable technologies in buildings.  Commercial properties account for at 
least 10% of overall emissions and energy consumption, and clients for new commercial 
buildings are increasingly seeking to install new energy saving or generating technologies into 
the buildings.  Technologies chosen can range from simple technologies like low energy 
lighting or roof mounted solar panels to more complex technologies like ground source heat 
pumps and building integrated photovoltaic systems which need to be integrated within the 
structure of the building.   
These more integrated technologies are more than just bolt on, minor additions to the building 
structure.  Instead these technologies have to be integrated within the fabric of the building 
itself and their incorporation is far from simple.  This process of incorporation can require 
adjustments to the technology itself, the building into which it fits, and the standard design 
and construction stages which take place throughout a project. The resulting mutual 
articulation of technology, building and process can be thought of in terms of co-development 
and the way that this takes place shapes the resulting building design and electricity 
generation potential.  BIPV is an integrated technology and the issues of integrating BIPV 
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into a building are complex and affect many aspects of the construction process.  Current 
research does not extend to understanding the project and process difficulties that arise when 
integrated technologies are incorporated within a building.  Little research has been conducted 
into the micro-level occurrences which occur as a complex, integrated technology is adopted 
into a building project – both in terms of technical and social aspects.  This research addresses 
that gap by exploring how decision-making evolves as successive problems and solutions 
unfold during the project level adoption of BIPV. 
1.2 Research Problem 
While much of the research into innovation and its adoption considers technologies to be self-
contained entities which can be inserted directly into a building, practice suggests that the 
process is often much messier.  This is especially the case with many of the recent renewable 
technologies which are integrated technologies with multiple inter-dependent components 
rather than single discrete components which require little integration.   
Incorporation of these integrated technologies into buildings presents many challenges for 
construction in terms of technical performance, building development and project processes.  
Emerging reviews of the contribution of these technologies towards energy reduction targets 
consistently document a failure of the technologies to deliver on their promises of improved 
efficiency and energy savings (Leonard-Barton & Kraus, 1985; Palmer et al., 2016; 
Zgajewski, 2015).  This would indicate that the process of incorporating integrated 
technologies within buildings is not straightforward and that for new technologies to deliver 
the required energy savings, a better understanding of the process of incorporating the product 
into projects is needed.  
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1.3 Aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is to explore the micro-dynamics around the adoption of innovative 
technology and so develop an understanding of what happens when innovative, integrated 
technologies are incorporated into building projects.  The research follows the inclusion of a 
new technology into three commercial building projects.  Adoption is the term used to 
describe the process of incorporating the product into projects rather than the term diffusion 
which often refers to the spread of the technology once it is “market ready”.   
The research uses building integrated photovoltaic technology (BIPV) as an example of an 
integrated technology and examines what happened as BIPV was incorporated into three 
commercial buildings.  It is concerned with the micro-level occurrences and accommodations 
that are made both to the innovative technology (in this case BIPV) and to its complex local 
physical and processual context during its adoption.  This aim is supported by three 
objectives: 
 To explore how the building and the technology develop as design decisions are made 
during the project when BIPV is incorporated;   
 To examine what may influence the installed generation potential of the BIPV 
technology; 
 To explore the implications of this research for the adoption of BIPV and other 
sustainable technologies. 
1.4 Summary of research method 
As the adoption process has both social and technical aspects, this research uses a social 
construction of technology approach (SCOT) to focus on the process of adoption as building 
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integrated photovoltaic technology (BIPV) is incorporated within new buildings. The 
approach is used to examine how the co-development of the technology, building and project 
processes may explain this problem. 
1.5 Synopsis of thesis 
The integrated nature of BIPV is introduced in Chapter 2 with a description of the 
components within a BIPV system.  Current research into the adoption of BIPV is shown to 
focus on the technical and commercial considerations of the technology, without looking at 
the micro-level issues surrounding its incorporation into a building.  The chapter establishes 
that the practical challenges associated with the adoption of BIPV invite research to 
understand what actually happens when BIPV is specified on a building, thereby giving 
greater understanding of the process of adoption. 
Current literature on the adoption of technology is explored in Chapter 3, together with a 
discussion about specific literature on the adoption of innovation in construction projects.  
Although some innovation diffusion studies recognise the effect that innovation has on its 
local context, they do not consider innovation adoption as a dynamic and two-way process.  
The chapter establishes that whilst barriers to innovation adoption have been extensively 
reviewed, little attention has been paid to the empirical study of what actually occurs on a 
construction project when an integrated new technology is introduced.  Building on existing 
literature, the chapter develops the concept of the dynamic nature of innovation adoption and 
establishes that the study of the incorporation of an integrated technology within a 
construction project would provide insight into the dynamic process of adoption. 
In Chapter 4, the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) is established as the socio-
technical lens to be used for this research.  The chapter explores the use of this micro-level 
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approach, which pays attention to the actors involved, the technology being used and the 
larger building project which accommodates it, to understand interdependent technical 
developments in a complex environment.  For this study the relevant actors are the projects 
team members and the artefacts under consideration are the components of BIPV and the 
elements of the building with which they interface.  SCOT is used to map out the unfolding 
series of problems and solutions which occur as the technology is incorporated into the 
building.  
The research then explores the process of technology adoption by asking what 
accommodations are made both to the innovation and to its local physical and processual 
context during the adoption of an innovation.  Chapter 5 sets out the design of the empirical 
research, which studies three commercial building projects each incorporating BIPV 
technology.  Data from interviews and project documents is used to identify groups of actors 
who have different needs and expectations from the technology.  The chapter then explores 
the successive problems and solutions which occur during each project as the BIPV system 
and the building develop.  The ensuing mutual articulation of the building and technology is 
explored and is used to compare similarities and differences in the mechanisms of this co-
development of building and technology on all three projects.   
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 describe the case studies and analyse the key episodes in each of the 
projects in terms of technological frames and the co-development of the building and BIPV 
system.  SCOT is used to explore how the project teams decided on which solutions to adopt 
for emerging problems and how this decision-making shaped the final configuration of the 
building and technology.  Issues and challenges from the incorporation of BIPV that are 
particular to each project are examined and issues which have particular relevance for 
construction projects in general are identified. 
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Similarities and differences between the three case studies are examined in Chapter 9 and 
these are explored in terms of two key themes; integration and the dynamics of co-
development.  These themes are used understand some common mechanisms that were seen 
to occur during the adoption of the technology.  Chapter 10 moves from an analysis of the 
three specific cases to a re-engagement with the literature on the adoption of technology.  The 
discussion explores how the case of BIPV challenges a number of basic assumptions which 
inform research into innovation in general and sustainable innovation in particular.  The 
chapter highlights how innovation occurs on-site as construction of the building proceeds and 
explores the implications of this in the adoption of integrated technologies.  
Chapter 11 provides an overview of the research and presents its theoretical and 
methodological contributions.  This chapter suggests implications for practitioners and 
proposes areas for further research directions.  This research brings the dynamics of adoption 
into focus and allows for an understanding of how decisions are made and of the effects of 
those decisions on both the artefacts and the actors.   
Chapter 2: BIPV technology 
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 Building Integrated Photovoltaic Technology Chapter 2:
This chapter introduces renewable solar energy technologies in general and BIPV in 
particular, and describes the challenges associated with its adoption.  The discussion 
introduces a key distinction between the adoption of complex, integrated technologies and the 
adoption of discrete, less complex innovations.  This distinction draws attention to the 
multiplicity of decisions and considerations that occur in the adoption of these more complex 
technologies. 
2.1 Renewable solar energy technologies 
There are two main types of solar energy technologies: solar thermal energy (providing hot 
water) and photovoltaic power (providing electricity).  Both of these types of solar energy 
make different contributions to the energy and carbon reduction agenda.  The following 
section gives a brief introduction to solar thermal technologies and photovoltaic technologies 
and ends with an outline of BIPV technology. 
 Solar thermal technology  2.1.1
Solar thermal technology uses heat exchangers - usually mounted on the roof of buildings 
(either domestic or commercial), to convert heat from the sun into useable heat energy.   Solar 
thermal installations are fitted after the roof has been constructed and are usually employed to 
heat the water used in the building, or occasionally to heat ceilings or floors.  Solar energy is 
stored in the form of hot water and so can be used when there is no solar radiance.  In addition 
to the panels on the roof (which are heat collectors) the assembly includes a heat transfer 
liquid (similar to a refrigerant), pipes to carry the heating medium to the hot water system, 
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and a suitable water cylinder which uses a heat exchanger between the refrigerant and the hot 
water system to store heated water (eSolar et al., 2008).   
Electricity is not generated by this form of solar technology and so considerations of 
connectivity to the electricity grid are not relevant.  The exception to this is Concentrated 
Solar Power (CSP), when huge solar collectors are used within a power plant to heat water to 
become steam, which drives conventional turbines - so generating electricity.  These power 
plants are generally geographically restricted to areas of high incident solar radiation (for 
example, Spain, Morocco, India and North America) (Khanna, 2012). 
 Photovoltaic technology (PV) 2.1.2
Photovoltaic technology uses a solar cells and wiring to produce electricity.  The solar cells 
are usually embedded within solar panels and positioned to catch the sun’s rays.  PV systems 
use a suite of technologies to convert solar radiation into electricity using the photovoltaic 
effect within a solar cell.  Incident sunlight causes electrons to be energised within the cell, 
with the subsequent reactions generating an electromotive force, some of which is converted 
into electric energy.  PV systems produce direct current (DC) and the power produced 
fluctuates with the intensity of the sun.  It is not necessary to have full sunlight to produce 
electricity, but the angle of the cells and their orientation are important factors in maximising 
the potential electricity production. 
Solar power assemblies consist of the PV cells, the matrix - usually glass, in which they are 
embedded (the panels), cables which carry the DC power, inverters which convert the DC 
electricity to alternating current (AC), and cabling from the inverters to the standard supply 
metering system.  The electricity can be used to power the building where it is installed or can 
be exported to the grid.  Any PV system in the UK which is connected to the grid attracts a 
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Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) for any electricity that is generated, which is paid by the local electricity 
supply company to the owner of the PV system. 
There are two main ways in which photovoltaic systems are installed: building applied 
photovoltaics (BAPV) and building integrated photovoltaics (BIPV).  The technologies 
remain similar, but the challenges of their installation differ greatly (Holden & Abhilash, 
2014).  Figure 2-1 gives a schematic representation of renewable solar technologies. 
Renewable Solar Technologies
Solar Thermal Technologies 
(provide hot water)
Photovoltaic (PV) 
Technologies
(generate electricity)
Building Applied 
Photovoltaics (BAPV)
- added above the 
roof structure
Building Integrated 
Photovoltaics  (BIPV)
-incorporated into the 
fabric of the building
Figure 2-1: Renewable solar technologies 
2.2 Building applied photovoltaics (BAPV) 
Building Applied Photovoltaics are usually situated on roofs of buildings.  The PV cells are 
mounted on top of the roof membrane and are not part of the structural element of the 
building.  Panels are aligned to maximise incident light - the angle (azimuth) and direction of 
the cells - are optimised and the wiring and inverters are installed within the building.  As the 
panels sit on the roof, often on a framework, there is little impact on the building structure and 
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so BAPV is often installed as a retro-fit technology to existing buildings.  The major 
challenge for this technology is to maximise generation from the number and position of the 
panels and to minimise efficiency losses from cable runs by siting the inverter as close to the 
panels as possible.  Contracts for BAPV installation are often turn-key and generally regarded 
as an add-on to the main design and construction of the building (Holden & Abhilash, 2014). 
2.3 Building integrated photovoltaics (BIPV) 
BIPV is very similar to BAPV in terms of its components, but the key distinction is that with 
BIPV the photovoltaic panels are integrated into the fabric of the building, rather than being 
placed on top of the structure.  This integration into the building structure can include using 
BIPV in the roofs, windows, façades, louvres, brise-soleil or rain screens.  With BIPV, the 
panels replace conventional building materials in part of the building - for example roof tiles, 
façade panels or window glass.  The function of the panels is a combination of electricity 
generation, architectural aesthetic appeal and building function (in terms of water tightness, 
strength, durability etc.).  
Unlike BAPV, BIPV has many interfaces with the rest of the building structure, which makes 
it both expensive (by virtue of its bespoke nature) and complicated (because of the number 
and type of interfaces with the building) (Henemann, 2008).  BIPV is generally restricted to 
commercial building projects, where each building is uniquely designed and where the 
adaptability of BIPV installations allows the technology to fit and contribute to the building 
architecture.  The bespoke nature of the technology and the knock-on effects of its 
incorporation into a building project pose major challenges for construction professionals.   
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Figure 2-2 shows an example where BIPV has been used as part of the façade and roof of the 
building and demonstrates the combination of aesthetic and functional qualities of BIPV in 
buildings.  
 
Figure 2-2: An example of BIPV 
2.4 Component parts of photovoltaic systems 
Rather than being a simple technology, BIPV systems comprise several component parts 
which have to be matched as a system and then accommodated within the design of a 
building.  These component parts include photovoltaic cells, PV panels, wiring, inverters and 
meters.  A brief discussion of each component serves to demonstrate the way that these 
components are inter-dependent and highlights the complexity of BIPV systems. 
 Photovoltaic cells 2.4.1
Photovoltaic cells are the components which convert photon energy into DC electricity.  
There are two main technologies commonly used: thin film and crystalline silicon.  Much 
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research is being invested in developing newer and more flexible spray-coated technologies, 
but these are still in their infancy (Zweibel, 1999). 
Thin film technology involves thin layers of a photovoltaic material being deposited directly 
onto a substrate (glass, plastic or metal).  The technology is cheaper than its crystalline 
counterpart, but is less efficient in terms of electricity generation.  The production of thin film 
technology is fast and more efficient and longer lasting films are increasingly available.  An 
additional advantage of thin film technology is that the degree of opacity can be manipulated 
to allow a significant degree of transparency for daylight transmission (Razykov et al., 2011).  
Crystalline silicon technology involves either growing or casting ingots of silicon crystals 
which are then sliced into wafers.  Each wafer is termed a PV cell and is shaped and polished.  
Electrical contacts are deposited onto the cells so that they can be connected together.  Figure 
2-3 illustrates a single monocrystalline PV cell with wiring strips. 
 
Figure 2-3: PV monocrystalline cell 
The method of manufacture determines whether a homogenous crystalline framework is 
produced as a bar (monocrystalline) or whether the matrix consists of small crystals 
(polycrystalline) (Solar Cell Forum, 2016).  These methods of manufacture are standard 
across the world, with the largest manufacturing country being China.  There is a trade-off 
between cost (monocrystalline is more expensive than polycrystalline), and generating 
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efficiency (monocrystalline is 14-19% efficient while polycrystalline is only 11-15% 
efficient). 
 PV Panels 2.4.2
The PV panel is the substrate in which the individual solar cells are fixed.  Solar cells are 
arranged on a substrate - often by hand, and connected together with thin, (usually) tin-coated 
copper strips.  A slightly larger thin strip is positioned to collect the output from the cells and 
two connectors are positioned to allow panels to be connected together.  Once the layout is 
complete, the cells are sandwiched between sheets of glass and are annealed.  This produces a 
rigid, laminate panel which can be used as a building material.  Figure 2-4 shows PV cells 
laid out on the glass substrate prior to laminating the glass layers. 
 
Figure 2-4: PV cells laid out on glass laminate  
 PV system wiring 2.4.3
Wiring for PV panels has to be matched to the system being installed in terms of the DC 
voltage being generated, the length of the cable run and the acceptable percentage loss.  
Chapter 2: BIPV technology 
15 
 
Typically cables are heavy duty, flexible rubber-coated and vary in diameter from 1.5mm to 
400mm depending on the voltage generated (Energy Development Co-operative Ltd, 2013).  
Each PV panel has to be connected together and the configuration of this wiring determines 
the characteristics of the system.  There are three major considerations: the order in which the 
cells are connected; the specification of the wiring used; and the distance over which the 
wiring has to run before it is connected to the inverters. 
PV panels can be connected together in two main ways - in series or in parallel.  The choice 
depends on whether the installer desires either increased current or increased voltage.  In the 
case of parallel installations, each positive terminal is connected together and each negative 
terminal is connected together.  This configuration (shown in Figure 2-5) gives more current 
and allows more efficient inverters to be used.   
 
Figure 2-5: Parallel connection of PV panels (Save the polar, 2013) 
In the case of series connection, the positive terminal of one panel is connected to the 
negative terminal of the next panel and so on along the string of panels.  This configuration 
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(Figure 2-6) increases the voltage output from the system, but has the disadvantage that if one 
panel in the series or string fails then generation from the whole string is lost.   
 
Figure 2-6: Series connection of PV panels (Save the polar, 2013) 
Generally in BIPV systems, panels are connected in series as a string.  Each string of panels is 
connected to other strings in parallel and these parallel strings of panels are used to increase 
both the current and voltage generated by the system.  This configuration also reduces the risk 
of failure of the whole system from either shading or maintenance issues as each string 
generates electricity independently from the others.  Figure 2-7 illustrates how this 
arrangement of panels is configured.  This configuration of panels can give rise to bulky 
wiring runs, as each string has two sets of wires which have to be routed to the inverter (BRE 
et al., 2002). 
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Figure 2-7: Series and parallel connection of PV panels (Save the polar, 2013) 
Different wires have different resistance characteristics and this affects the efficiency of the 
system.  Larger diameter wires generally offer less resistance to the current and are considered 
more efficient.  Resistance is also affected by the material of construction of the wire and 
recent technical developments have made available lower resistance, smaller diameter wiring.  
When considering BIPV, there is usually a trade-off between the cost of the wiring and the 
space taken up by the wiring (BRE et al., 2002). 
The length of the wiring run from panels to inverters influences the resistance of the wiring 
and therefore the efficiency of the system.  The efficiency losses increase with the length of 
wiring runs and it is therefore better to keep wiring distances as short as possible (BRE et al., 
2002).  
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 PV system inverters 2.4.4
Inverters are used to convert DC current to AC current and so make the electricity generated 
from the cells compatible with mains voltage.  This compatibility allows the electricity 
generated by the PV panels to be joined to the mains electricity entering the building and used 
either within the building directly or else exported to the grid. 
The number and type of inverters used in an installation depends on the number of panels 
used, the wiring configuration of the panels and the output voltage.  String inverters are used 
to collect the outputs from several strings of panels (connected in series) whilst micro-
inverters are attached to each panel.  Both options have different costs and advantages.  String 
inverters are cheaper and easier to install, whilst micro-inverters provide greater efficiencies, 
but are more costly and can require the installation of sub-collectors (BRE et al., 2002).  
Figure 2-8 illustrates a bank of inverters and isolators for a small BIPV installation. 
 
Figure 2-8: Inverters and isolators 
 Cables 2.4.5
Conventional AC cabling is required from the inverters to the G59 cabinet (see 2.4.6).  These 
cables differ from the DC wiring as they carry electricity at higher voltage but lower current.  
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They are also typically larger in diameter than the DC wiring (BRE et al., 2002).  The cables 
are sized to minimise voltage drop and to contribute to overall system efficiencies.  Total 
system losses from electrical components can reach around 14% (BRE et al., 2002). 
 G59 cabinet and isolator 2.4.6
This part of the PV system takes the AC electricity from the inverter and allows it to be 
connected safely to the mains electricity entering the building.  It is a UK standard 
requirement that the PV system be connected to a G59 device which is sited in a cabinet just 
before the isolator switches (BRE et al. 2002).  The G59 is a mains protection relay and is 
programmed according to parameters fixed by the Distribution Network Operator (DNO).  If 
the PV output falls outside these parameters (in terms of voltage, frequency or current) circuit 
breakers operate to isolate the system from the grid.  Figure 2-9 shows an internal view of a 
typical G59 cabinet. 
 
Figure 2-9: Typical G59 cabinet (Sibert Instruments, 2016) 
This section has described the main components of a BIPV system with a view to giving 
background to the case studies in the dissertation.  The discussion has highlighted some of the 
design considerations required for each component and has explained how the components 
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are interconnected.  It is this inter-connectivity of the BIPV system that makes its 
incorporation into buildings a significant challenge.  
2.5 Diffusion of BIPV in the UK 
There are a number of UK policies which affect the adoption of BIPV, but three in particular 
are important to this research and require a brief introduction.  These policies are Feed-in 
Tariffs, local planning requirements and building certification schemes.  Whilst not 
exhaustive, these policies provide an important context for the case studies presented later 
(Chapters 6, 7 & 8). 
 Feed in Tariff (FiT) 2.5.1
At the time of writing, all electricity generated in the UK by a PV system qualifies for a Feed 
in Tariff (FiT) payment.  All generated electricity is metered and a generation tariff is payable 
for every kilowatt hour of electricity generated.  In addition, if electricity is exported to the 
grid, an export tariff is payable for every kilowatt of electricity exported.  Under current 
policy, Feed in Tariff is paid for a period of 20 years and is index linked to RPI. 
 Planning requirements  2.5.2
At the time of writing individual UK council planning requirements vary considerably.  The 
use of renewable energy within buildings is often a condition of planning, as is the 
development of a sustainability strategy which sets out the way in which a building 
contributes to the UK Government’s low carbon agenda.  For example, between 2003 and 
2015 Camden Borough Council stipulated that all new non-residential developments must 
generate at least 10% of their energy requirements from on-site renewable energy equipment 
(Merton Council, 2015) and this policy directly affected one of the case studies.  This policy 
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has now been superseded by the new energy requirements in Part L2a Building Regulations 
2013 - conservation of fuel and power in new buildings (HM Government 2006).  Building 
Regulations Part L2a came into effect in the UK in 2014 and is designed to ensure that new 
non-domestic buildings deliver a 9% carbon dioxide saving and that this is demonstrated in 
the Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) for the building. 
 Building Certification Schemes 2.5.3
Local planning policy in the UK has increasingly required energy efficiency to be considered  
in new builds and this has focussed attention on the specification of renewable technologies 
and in particular BIPV.  There has been a growing requirement from clients for building 
certification (e.g. LEED and BREEAM) and from the Government for energy performance 
certificates (EPCs), which has increased the specification of BIPV on buildings.  Two of these 
certification schemes are of particular relevance to this dissertation and this discussion gives 
background information to support the case studies. 
BREEAM (Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Methodology) is a 
method of assessing and certifying the sustainability of buildings by using a rating system to 
certify new buildings.  Certification grades are Outstanding, Excellent, Very Good, Good and 
Pass.  The scheme uses a system of credits in ten areas of sustainability and the use of 
sustainable technology is included within two of these areas.  All three case studies were 
BREEAM Excellent buildings (BRE). 
Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) are required for non-domestic buildings constructed 
after 2008 (DCLG).  Buildings are rated for their energy efficiency on a scale from “A” to 
“G”.  Renewable technologies make a contribution to the energy efficiency of a building and 
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the use of BIPV on the case studies used was a contributing factor to the buildings achieving 
the higher energy performance certification levels of “A” or “B”.    
 BIPV systems in UK buildings 2.5.4
BIPV technology has been commercially available in the UK since the 1990s and has been 
increasingly used in flagship commercial builds.  The technology is expensive but provides a 
very visible demonstration of green credentials.  BIPV projects in the UK are custom 
designed for each application - there are no “off the peg” solutions. 
Exemplar BIPV projects in the UK have included: 
 Heron Tower, London, a 46 storey building with 4000m2 of PV modules integrated 
into the façade, which generate 92,000kWh of electricity annually.  The panels meet 
2.5% of the building’s electricity demand.  
 Blackfriars Station, London where BIPV roof panels were installed as part of the 
station refurbishment.  The 1.1 MW system spans the River Thames and is expected to 
generate 900,000kWh per year, which is 50% of the station’s electricity requirements. 
 Kings Cross Railway station, London where 1,392 laminate roof panels covering 
2,300 m
2
 of have been installed to generate 175,000kWh electricity annually 
2.6 Research into the adoption of BIPV 
In view of the generic challenges posed by BIPV and the particular issues regarding adoption 
discussed above, it is somewhat surprising to find that there has been little research into the 
process of adoption for BIPV.  Current literature on BIPV focuses on three main areas: 
technical challenges of the technology, ways to improve its market diffusion and industry 
advice to professionals on BIPV installation.   
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Research into the technical challenges of the technology tends to focus on the formal features 
of the technology and its anticipated impact on energy use.  Much research is highly 
technical, concentrating on scientific advances and improvements to the system.  At a less 
technological and more performance-based level, issues studied include system performance 
(Sozer & Elnimeiri, 2007), reliability (Laird, 2009) and cost (El Chaar et al., 2011).  What this 
research has in common is the shared assumption that once the product is technically sound 
and economically viable, adoption will surely follow. 
Alternative and perhaps more balanced views of the adoption of BIPV consider ways to 
improve market diffusion by identifying barriers and enablers for the adoption of BIPV.  
Barriers to adoption have both technical and non-technical elements.  Research into non-
technical barriers is generally concerned with sustainable technology as a whole, rather than 
BIPV as a particular technology.  Barriers have been found to include issues of sustainable 
policy, regulation and economic incentives (Tsoutsos & Stamboulis, 2005), the need for 
project team integration and supply chain integration for sustainable construction (Mollaoglu-
Korkmaz, S., Swarup, L., and Riley, D., 2013; Yang & Zou, 2015) and the need for early 
involvement of specialist engineers in the design process (Specialist Engineering Alliance, 
2009).  Whilst these issues are important, research into non-technical barriers for adoption 
tends to be very general and ignore the differences across technologies and buildings.  
Technical barriers for the adoption of BIPV have been found to include issues such as: 
structural compliance; system design; electrical safety; and calibration (Yang, R., 2015).  
These technical barriers to adoption indicate that the issues of integrating BIPV into a 
building are complex and affect all aspects of the construction process.  However, research 
does not extend to understanding the project and process difficulties that arise when BIPV is 
incorporated within a building. 
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Literature from the photovoltaic industry (for example BRE, National Solar Centre, CIBSE, 
solar panel suppliers) includes guides to size and design systems, advice on building 
certification and Feed in Tariffs, and recommendations for project teams (BRE et al., 2002).  
These guides tend to be of a prescriptive nature, setting out guidelines for best practice 
without necessarily appreciating the constraints of construction projects and the practicality of 
the guidance.  Curiously these industry guidance notes assume an idealised world, where 
communication between contractors is clear, where there is continuity of personnel and where 
system design parameters are well defined.  As the following case studies will show (Chapters 
6, 7 & 8) this is not necessarily the reality of construction projects. 
Research into the adoption of BIPV focusses on the technical and commercial considerations 
of the technology, without looking at the practical issues surrounding its incorporation into a 
building.  The interrelationships between the technology, the physical building and the project 
team interactions around these are a critical issue in the adoption of BIPV, and this mutual 
articulation is under-represented in the literature and typically over-simplified.  What is 
missing from research currently is an understanding of how the specification of BIPV in a 
project poses considerable challenges both for the project team and for its integration into the 
building.  In particular, this gap invites research into how decision-making evolves as 
successive problems and solutions unfold during the adoption of complex, integrated 
technologies.  
2.7 Challenges of BIPV adoption 
The incorporation of BIPV into a new building poses four technical challenges: the unique 
configuration of the technology for each building; the frequent changes made to the 
technology; the integration of the technology within the building; and the fit with standard 
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procedures and processes.  A discussion of each of these challenges establishes the basis for 
an understanding of the issues posed by the technology and for the complexity of the case 
study analyses presented later. 
From the descriptions earlier in the chapter, it is clear that BIPV comprises many components, 
each of which brings its own characteristics and challenges.  What is less immediately 
obvious, but presents one of the major challenges for the project team, is that the BIPV 
system is uniquely configured for each building.  The decision to include BIPV may be 
relatively lightly taken, but the design of the technical elements is complex. 
A further challenge of BIPV is that the technology changes rapidly.  Initially available PV cell 
technology can be superseded by improvements in design and efficiency over the course of a 
project.  Changes to inverter design can involve smaller, more efficient units, often fewer in 
number, requiring different connection strategies.  Wiring and cabling developments can 
mean that cables become thinner and connectors differently configured.  These rapid 
developments have two implications.  First, construction projects take years to design and 
often longer to build.  The BIPV design proposed at the start of the project is likely to include 
technology that is outdated and perhaps more expensive than the technology that is available 
at the installation stage.  Secondly, changes to safety standards and procedures are fast 
changing and can themselves impose changes to the BIPV system being designed. 
The third and arguably the greatest challenge for the construction industry is that the BIPV 
system has to be integrated within the building.  As an integrated technology, BIPV has to be 
designed to fit in with the aesthetic considerations of the building, be strong enough to form 
part of the building structure and be functional enough to perform the duty of a window, roof 
or louvre.  As well as these requirements for a flexible but functional system, all the elements 
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of the technology have to be accommodated within the building design.  Panels have to be 
mounted within the façade and the wiring has to be integrated within the structure of the 
building so that it does not detract from the aesthetics or functionality of the design.  The 
control system has to connect to the building's main electrical design.  At the same time, the 
size of the wiring and the length of wiring runs have to be optimised to reduce system losses, 
and be invisible.  Inverters and G59 cabinets have to be accommodated within the building, 
must be sized to minimise losses and need to be connected into the main electrical systems of 
the building.  All of these considerations make the integration of a BIPV system into a 
building a complex process which is intertwined with the design of the building itself.  
Finally, the design, installation and commissioning of the BIPV system has to fit within 
complex and well established project procedures and practices.  For example, as the case 
studies which follow indicate, these procedures and practices are not necessarily designed to 
adapt to new technologies and the inclusion of BIPV might lead to problems and tensions 
over the course of a project.   
In summary, the adoption of BIPV is complicated by its many inter-related components, the 
need to incorporate an assemblage of technically diverse components into a building (which is 
a complex assemblage in itself) and the pre-existing procedures and processes which are used 
in construction projects.  These challenges invite research to understand what actually 
happens when BIPV is specified on a building and thus give greater understanding of the 
process of adoption.  The next chapter reviews literature which deals both with the adoption 
of technology and also specifically with the adoption of innovation in construction projects. 
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 The Adoption of Innovative Technologies in Buildings Chapter 3:
This research is concerned with the adoption of sustainable technology in buildings.  Chapter 
1 established the background and importance of this topic in terms of the climate change 
agenda and UK policy.  The UK Energy White Paper (2007), Climate Change Act (2008), and 
Energy Bill (1998) have had the effect of raising the profile of the energy performance of 
buildings and have influenced the development of planning regulations and building 
certification schemes.  Two particular schemes have been developed from these policies to 
increase the adoption of sustainable technologies.  Firstly the EU Energy Policy Buildings 
Directive (2010) requires all new buildings to display an energy performance certificate 
(EPC) which gives an assessment of the building’s energy efficiency.  Second the voluntary 
BREEAM certification scheme (BRE, 2015) is adopted by building owners as a way of 
demonstrating their commitment to sustainability and of adding value to the property.  Both 
certification schemes are aimed at increasing the adoption of sustainable technologies in 
buildings but there is increasing research which suggests that while certification can provide a 
means of recognition and increased reputational value for buildings, their effect on the 
adoption of sustainable technology in buildings varies.  Schweber and Haraglu (2014) used a 
comparative case study of eight building projects to identify variations in the effect of 
BREEAM on design decisions within projects and the impact of these decisions on 
sustainable construction.  The authors found that the level of adoption of sustainable solutions 
depended more on the project actors’ individual engagement with sustainability issues, rather 
than knowledge of individual technologies or of the BREEAM method.  This gap between 
intent and effect of policies and certification tools has been observed at many levels.  In a 
review of the composition and nature of sustainable development indicators Russell and 
Thomson (2009) conducted a review of government documents, comparing the vision of a 
Chapter 3: The adoption of innovative technologies 
28 
 
sustainability strategy for Scotland with the operationalisation of that policy in terms of 
sustainability indicators.  They found that there was significant misalignment between the 
objectives of sustainability policy strategy and the effect of sustainability indicators used to 
achieve these objectives.  Although neither of the research above was aimed specifically at 
matching sustainable building certification to the adoption of sustainable technology, both 
indicate that the way that strategy and schemes are operationalised does not necessarily 
achieve the desired outcome of increased adoption of sustainable technology. 
Much literature on innovation and its diffusion assumes that adoption will follow once the 
technology is commercialised and economic conditions are met.  This assumption is 
particularly striking in the literature of the performance gap which explores the difference 
between the “boiler plate” design potential of technology and its installed performance (this 
difference in performance is often called the “performance gap”).  This literature starts from 
the assumption that technology and buildings should perform the way that they are modelled 
or designed.  Performance gap studies (Fedoruk et al., 2015; Zgajewski, 2015) show that 
despite the technology being readily available, technological innovations for sustainable 
energy in buildings consistently fail to deliver on their promise of improved efficiency and 
energy savings.  This signals the need to gain a better understanding of the processes which 
occur during the adoption of technology and the resulting adaptations which might affect the 
performance of the technology and the building.   
Much of the research concerned with innovation adoption focusses on developing models 
which are held to be a universal description of the adoption or innovation process, and on 
specifying best practice (Tidd, 2001).  The question which the models generally address is: 
can the adoption of innovation be modelled, predicted or improved?  These models range 
from simple linear S-curve models (Ryan & Gross, 1943; Rogers, 1976) to more complex 
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models which involve iterations and parallel working, to models of integrated innovation and 
adotpion (Mensch et al., 1980; Rothwell, 1994).  Of their time, these models gave ground-
breaking insights into the field of innovation adoption, but generally addressed simple product 
innovation which proceeded in a linear manner through simplified stages of market need, 
development, manufacturing and sales.  These simple block models, albeit with the later 
addition of iterative feedback loops (Rothwell, 1994; Aranda-Mena et al., 2008) assume 
idealised communication networks, processes and relationships, and treat these as general, 
universal stages which apply to all innovation adoption.  In his latest retrospective on 
diffusion work, Rogers himself stressed the emerging importance of networks and the effects 
of sociological interactions (Rogers, 2004) and in this way signalled the need to understand 
what is happening in respect of the innovation and its local context.  
In research adoption of innovation is often considered from two opposite points of view: from 
the view of the innovation or from the point of view of the user or adopter of the innovation.  
The former point of view looks at the technology, models its development and diffusion, 
examines the barriers and enablers to make adoption occur or explores how improvements 
and developments of the technology encourage adoption (Pagliaro et al. 2010; de Wilde 
2014).  Research from the other view examines innovation from the user end and seeks to 
understand why the user adopts the innovation, the impact the innovation has on the user (its 
characteristics) and how the user can adapt the innovation to suit their required purpose 
(Menezes et al., 2012; Fedoruk et al., 2015).  Whilst both these viewpoints of the adoption of 
innovation are important, it is a third view of adoption of innovation which is of particular 
relevance to this research and moves away from the generic towards a more specific 
understanding of the adoption of technology.  The process view of innovation seeks to 
understand the processes of adaptation which occur as an innovation is adopted (Van de Ven 
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et al., 1989).  This exploration of the intermediate processes which occur as an innovation is 
adopted is important in the context of construction projects where an innovation is specified 
on a project and must then be incorporated into a building before being handed over to the 
user or client.   
This literature review starts by exploring research into technical approaches to innovation 
adoption and the performance gap and establishes the need to understand more than just the 
technological development of the innovation.  Using literature which shows the effect of the 
adoption of innovation on its local context, the review then establishes a link with literature 
on the process of innovation.  By outlining six themes of innovation adoption within process 
innovation research, the review then goes on to develop connections with literature on the 
adoption of innovation in construction projects.  The review concludes by establishing the 
importance of developing a socio-technical understanding of understanding the project and 
process difficulties that arise when new technology is incorporated within a building.  This 
review establishes the paucity of research on the process of innovation adoption and proposes 
empirical research to explore the process of incorporating innovative technologies into 
building projects.  
3.1 Technical approaches to the adoption of innovation 
Although seemingly technology and context specific (with a focus on energy and buildings), 
the concept of the performance gap (the gap between the predicted performance of a 
technology as designed and the performance in use) can be used to explore issues within the 
adoption process.  Research into the performance gap can be divided into three categories: 
work on the modelling of energy performance (de Wilde, 2014; Menezes et al., 2012), work 
on building occupants and the effect of their behaviour on energy performance in use 
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(Sunikka-Blank & Galvin, 2012; Rohracher & Ornetzeder, 2002) and a third small but 
growing literature on the role of building delivery in the ‘gap’ (Dainty et al., 2013; Gorse et 
al., 2012).  It is this third category of research which gives insights into the intermediate 
process of innovation adoption outlined above.  
Literature which addresses the role of building delivery in the performance gap points to 
issues within the adoption process which should be considered.  Gorse et al. (2012) built on 
research which established the evidence of performance gaps in wall cavity insulation (Lowe 
et al., 2007), to document and explain possible reasons for this gap.  A post-occupancy survey 
of twenty five houses compared designed thermal performance figures with measured heat 
loss data, and used interviews and technical reports to identify themes which might explain 
the differences.  The conclusions indicated that much of the measured performance gap 
stemmed from poor understanding by the construction team and mistakes in installation which 
were not picked up during the commissioning process.  The other striking conclusion of 
Gorse et al.’s research was that very few buildings are routinely checked for performance and 
compliance with design figures.  Although a small survey, it points to issues in adoption 
which are more than just technology related and this finding is supported by other researchers.  
Dainty et al. (2013) conducted a largely review-based study of contextual factors which affect 
performance of low carbon technologies in housing and identified similar issues in the 
performance gap and the need for performance evaluation.  In addition they developed a 
model for a collaborative approach between all parties in the supply chain to deliver good 
building performance.  Fedoruk et al. (2015) studied the construction of a sustainable 
university building and its performance testing and concluded that attention should be 
focussed on measuring and publicising performance characteristics as a means of improving 
adoption.   
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What these studies have in common is that they recognise that the adoption of new 
technology is not a simple process which is concerned with improvements to technology. 
Instead the research draws attention to more processual elements of innovation adoption 
which occur during construction projects and show that these may account for issues of 
performance gap.   
 How context of adoption influences the technology 3.1.1
The performance gap literature discussed above gives a view that technology is influenced by 
its context during the adoption process – for example that the thermal performance of cavity 
walls is influenced by the quality of workmanship during construction (Gorse et al., 2012), or 
that project processes of supply chain management and performance testing influence the 
performance of low carbon technologies (Dainty et al., 2013).  This view signals a departure 
from empirical modelling of innovation and its adoption which assumes that the innovation 
once “market ready” remains relatively stable during adoption.  Empirical modelling of 
adoption is usually limited to a single innovation adopted within a specific, simplified market 
or sector - such as integration of “Just-in-Time” management within the car industry 
(Rothwell, 1994) or the adoption of BIM within construction contracts (Aranda-Mena et al., 
2008).  Such research does not address the way that the innovation changes through the 
adoption process; rather it assumes that innovation of a product is an iterative process which 
ends prior to adoption.  In other words, once the technical properties of the technology are 
established, the main challenge is the market (Rogers et al., 2001).  Many innovative 
technologies are not clearly bounded, stable products, but are complex in nature, requiring 
integration into their local context.  In construction projects this local context is both the 
material building which accommodates the innovative technology and the social element of 
project team processes which are used to deliver the building with the new technology 
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incorporated).  As such, product development extends well into the implementation phase and 
affects both the technology (the BIPV) and the context into which it is introduced (the 
building and the project processes).  It is this interplay of accommodations and development 
which needs to be explored. 
 How the adoption of technology influences its local context 3.1.2
The idea that innovation can shape its local context is developed in literature which explores 
the effect of innovation on its local context.  This understanding adoption of innovation gives 
a richer, less technological understanding of some of the issues of the adoption process.  The 
view that innovation has different characteristics which have different effects on its local 
context was developed by Nelson and Winter (1977) and developed further by Tushman and 
Anderson (1986) who used data from the mini-computer, cement and airline industries to 
examine patterns of technological change.  They proposed that innovation could be assigned 
either competence enhancing properties (incremental innovation) or competence destroying 
properties (radical innovation) to innovations, and this pointed to differences in how the local 
context responded to the innovation.  The typification of innovation by its effect was 
developed further by Abernathy and Clark (1985), who used examples from the US 
automotive industry to develop the concept of incremental change as a more organic and 
enhancing innovation model, which was occasionally disrupted by radical innovation (often 
from sources external to the firm).  These radical innovations had the potential to endanger 
existing business models and allow new entrants to the field.  The more benign incremental 
innovations continued profitably for existing players whilst radical innovation heralded 
change and threats to the status quo.  It is this understanding that innovation can affect and 
change its local context which indicates that the adoption of innovation is a complex process. 
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Henderson and Clark (1990) questioned the universality of the radical and incremental 
categorisations, by looking at how individual firms accommodated technological innovations 
within existing products, and developed a more nuanced understanding of the effects of the 
innovation on its local context.  Their research in 1990 developed a distinction between four 
types of innovation: architectural; modular; incremental; and radical, each of which had a 
particular effect on the firm into which it was introduced.  In simple terms, incremental 
innovation could be thought of as renovation or simple improvements to core components 
which have no effect on the local context.  Modular innovation could be described as 
replacement of part of a technology with new components which fit into the existing system 
without needing excessive changes.  Architectural innovations need to be accommodated by 
changes to existing technical and organisational processes, whilst radical innovations signal a 
major departure from the status quo.   
When translated into the context of a construction project the implications that technological 
innovation has different characteristics which shape its local context become significant.  
Construction projects involve temporary teams made up of many different firms, using 
different processes and involve millions of components and technologies.  The challenges of 
construction projects and their management in terms of adoption of innovation are discussed 
in section 3.3.1, but it is clear that the adoption of new technology into building projects will 
also have effects on the management of the project and on the constitution of the building 
itself.  It shows that the process of adoption is more than a simple stage of innovation 
diffusion and underlines the dynamic nature of the process of adoption as both the innovation 
and its local context are affected.   
This review of literature has so far shown that the process of adoption of innovation is more 
complex than stage models would suggest.  Performance gap literature has established the 
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relevance of considering adoption from a process viewpoint and the link has been made 
between the complexity of integrated technological innovation and the ongoing process of 
accommodation as the technology is incorporated.  The dynamic nature of innovation 
adoption has been demonstrated by literature which shows the effect of innovation on its local 
context and vice versa.  The section has demonstrated that technical performance and the 
characteristics of the technology are not sufficient to understand the adoption of integrated 
technologies, and that a more processual understanding of the process of adoption is needed. 
Pettigrew (1985) and Van de Venn (1986) developed a processual view of management and 
innovation which can be used to consider the adoption of technology.   
3.2 Processual view of innovation adoption  
The processual view of innovation builds on an approach to the management of strategy and 
organisations. Processual views of innovation explore how and why innovations develop over 
time from concept to implementation, and seek to understand how an innovation (either 
technical or processual) comes into use.  Process research was rooted in the development of 
organisation change theory and practice (Pettigrew, 1985; 1990), where longitudinal studies 
into organisational change management were conducted and a process approach was used to 
draw out theories of change management to help business managers understand and 
implement change.  By applying the approach researchers use detailed empirical study of the 
actors involved in the change and the study the sequence of events which occur over the 
length of the change project.  Pettigrew (1985) put forward the idea that strategic management 
rarely follows the ideal of rational decision making and planned change.  The epistemological 
approach of process research has been used to study innovation by exploring the development 
of innovative businesses (Van de Ven, 1986; Poole, et al., 2000).  Process innovation research 
is directed towards assisting project managers to understand the emergence and development 
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processes of innovation and to see that innovation comes about through “complex and 
meandering processes” (Sminia, 2009. p.98).  This processual view of innovation can be seen 
to inform an understanding of the adoption of an integrated technology into a construction 
project. 
Process research has developed three main ways of looking at “process”: as a logic where a 
particular outcome is defined by different variables; as a series of steps which can be 
modelled as a series of cause and effect variables; and as a pattern of developmental events 
which unfold as a change occurs (Poole et al. 2000),  This third strand of process research 
recognises that the phenomenon being studied changes through the innovation period and uses 
a longitudinal study approach to explore behavioural response to events rather than the 
research object itself (Pettigrew 1990).  Longitudinal, qualitative research into empirical case 
studies is used to understand the critical events which occur and the causal patterns which 
take place in the development and implementation of new ideas (Pettigrew, 1985;  Van de 
Ven et al., 2008).  Seeking to help managers of innovation to manage the innovation process, 
these studies propose a process road map of the innovation journey.  In particular the 
Minnesota innovation research project (MIRP) (Van de Ven & Poole 1990) used longitudinal 
studies of innovation to explain how and why innovations develop over time.  These 
empirical cases were used to observe change, code and analyse event data to identify process 
patterns which could explain the observed innovation processes (Van de Ven & Poole 1990).  
Van de Ven et al.’s process model (2008) was developed from studies of specific innovations 
and identifies three common phases within the innovation process: the initiation period; the 
development period; and the implementation/termination period.  It is the last of these 
elements which is directly relevant to the study of adoption of innovation.  In developing a 
process view of the adoption or implementation of innovation, Van de Ven et al (2008) 
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identify several key characteristics of the implementation/termination period which include: 
setbacks occurring frequently; shifting innovation performance criteria; fluid participation of 
innovation personnel; top management involvement and roles; the frequent altering of 
relationships; and the creation of a community and infrastructure.  Generally research into 
process innovation focusses on developing skills for managers when implementing 
innovations within organisations and on how to manage these problems effectively, but does 
not explore the effects of the process of innovation on the team, the business into which it is 
introduced or the innovation itself.  Although the focus of process innovation research on the 
managerial and social aspects of innovation excludes consideration of the effect of the process 
of adoption on the technology, it does suggest that these themes will have an impact on the 
development of the innovation itself and they will be revisited in section 3.3 with a particular 
focus on construction research.   
A review of literature on the innovation process by Garud (2013) concluded that innovation is 
“not just the emergence of a new idea or a final product, but the entire process that takes an 
idea from inception to implementation” (Garud, 2013, p.803).  He also observed that 
“innovation processes unfold not just within firms, but also across multi-party networks, and 
within communities” (Garud, 2013. p.803).  This particularly resonates with the context of 
construction projects which have just such complex interdependencies (section 3.3.1).  This 
draws attention to the complexity of innovation adoption and in terms of the adoption of 
integrated technologies like BIPV, provides a point of departure for further empirical research 
of specific innovations to understand more about what happens when an innovation is 
adopted. 
Process innovation research gives a view of common patterns which occur in the adoption of 
change in strategic management.  These patterns were described as: leadership; changing 
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relationships; infrastructure; learning; and change and adaptions (Pettigrew 1985).  Van de 
Ven et al.’s (1989) later research into the process of innovation refined these descriptions into 
six themes of the implementation/termination period and named the themes as: setbacks 
occurring frequently; shifting innovation performance criteria; fluid participation of 
innovation personnel; top management involvement and roles; frequently alteration of 
relationships; and the creation of a community and infrastructure.  Section 3.3 will show how 
these themes point to issues which are also identified in construction management literature 
and the section highlights some common challenges in the adoption of innovation.   
Process innovation research (Van de Ven et al., 1989; Pettigrew, 1990) compares empirical, 
longitudinal case studies to show common patterns emerging between the cases and to 
demonstrate the complex landscape of innovation adoption.  This comparison of cases allows 
researchers to develop managerial or organisational understandings of the process of 
innovation.  This element of comparison is central to exploring common elements of the non-
linear, but also non-random process of innovation and will be used in the research design to 
reflect on the process of adoption of BIPV in buildings. 
3.3 Six processual themes of innovation adoption in the context of construction 
projects 
The six themes of the implementation/termination period which were identified by Van de 
Ven et al (2008) during the Minnesota Innovation Research Project (MIRP) (setbacks 
occurring frequently; shifting innovation performance criteria; fluid participation of 
innovation personnel; top management involvement and roles; frequently alteration of 
relationships; and the creation of a community and infrastructure) resonate with many 
challenges already identified within a range of construction management literatures.  The 
Chapter 3: The adoption of innovative technologies 
39 
 
following section place the contribution of process innovation research into the context of that 
literature. 
An important focus of innovation research within construction is concerned with 
understanding the context within which construction projects are carried out (Pavitt, 1984; 
Malerba, 2002).  The setbacks which occur frequently in construction projects occur during 
the processes of project management, change management and decision making (Salter and 
Gann, 2000; Cooke-Davis, 2002; Chinowsky et al., 2008; Bakht & El-Diraby, 2015).  These 
management themes have their own literatures and are discussed in section 3.3.2.  Shifting 
performance criteria are evidenced throughout construction projects (Gorse et al., 2012; 
Dainty et al., 2013), where new requirements are brought into projects at different points in 
the project by different actors. For example, the project manager may be concerned with 
achieving the lowest price on a contract at one point, but may then focus on making up project 
time at another.  These shifts in focus and attention of the project team actors have been 
shown to affect the performance of innovation and technology and are discussed in the section 
3.3.3.  The observations of process innovation research on the fluid participation of 
innovation personnel resonate particularly with the temporary and evolving nature of project 
teams (Sexton & Barrett, 2003; Harty, 2008a) which is discussed in section 3.3.1.  Much 
construction management research focusses on the effective management of project teams 
(Salter and Gann, 2000; Bourne, 2001; Cooke-Davis, 2002) and section 3.3.4 discusses the 
links between this and the observations in process innovation.  Process innovation research 
makes much of the role of the leader and indeed one of its major concerns is to equip 
managers with tools to lead effectively.  Construction management research also has a focus 
on leadership (Huber, 1991; Cohen & Levinthal, 2012) and one strand of this literature is 
particularly concerned with capabilities of firms to lead innovation and the role of the 
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innovation champion (Nam and Tatum, 1997; Gambatese and Hollowell, 2011).  This 
literature is discussed in section 3.3.5.  The final characteristic identified by process 
innovation research is that of the creation of an infrastructure surrounding the innovation.  
Each construction project has a unique infrastructure which includes clients, contractors, 
subcontractors and users.  The complex inter-organisational nature of the project team and the 
supply chain and its impact on innovation management has been recognised with construction 
literature (Dubois and Gadde, 2010; Bresnen & Marshall, 2000; Briscoe et al., 2001; Briscoe 
& Dainty, 2005) and this relationship is expanded in section 3.3.6.   
Translated into construction management literature on innovation, the common themes of 
process innovation in the implementation/termination period have resonance with a range of 
construction innovation literatures in terms of the management of projects, change and 
decision making; the shifting of performance criteria of within projects; the temporary and 
evolving nature of project teams; leadership of innovation; and managing the inter-
organisational relationships within the project - particularly with respect to the supply chain.  
The following section looks at the nature of construction projects and then reviews literatures 
which reflect the themes above within the context of construction, with a view to exploring 
both the processual and material elements of innovation adoption.  
 The nature of construction projects and implications for adoption of innovation 3.3.1
Construction projects have the distinctive characteristic of being both fragmented and 
systemic.  Their systemic nature comes from the number and interdependence of firms and 
actors involved in project procurement, ranging from architects, main contractors, and 
specialist consultants, to suppliers, designers and subcontractors.  The fragmented nature of 
construction is a result of the highly specialised and diverse nature of the projects it delivers.  
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Rather than being a stable, cohesive unit, construction projects involve temporary, multi-
disciplinary, multi-firm projects teams, with different firms within a project having different 
priorities and sensitivities (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba, 2002).  Membership of the project team 
changes during the course of a construction project, with actors joining and leaving the team 
at different stages.  For example, it is normal for the main contractor’s firm to change its 
representative during different stages of the project, so the project manager at concept design 
is likely to be a different project manager to the one at detail design and different again during 
mobilisation and construction (JCT, 2011).  The supply chain of a construction project has a 
complicated series of relationships and obligations which are typically bound through 
complex contractual arrangements (Sinclair, 2012).  Firms within the supply chain serve the 
main contractor or supplier, but also have their own ways of workings and their own alliances 
and interests.  Within the formal project arrangements and interdependencies, there are 
informal systems, relationships and procedures which further fragment the project team.   
These characteristics, coupled with both formal and informal systems, relationships and 
procedures, make the process of adoption of innovation in construction complicated.  Winch 
(2003) contested the conventional view that the construction industry lags behind other 
industries (in this case the motor industry) in innovation adoption.  He asserted that the 
construction sector does adopt innovation but that the complicated supply chain dynamics 
mask the adoption of innovation.  A micro-level exploration of the adoption of innovation 
within a building project would test this assertion.   
In an attempt to understand better the adoption process within construction projects, and in 
particular to do this with regard to more integrated innovations, Slaughter (1998) examined 
the impact of innovations which are integrated in character.  Building on the concepts of 
incremental, radical, modular and architectural innovation (Nelson & Winter, 1977; Tushman 
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& Anderson, 1986; Henderson & Clark, 1990), Slaughter proposed that innovations could be 
differentiated by their degree of change from current practice and their links to other parts of 
the building assemblage.  Slaughter distinguished between the discrete types of innovation 
outlined by Henderson and Clark, and those which have system characteristics and which 
require timing of commitment, coordination among the project team, special resources, and a 
high level of supervisory activity.  Slaughter then used her largely synthesised framework, 
which categorised system innovation within the construction industry, to simulate and assess 
the impact of innovation within a project and then to suggest strategies to increase the 
efficiency of innovation adoption (2000).  Although this later predictive work did not address 
empirical details of the effects of innovation in depth, her work contributed to the 
understanding that the complex nature of project work complicates innovation adoption.  
Having established the characteristics of construction projects and the impact that these 
characteristics have on innovation adoption, the next section of this review examines 
literature which links some of the complexities of adoption across the construction project 
with the themes which emerge from the processual approach to innovation described in 
section 2.2.   
 The management of projects, change and decisions 3.3.2
This section considers the management of projects, change and decision making, in terms of 
project practices, processes and procedures. Construction teams do not operate in a vacuum; 
they are composed of multi-disciplinary, multi-firm team members who are primarily 
accountable to a parent firm, but who also have strong project allegiances and responsibilities.  
This duality of responsibility makes the adoption of innovation potentially problematic, as 
project team members may not be free to adopt innovative technologies, procedures or 
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processes unless these are in line with their firms’ policies and procedures.  Salter and Gann 
(2000) explored factors which inhibited innovation and its adoption in construction projects.  
In an interview-based comparison of project based firms, they identified potential mismatches 
in business and project processes which inhibited innovation adoption and learning across the 
organisation.  These differences signalled a disparity between business processes which 
privilege standardisation of systems and project based goals of flexibility and adaptability.  In 
the context of the adoption of BIPV, this would indicate that there is a tension for the project 
team between existing project processes and the adoption of new procedures or procedures 
which might simplify adoption.  
It is important to recognise that a building is not a fixed, static object into which an innovation 
has to fit; instead it is a complex assemblage of systems which must be managed and 
coordinated by the project team.  Façade systems, lighting systems, heating and ventilation 
equipment, etc. all have to be designed, procured and installed with reference to each other, 
and there are established project processes to manage these.  
Construction projects are governed by standard procedures and practices, both in terms of the 
stages at which project team members engage with the project and the procedures that are 
used to manage the project (JCT, 2011).  The project specific nature of construction and the 
existence of complex procurement processes mean that contracts and their management are an 
important element of innovation and adoption.  There have been consistent calls for the 
development of clear contracts with more collaborative approaches and clearly understood 
project requirements, rights and obligations, together with early involvement of the whole 
construction team (Bourne, 2001).  Questions that these issues raise are about how contracts 
are drawn up when integrated technologies are used; how change orders are handled; and 
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what this means for the project in terms of adoption of innovation.  The discussion which 
follows looks at research which addresses these questions.  
Ideals of project management include timely work package definition and tender, increased 
collaboration and continuity, and a fixed project schedule (Cooke-Davis, 2002).  This has 
been followed by attempts to understand better the impact of construction processes on 
adoption of innovation and the commitment of resources needed to assist this (Slaughter, 
2010a; Slaughter, 2010b).  In particular Slaughter (2010a) noted that attention should be paid 
at the initiation of the project to the implications of innovation on the project supply chain and 
that integrated technologies need to be taken into account very early on in the development of 
the project.  Gruneberg et al. (2007) suggested that performance-based contracting (PBC) 
could be used to ensure that innovative technologies were procured and installed in a way that 
delivered the intended benefits of the innovation.  Whilst seeming to represent good practice, 
this early involvement of the supply chain, and timely consideration of the implications of 
innovative technology within a project, appears to be in tension with the current 
predetermined and habitual project management processes and procedures. 
 
Change Management 
A further example of tension between standard project management practice and the adoption 
of innovation is in the context of project change management.  Change orders in construction 
projects are used to control deviations from the detail design of a project.  They are generally 
raised to amend design or installation details and often involve re-work, wastage and cost.  
Project managers try to minimise their use, unless responsibility for the changes and payment 
is negotiated (Love and Li, 2000; Sun and Meng, 2009).  Shipton et al. (2014) explored the 
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effect of this resistance to change orders and noted that concerns about the following of 
procedure and the minimisation of change took precedence over acceptance that change might 
be required in order to improve the functionality of the building.  Innovation adoption in 
construction projects is likely to result in change which will have substantial knock-on effects.  
In simple contexts, change is bounded in the firm within which it is adopted and repercussions 
outside the firm are small.  Within the more complex context of construction, there are a 
series of loose and tight couplings which mean that predicting the knock-on effects of even 
small changes is unpredictable and often unexpected (Dubois & Gadde, 2010; Harty, 2008).  
This “domino effect” of change implies that innovation does not stop at specification, but 
continues, often in unplanned directions during adoption.  The idea that adoption is a process 
which takes place during implementation can be found in Clegg and Kreiner’s (2013) study of 
construction failure.  Their research analyses an investigation into the failure of concrete 
beams and highlights the way in which building outcomes are shaped by a multiplicity of 
“little things” (Clegg & Kreiner 2013, p263).  Their focus on the micro-level occurrences 
which shape the adoption of a technical artefact (object) resonates with the idea that micro-
level explorations of the accommodation of building project teams and building designs to the 
demands of new innovations will inform our understanding of the dynamics of innovation 
adoption. 
Decision making 
The process innovation view of this aspect of innovation recognises that many changes occur 
during the course of the implementation of an innovation and that the management of 
setbacks is of particular importance (Van de Ven et al., 1989).  These studies recognise the 
snowballing effect of setbacks, as the consequences of one decision lead to a build-up of 
effects which are difficult to manage.  However the studies do not look at either how 
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decisions are made or what impact these decisions have on the innovations.  To address these 
ideas of decision making it is useful to consider particular literature on decision making 
within construction. 
Decision making literature within construction falls into three main groups: the development 
of tools for decision making; the identification of key decision makers and groups , and the 
development of techniques for decision taking (Krishnan et al. 2001).  This research into 
innovation adoption is not concerned with quantitative methods to optimise decision making 
tools, but is concerned with understanding: who takes decisions; on what basis; and with what 
result.  As concerns for sustainability within the built environment become more important, 
the criteria used for decision making have become more complex.  How project teams balance 
criteria for decision making will directly affect the outcome of the project and will have an 
impact on the technology and building.  
Increasingly research recognises that decisions within construction projects are taken with the 
involvement of many team members and in the context of a social network, as well as having 
a technical element.  This social network approach to decision making takes a step back from 
optimising decision making in terms of project management efficiency and recognises the key 
roles of individuals within project networks and the complexity of communication that 
transpires (Chinowsky et al., 2008; Bakht & El-Diraby, 2015).  Social Network Analysis is 
used to improve project outcomes by modelling the network of decision-making during a 
construction project, identifying  key project actors and the categories of decisions taken 
(Keast & Hampson 2007a).  Whilst this network approach identifies characteristics of 
effective networks and suggests best practice for project decision making, it does not go 
further into identifying the impact that decisions have on the development of the technology 
or building.   
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The last contribution of decision-making literature is on identifying how decisions are made – 
judgement  based , rational based or emergent (where the final consensus arises as a result of 
interactions among multiple decision contributors) (Bakht & El-Diraby, 2015).  Empirical 
research on this aspect of decision making is mainly limited to  decision making within single 
firms over the course of product innovation (Krishnan et al. 2001), but Taylor and Levitt 
(2007) identify the need to understand the dynamics of decision making in innovation that 
take place in complex project networks.  
It would seem from this review of decision making that although the concept of multiple 
stakeholder decision making and the complex criteria for taking decisions are well identified, 
there is a paucity of empirical research which identifies the effects of decision making on the 
innovation itself.   Given the preceding discussion of the performance gap in section 3.1, this 
is perhaps surprising. 
 Shifting performance criteria 3.3.3
Within process innovation literature Van de Venn et al. (2008) identify three types of 
outcome criteria that run through the implementation phase of innovations.  These were 
defined as Input Criteria (resources needed, time required, information needed etc.), Process 
Criteria (technical milestones, budget and schedule deadlines, credibility etc.) and Output 
Criteria (demonstrate success, contribute to goals, growth). This research illustrates that these 
criteria do not operate in practise in the rational, linear manner described in project 
management literatures, but operate in a sometimes divergent manner which leads to periods 
where criteria shift as different information becomes available. The focus of the process 
innovation approach is to highlight the problems created for project managers by these 
shifting criteria, but it is axiomatic that shifting criteria will affect how decisions are taken in 
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the course of a project and that these decision chains will affect the materiality of the 
innovation and its context. 
Something of the shifting criteria at play in the construction of buildings is evidenced by 
Gorse et al. (2012) in their exploration of the performance gap in cavity-wall insulation and 
by Dainty et al.'s (2013) review-based study of contextual factors which affect performance of 
low carbon technologies in housing (these are discussed more fully in the performance gap 
section of this review).  The conclusions of these papers indicate that that output criteria in 
terms of project success are considered in terms of project completion schedules, budgets and 
client satisfaction and that the focus of the project team changes as the project proceeds.  
 The temporary and evolving nature of project teams 3.3.4
Process Innovation literature identifies that the temporary and evolving nature of project 
teams brings some advantages to projects in terms of new perspectives and competencies, but 
also identifies issues with loss of information, expertise and common purpose.  These 
contributions to project management literature are largely in the form of suggestions for 
improved project team performance but, from the discussions above, will have a large effect 
on the decisions made, the criteria adopted and ultimately on the performance and 
configuration of the innovation itself. 
 Leadership of innovation 3.3.5
Angle and Van de Ven (1989) identified four counterbalancing roles of leadership within the 
innovation journey which did not reflect personal characteristics of one project team member, 
but which were shared among decision making executives, leaders and managers.  They went 
on to identify that disagreement between these decision makers acts as a series of checks and 
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balances during the innovation project. This perspective on leadership from process 
innovation research is very different from other research into innovation leadership which 
focusses on the importance of a particular role of innovation champion or sponsor (expanded 
below).  By recognising that innovation leadership is an interdependent set of roles, the 
approach shows that decisions are made pragmatically in response to changing conditions and 
the differing perspectives held by other top managers, rather than by planned course of action.   
These insights raise questions for the adoption of innovation in the autonomous and highly 
networked forms of construction projects where work is carried out away from hierarchical 
environment of parent organisations. They also invite reflections – particularly in terms of 
technological innovation - on where leadership comes from in a project, who makes decisions 
in projects and what concerns or criteria frame their decisions.   
Within literature which focusses on the role of innovation leaders and the particular 
importance of the innovation champion, different views are prevalent.  The link between 
innovation diffusion and the capability and knowledge of those involved in its adoption has 
been well established (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975).  Firm level capabilities to assimilate 
innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 2012) and knowledge transfer capabilities within firms 
(Huber, 1991) have been shown to have important effects on innovation diffusion, but a study 
of these organisational aspects of innovation adoption falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  What is within the scope of a more micro-level understanding of innovation 
adoption is the role of the innovation champion.  During a study of the relationship between 
types of leadership and successful innovation, Nam and Tatum (1997) conducted over ninety 
interviews with construction professionals to identify key aspects of innovation leadership.  
They surmised that one of the key characteristics of successful innovation was the presence of 
an innovation champion, who would follow or push the adoption of innovation.   
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Nam and Tatum suggested that this champion should have a high level of technical expertise 
and be of sufficient seniority to have the resources and power needed to push through 
innovation.  In a similar study looking at twenty construction project case studies of 
innovation, Gambatese and Hollowell (2011) came to a different conclusion.  They suggested 
that rather than relying on a champion within the project to push innovation adoption, it was 
the client or owner’s influence which played a stronger role.  These two conflicting 
conclusions add support to the view that innovation champions have an important role to play 
in the adoption of innovation, but also that that one person cannot necessarily guarantee the 
outcome.   
 Managing inter-organisational relationships and the supply chain 3.3.6
The perspective that the process innovation approach brings to the managing of inter-
organisational relationships and the supply chain is that as relationships develop within a 
project team they become a web of interdependent and mutually influential relationships 
which can be categorised in a framework of characteristics: cooperative, competitive, 
regulative and conflictual.  How this web of relationships emerges, shifts and plays out over 
the project has been explored in various ways and has a particular importance in construction 
management literature as the extended supply chain makes these relationships even more 
complex. 
An understanding of the dynamics at work within construction projects was developed 
through the ideas of loosely and tightly coupled systems within organisations (Weick, 1976) 
and strong and weak ties between different networks (Granovetter, 1973).  These concepts 
were further developed by Dubois and Gadde (2010) who explored how the complex 
interrelationships in construction projects enabled or hindered innovation and its adoption.  
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Their largely conceptual paper distinguished between tight and loosely coupled systems to 
explain how innovation is accommodated differently in construction projects.  Loose 
couplings between firms in a supply chain allowed for a degree of independence when 
innovation is introduced, whilst the tighter coupled system of project work made for a high 
degree of interdependency, and necessitated greater degrees of accommodations when 
changes were introduced.  The idea of tight and loose couplings, and the recognition that 
innovation adoption affects and is affected by the nature of construction projects, was used by 
Harty (2010) to develop the idea of relative boundedness to explore the dynamics of adoption.  
Following the design and introduction of a new ICT system on a large construction project, 
Harty used ANT (Actor Network Theory) to map the dynamics and the consequences of an 
innovation, and to account for differences between the initial intention and final outcome of a 
project.  One of the contributions of Harty’s research was the recognition that the envisaged 
outcome of an innovation is often different to the achieved result and that these differences 
can to some extent be accounted for by the varying degrees of interdependence within the 
supply chain.  In describing construction projects as being relatively unbounded, Harty 
recognised the complexity of the adoption process in construction projects and called for the 
collection of more empirical evidence to understand the detail of what occurs during the 
innovation process. 
An alternate view of the supply chain and its effect on innovation adoption has been to 
attribute project inefficiency and lack of innovative practice to its disparate and fragmented 
structure (Latham, 1994).  Calls have been made to address these inefficiencies by closer 
supply chain integration and the need to develop closer working relationships between firms 
(Egan, 1998; Wolstenholme, 2009).  The challenges of achieving closer supply chain 
integration have been highlighted, particularly with regard to issues of collaboration, 
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communication and trust (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000; Briscoe et al., 2001).  Briscoe & Dainty 
(2005) studied the role of small and medium enterprises (SME’s) in the supply chain and their 
perspectives on integration of the supply chain.  Using interviews, they pieced together 
perspectives of different actors within the supply chain and identified barriers to integration.  
These barriers included issues around lack of trust, quality of information issues, programme 
related issues and attitude related issues.  The reliance of collaborative projects on informal 
relationships within the supply chain (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000a) and the propensity of 
principal contractors and clients to form longer-term relationships with each other rather than 
with subcontractors (Briscoe & Dainty, 2005) are two of the issues signalled as challenges to 
supply chain integration.  
The literature presented so far suggests that the adoption of innovative technologies will 
present different challenges to different actors within the supply chain, and that issues 
surrounding integration of the supply chain are likely to be present in the specification of 
BIPV on buildings. The challenge of adoption of sustainable technologies within the 
construction sector is often treated as a problem of project team and supply chain integration, 
with the focus being on professionals and their procedures and competencies (Specialist 
Engineering Alliance, 2009).  While this perspective highlights important issues, the focus on 
professional roles and formal procedures obscures the complex decision-making processes 
which explain how and why the solutions are developed and implemented.  In addition, it 
masks adjustments which are made to both the innovation and the building as the process of 
accommodation proceeds.  Little attention is paid to how innovative technologies involving 
cross-disciplinary issues affect the building in which they are incorporated, or the processes 
by which they are installed.  What is missing is an understanding of how these 
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interdependencies and the ways they are accommodated come together to shape both the 
technology and the building. 
Although process innovation research looks at the social or managerial implications of the 
adoption of technology, it does not pay attention to the materiality of the adoption of 
innovation.  In terms of this research process innovation would not account for material 
developments surrounding the innovation (the building) or to the innovation (the BIPV 
technology) which occur as the process of adoption plays out. 
3.4 The socio-technical nature of the adoption of BIPV in construction projects 
This review has led to a clear focus on the phenomenon of the dynamic nature of innovation.  
The thrust of the discussion has been to explore how this dynamic becomes more complex in 
the case of the adoption of integrated technologies and within the context of construction 
projects.  This final section therefore focusses on the challenges which might occur during the 
incorporation of an integrated technology (BIPV) into a construction project and suggests that 
a socio-technical approach to the study of the adoption process would be appropriate.  
The inclusion of an innovative technology which is part of the fabric of a building poses 
several research challenges.  The incorporation of the technology into a construction project 
necessarily involves extensive accommodation at many levels and in many different ways as 
it interfaces with many aspects of the project and its components.  These accommodations are 
made both to the technology and to the building in which it fits, and can be in the form of 
technical adjustments which involve sets of design and solution issues, or of changes to 
standard designs or ways of working.  These technical, design and process-management 
issues are often treated as distinct and separate, but in practice are interrelated.  This idea of 
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mutual constitution of the technology the building and the project processes challenges 
previous analytic distinctions between context and innovation. 
BIPV offers an example of a technology which is integrated into a building during 
construction rather than being bolted on after the event.  The successful incorporation of 
BIPV into a building therefore depends on the technology itself, the building within which it 
is situated and the range of actors involved.  This complexity and the preceding review raise 
three particular challenges.  The first challenge is to understand the different requirements 
which the technology and the building impose on the project team and on each other.  The 
second is to explore the different and sometimes conflicting interests which arise around the 
implementation of the technology.  The final challenge is to follow how the problems and 
tensions which arise in the course of a project are eventually resolved and how the technology 
incorporated into the building.  These challenges point to the need for fine grained analysis of 
what occurs when such innovations are introduced and the need for a research approach 
which allows for consideration of both the technical and social aspects of its adoption. 
The combination of technical and social influences is becoming well recognised as having a 
particularly important contribution to play in understanding the adoption of sustainable 
innovation within construction projects.  Rohracher (2010) recognised the added complexity 
of sustainable innovation and underlined the contribution that socio-technical studies could 
make to a deepening understanding of the innovation process in sustainable buildings.  What 
appears to missing from literature is attention to the process of adoption, particularly when 
incorporating sustainable technology into buildings.  This is especially surprising given a 
growing awareness of the professional and social challenges which sustainable construction 
poses for the sector (Rohracher, 2001).   
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Research into projects incorporating sustainable technologies underlines the importance of 
project team integration  (Mollaoglu-Korkmaz et al., 2013), and the need for greater co-
ordination of project team members and design features, as well as early involvement of 
specialist engineers in the design process (Specialist Engineering Alliance, 2009).  The 
introduction of sustainable technologies into buildings can complicate construction by 
requiring changes in building standard design and building processes.  The way that decisions 
are made, and how the design accommodates the requirements from different actors are 
important in the understanding the process of innovation diffusion for this technology.  
Harty’s study (2010) drew attention the relative boundedness of construction projects and 
showed how the original concept of an innovation was translated into a different realisation.  
Indications that innovations are not fixed, but change and develop as adoption continues, can 
be found in research by Tryggestad et al. (2010), who used socio-technical studies to show 
that project goals are not fixed, but develop as the project proceeds.  Socio-technical studies 
have also shown how artefacts themselves can alter the logics of construction (Tryggestad & 
Georg, 2011), giving weight to the idea of the mutual articulation of the innovation and its 
local context.   
The proposed research began from a simple set of questions concerning the effect of 
incorporating BIPV on standard building designs and processes.  Instead of treating 
technology as a fixed object, which construction professionals have to accommodate, the 
premise is that integrated technologies potentially involve the mutual accommodation of both 
the technology and the building.  Any research approach to this research question should 
focus attention on the succession of problems and solutions which occur as the project 
proceeds and the resulting design decisions which shape the co-development of both objects.  
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This analysis, in turn, would provide a basis to track the place of both BIPV and energy issues 
in the building design from conception to handover. 
In summary the process of incorporation of BIPV within a building project will necessitate 
understanding the interactions between the development of the artefact (in this case the BIPV 
system within the building), the building into which it fits and the project actors involved in 
the construction of the building.  The following chapter outlines the socio-technical approach 
which will be mobilized to conduct the research 
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 Social Construction of Technology Chapter 4:
The previous two chapters have drawn attention to the integrated nature of both BIPV and 
construction projects.  Chapter 3 reviewed literature on innovation and its adoption and 
concluded that building level adoption is a dynamic process which invites further research.  
An additional outcome from the review of adoption was that adoption of integrated 
technologies into buildings posed particular challenges and that a socio-technical analysis 
would allow for a micro-level exploration of the problems and solutions which arise during 
construction projects.   
To explore this research question, the study adopted a Social Construction of Technology 
(SCOT) approach.  For the purposes of this study, SCOT offered three advantages.  First, it 
treated technology as an object in (potentially) continual development and change.  Secondly 
it linked those changes to the network of people and other objects with which it was 
associated at any given moment in time.  Thirdly, it underlined variations in the 
understandings and expectations which different people brought to decision making as the 
design was developed.  The approach also supported a symmetrical approach to the study of 
sustainable technology and the building into which they were incorporated.  Instead of 
treating one or the other as fixed, the approach treated both as mutually constituted system(s), 
supported by socio-technical networks which changed as the technology and the building 
developed.  This allowed the research to follow the mutual influences of process, context and 
technology as the projects progressed.  In contrast to some other approaches for understanding 
adoption such as Actor Network Theory (ANT), SCOT retains an analytic distinction between 
the social and the technical and between (fluid) objects (technologies) and the socio-technical 
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networks which support them at any given point in time.  It also focuses explicitly on the 
succession of design decisions which shape the ongoing development of a technology.   
The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) is an approach which is concerned with 
actors, the way they interact with a new technology and how the new technology is shaped by 
these interactions.  The discussion which follows introduces SCOT as an approach to study 
the process of adoption and shows how the approach can be applied specifically to the 
adoption of BIPV.  SCOT is usually applied to the development of a single technology and 
one of the challenges of this research is to apply the approach to the co-development of two 
complex, integrated assemblages - the technology (BIPV) and the building.  SCOT provides a 
way to understand the interdependencies and interactions between these two integrated 
assemblages and the project actors as BIPV is incorporated into a building. 
4.1 Introduction to SCOT  
SCOT is a micro-level socio technical approach which explores the development of 
technology through a succession of problems and solutions.  The approach is used to ask the 
question: “how can we account for the fact that a technology develops in one way and not in 
another?”  The approach does not assume that the answer is: “it is the way it is because that 
was the best technical solution”.  SCOT sees a technology as the product of negotiations 
between actors with different understandings and interests.  
SCOT is an approach that was developed by Bijker & Pinch in 1984.  They used several 
empirical examples to illustrate their approach, one of which was their study of the 
development of the bicycle and how it came to be in the form it is today.  Their study of the 
bicycle will be used in this chapter to explain the key concepts of the approach and to 
illustrate how the SCOT is applied.  The approach has been used in a wide range of research 
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topics which include: the development of Bakelite and light bulbs (Bijker, 1999),  the re-
development of the city of Barcelona (Aibar & Bijker, 1997), the rebuilding of the Tjorn 
bridge (Walter & Styhre, 2013) and the choice of IT software packages (Howcroft & Light, 
2010). 
4.2 SCOT: key concepts 
This section outlines the five main concepts used in the approach and illustrates how they 
have been mobilised in research.  These concepts are: interpretive flexibility (which accounts 
for the way that different actors attribute different meanings to the technology); technological 
frames (which define the different meanings attributed by the actors to the technology); 
relevant social groups (the groups of actors who adopt the technological frames); problems 
and solutions (which evolve during the development of the technology); and stabilisation and 
closure (the mechanism by which the technology becomes at least temporarily fixed).  The 
explanations that follow are derived from Bijker’s seminal text book “Of Bicycles, Bakelite 
and Bulbs” (1999) and are also illustrated by other examples of how the approach has been 
used. 
 Interpretive flexibility 4.2.1
The SCOT approach uses the concept of interpretive flexibility to draw attention to the 
multiplicity of meanings that one artefact may have for different groups of people (actors).  
Using the example of the development of the bicycle, Bijker (1999) identified several 
different meanings that could be attributed to the bicycle: a means of touring the countryside, 
a sports vehicle to ride at high speed in competitions, a dangerous device which could break 
bones, and a vehicle that could allow women to travel freely but which might trap long skirts.  
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In the case studies which follow, this concept will be used to explore the different 
requirements that the project actors have of BIPV.  
 Technological frames 4.2.2
Technological frames are the lenses through which the actors interpret the technology.  They 
are developed from the basic assumptions or elements which produce or support the actors’ 
interpretation of the technology.  Elements may include: actors’ goals; problem solving 
strategies adopted; requirements to be met by problem solving; current theories held by the 
actor; tacit knowledge; testing procedures; design methods; user’s practice (Bijker, 1999).  
The concept of technical frames can be demonstrated using the example of the bicycle and in 
particular the process of adoption of the pneumatic tyre rather than the solid tyre.  One of the 
technological frames that Bijker identified was that of the Sports Cyclist who required speed 
and manoeuvrability for racing.  In this example, the Sports Cyclist’s goal was speed and 
manoeuvrability, their problem solving strategy was to accept safety risks deriving from 
higher speed, and their requirements were improvements to speed or manoeuvrability.  
Current theories held by cyclists who adopted the Sports Cyclist frame included the 
understanding that faster speed came from solid tyres, which reduced friction.  Their tacit 
knowledge came from the racing characteristics of bicycles that they rode.  Testing 
procedures for the Sports Cyclist were time trials or competitions and their practice was to 
ride on race tracks or paved areas.  In order for the Sports Cyclist to adopt the new-fangled 
pneumatic tyre, they had to be convinced that the new tyre would satisfy their desire for faster 
speeds.  Other users with a different technological frame were concerned with reducing 
vibration from the solid tyres, but this aspect of the pneumatic tyre would not have been 
important to the cyclists who adopted the sports cyclist frame.   
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The elements of a technological frame are not fixed but are modified by the researcher to 
reflect the research topic and aims of the project.  One example of this variation was shown 
by Prell (2009), who used SCOT to study the development of an information system called 
“Connected Kids”.  She included Bijker’s original elements of goals, problems, strategies, 
tacit knowledge and exemplary artefacts, but added the element of key material resources 
which was relevant to her study of the information system.  In the case studies which follow, 
this flexibility will be applied to reflect the actors’ interpretations of the technology. 
 Relevant Social Groups 4.2.3
If a technological frame is the lens through which actors interpret the technology, then a 
Relevant Social Group (RSG) is the group of actors who share the same frame.  In the case of 
the bicycle, Bijker and Pinch (2012) identified five groups of users who had different 
requirements of the technology: Elderly Men, Tourist Cyclists, Women Cyclists, Sport 
Cyclists and Producers.  As this suggests, RSGs are not groups of actors who share the same 
job title (architects, lawyers, doctors), but are actors with similar expectations of a particular 
technology.  This distinction allows the analysis to move beyond formal categorisations, and 
allows a nuanced understanding of how alliances between actors emerge around the 
technology.  For example, in a study of the development of the layout of the city of Barcelona 
in 1854, Aibar and Bijker (1997) initially identified relevant social groups which were aligned 
with job descriptions - these included engineers, architects, working class people, property 
owners and the government.  By the end of the research the authors concluded that as the 
plans for development progressed, different alliances were formed which no longer 
corresponded to occupational groupings.  In the case studies which follow, the concept of 
RSGs will allow an analysis of the shifting alliances and rationales for decision-making. 
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 Problems and Solutions 4.2.4
The fourth concept taken from SCOT is that of problems and solutions.  In a SCOT analysis 
the development of the technology is analysed in terms of the problems and solutions that 
arise as the technology is developed.  Each RSG defines problems in a certain way and brings 
with them solutions that fit with their interests.  At any given moment there are RSGs which 
have problems with the technology for which they want a solution.  Decisions are taken as a 
result of the conflicts and the resulting negotiations between RSGs, and an analysis of the 
succession of problems and solutions is used to explain the development of the technology.  
Negotiations, conflicts and choices are analysed to identify networks of different groups, 
problems and solutions to show important moments in the decision-making process as the 
technology develops.  
The evolution of the bicycle frame can be used to illustrate this process of unfolding 
development.  One of the most popular designs of bicycle had one large wheel at the front and 
a smaller one at the back.  This was primarily to allow for direct drive of the front wheel by 
the pedals or levers on the front wheel.  The elevated saddle position made it hard for ladies 
with long skirts to mount and made falling off dangerous for all riders.  Tricycles were 
designed to be easier for ladies with restricting clothing to ride, but became dangerous as the 
three tracks (one from each wheel) made it hard to avoid stones and holes in the road.  The 
development of the gear train made it possible to develop a trapezoidal frame with the pedals 
in the centre of the bike and two similar sized wheels.  Thus, the problems of different user 
groups were played out as the designs developed and the solutions chosen explained the 
development process (Bijker, 1999).  In the case studies which follow, the approach is used to 
identify the problems and solutions which occur, and then to explore the network which 
‘explains’ the development of different solutions and the eventual decisions taken. 
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 Stabilisation and closure 4.2.5
The concept of Stabilisation and Closure relates to the way in which the features of an artefact 
are negotiated and become stable (Humphreys, 2005).  Stabilisation and closure have been 
described as being “two sides of the same coin” and “two aspects of the same process” 
(Bijker, 1999. p85).  Stabilisation is used to describe the process by which the design of 
artefacts becomes more fixed, whilst closure refers to the mechanism by which the 
interpretive flexibility between groups decreases through negotiation and conflict.  Two 
mechanisms of closure are theorised: Rhetorical Closure (where the groups see the problem as 
being solved) and Redefinition of the Problem (when a new way of defining the problem 
eliminates the original problem) (Bijker, 1999).  In the example of the bicycle, Rhetorical 
Closure occurred when the gear train and design of the frame brought about a lower riding 
position and solved the problem of rider safety.  Redefinition of the Problem can be illustrated 
by consideration of the way the pneumatic tyre became accepted.  The new tyre was 
introduced as an anti-vibration solution, but was opposed by the sports cyclists who saw the 
tyres as a liability because of the risk of punctures.  The air tyre was universally adopted only 
after the sports cyclists realised that the new tyres also gave increased speed and so they no 
longer worried about the danger of punctures.  In the case studies which follow, the concepts 
of stabilisation and closure will be used to look beyond the simple mapping of problems and 
solutions, and will explore how decisions were taken and why certain pathways were 
followed.    
SCOT is not without critics and Bijker and Pinch have developed the approach further in 
response to these.  Early criticisms included concerns about the lack of consideration of the 
effect of historical and social influence on actors (Russell, 1986; Winner, 1993), the lack of 
appreciation of the effect of power asymmetry between groups (Klein & Kleinman, 2002) and 
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the subjective way in which groups were defined (Clayton, 2002).  In answer to some of these 
criticisms, Bijker and Pinch developed the concept of technological frames which was used to 
characterise actors according to their goals, key problems, problem solving strategies etc. 
(Bijker et al., 2012).   
The subjective nature of the SCOT has also been criticised in terms of the choice of sources 
used by the researcher, the subjective assignment of groups and the simplistic nature of the 
method (Clayton, 2002; Epperson, 2002).  In response Bijker (2009) acknowledged the 
subjectivity of the method but stressed that the focus of the approach was not on the 
technology per se, but rather on its development.  Although less good at identifying broader 
structural characteristics (Klein & Kleinman, 2002), the approach does allow the study of 
specific decision-making processes and contingent events which affect the development of 
technology.  In terms of the study of the adoption of BIPV, although the approach may 
obscure issues of project organisation or management style (which may indirectly have 
influenced particular decisions), the analysis does give a very clear idea of how and why 
solutions were adopted and how the process of adoption unfolded within a case study.  
This section has outlined the main concepts of the SCOT approach and illustrated their use 
with empirical examples.  What follows is a discussion of how the concepts can be used to 
apply SCOT to the analysis of a case study.  
4.3 Applying SCOT 
This section uses Bijker’s approach as laid out in “Of Bicycles, Bakelite and Bulbs” (Bijker, 
1999) to illustrate how the SCOT approach has been mobilised in the study of the adoption of 
technology in a construction project.  The discussion introduces SCOT diagrams as a way of 
mapping the development of an artefact as a succession of unfolding problems and solutions.  
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Bijker’s original example of the development of the bicycle is used to illustrate the approach.  
Section 4.4  draws on this discussion to explore the application of SCOT to BIPV.  Chapter 5 
provides a detailed explanation of how the SCOT approach was used in this dissertation. 
In a SCOT approach, analysis starts with the choice of a technology, breaking it down into its 
various component parts (the technological assemblage of the bicycle is broken down into 
parts such as tyre, frame, brake mechanism, saddle etc.).  The researcher then selects one of 
those components as a starting point and uses the component to identify actors who were 
involved in its development.  Actors who have common interests in the artefacts are identified 
and their interests are summarised in terms of technological frames and relevant social 
groups.  As discussed above, in the case of the bicycle, interests included concerns over the 
performance of the bicycle (speed and manoeuvrability), the safety of the bicycle, etc.  Once 
the RSGs have been defined, the analysis proceeds by exploring the successive definition of 
problems and development of solutions for each artefact, until a picture of the development of 
the whole technological assemblage is established. 
Central to the approach is the production of SCOT diagrams - the visual representation of the 
network of artefacts, actors, problems and solutions that occurred during the development of 
the technology.  This network of technological development is drawn up with the artefacts at 
the centre of the analysis.  RSGs are identified through their shared technological frames and 
ranged around the artefacts.   
Figure 4-1 illustrates how this network is represented.   
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Figure 4-1: The relationship between an artefact and the relevant social groups (Bijker et al., 
2012; p29) 
In a similar way, the problems represented by each artefact to each relevant social group are 
then identified and added to the diagram.  Figure 4-2 illustrates how this network is 
represented 
 
Figure 4-2: The relationship between one social group and the perceived problem (Bijker et al., 
2012; p29) 
Finally the solutions - both proposed and adopted, are added to the diagram and the network 
unfolds, showing the configuration which forms around each problem, and the possible 
proposed solutions, as the assemblage is incorporated into the building.  The development of 
these diagrams is seen as an essential part of the analysis path of decisions (Bijker et al., 
2012).  
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Figure 4-3: Schematic representation of SCOT analysis 
As Figure 4-3 indicates, in Bijker’s method ( Bijker et al. 2012), the heterogeneous 
assemblage is depicted as a network of components or artefacts (hexagons) and actor groups 
who have particular involvements with these artefacts are added (lozenges).  Problems with 
the artefact which the RSGs identify are mapped to the artefact (circles) and possible 
solutions are added (octagons).  One particular benefit of these diagrams is that they highlight 
the way in which a solution which resolves a problem for one RSG creates a different 
problem for another.  In this way the process of problem solution and technological 
development can be followed. 
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4.4 Mobilising SCOT in the study of BIPV 
This section outlines how the SCOT approach has been mobilised to study the incorporation 
of BIPV into a building.  Chapter 5 goes on to give a full account of the research methods. 
This study uses the SCOT approach to explore the adoption of BIPV.  In contrast to many 
commercial technologies that achieve a certain degree of stabilization prior being 
commercialized, BIPV in the UK is largely a bespoke technology, which is integrated into the 
façade or roof of the building.  As such, it has complex interdependencies with building 
design.  The successful incorporation of BIPV into a building (which itself comprises many 
elements and assemblages) depends on the technology itself, the building in which it is 
situated and the range of actors involved.  As a lens through which to view the adoption of a 
technology, SCOT highlights the technical issues raised by the introduction of BIPV, the 
relevance of those issues to the project actors, the solutions which were proposed and 
selected, and the impact of these on BIPV and the build process.  In turn this analysis allows 
for the consideration of key moments in the development of BIPV, the reasons behind these 
choices and, importantly, the knock-on effects to the building design and construction 
process.  
In the same way that the bicycle was analysed as an assemblage of parts, the building 
comprises many sub-systems which could also be considered in this way.  For example the 
heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system, lighting system and electrical 
system all interface with each other to form the building.  Using Bijker’s bicycle analogy 
(Bijker, 1999), the BIPV system is similar to a gear train assembly which is an integrated 
technology incorporated into the bicycle (in this case the building).  For clarity, this SCOT 
analysis is restricted to the BIPV artefacts and the elements of the building with which they 
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directly interface.  The parts of the building directly affected by BIPV include artefacts such 
as the building façade and building electrical system.  Each of the BIPV components has 
characteristics which are interpreted differently by different groups and which are considered 
to be part of the building itself.  For example, the BIPV panel assembly forms part of the 
waterproof façade and is also an important part of the aesthetic quality of the building.  
SCOT diagrams are used to map out the sometimes conflicting requirements which different 
groups have of BIPV and the building (for example, the architect may want a smooth 
appearance, whilst the design engineer might need an angled façade).  The mapping also 
includes the issues which arise in the incorporation of the technology, and the various 
solutions which are proposed to solve each problem.  This exploration of the succession of 
problems and solutions shows how BIPV is included or absorbed into the building.  The 
processes of stabilisation and closure are used to consider how the BIPV system and its 
interfaces with the building developed.  In this research, rather than the more usual study of 
the negotiations which lead to the stabilization of a generic version of the technology, it is the 
co-development of the building and BIPV system which is studied. 
There are several key concepts to carry forward from this review.  Firstly that RSGs are 
composed of project actors who share a view of the technology, rather than those who occupy 
common positions or roles.  Second, that project actors do not necessarily remain in one RSG 
throughout the project, and might be part of more than one RSG at one time.  Third, that 
solutions to problems develop from the negotiations between RSGs as the project develops.  
Finally that the mechanisms of closure and the process of stabilisation relate to the co-
development of the BIPV system and the building, rather than the stabilisation of generic 
BIPV systems.  As this brief discussion suggests, a particular strength of using SCOT to study 
the incorporation of BIPV into a building is that it can be used to understand interdependent 
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technical developments in a complex environment, by paying attention both to the actors 
involved and to the context in which it is developing.  The following chapter details the 
methods used in this research. 
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 Methods Chapter 5:
This research explores the dynamic nature of the process of adoption.  The general research 
question being asked is: “what accommodations are made both to the innovation and to its 
local physical and processual context during the adoption of an innovation?”  This research 
operationalises the general research question by studying the micro-level occurrences which 
unfold when an innovative technology (in this case BIPV) is specified on a commercial 
building project.  The specific research question asks “how does the mutual articulation of a 
building and the technology develop as BIPV is incorporated within a building?”  The 
preceding chapter outlined the SCOT approach, its ontological model and the fit of the 
approach to the research object and question.  This chapter details the research design, 
outlines the methods used to conduct the research, observes the limitations to the approach 
and outlines the ethical considerations of the research.  
5.1 Research design 
This research was conducted in three parts.  First a pilot study was carried out to gain a deeper 
understanding of the issues involved and to inform the main research.  Secondly, the research 
followed three projects and used a Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach to 
explore the adoption of BIPV in each case.  Finally a cross case analysis was used to further 
analyse the three case studies to explore the dynamics of adoption of BIPV.  
5.2 Pilot Study 
The pilot study was carried out to produce an initial mapping of the challenges which occur in 
construction projects as BIPV is incorporated and to confirm that SCOT was an approach 
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capable of handling the complexity of the mutual constitution of BIPV and a complex 
building.  The aims of the pilot study were: to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges 
of incorporating BIPV in construction projects; to develop and refine the application of 
SCOT; to refine interview questions; and to develop coding nodes for NVivo analysis and 
methods for drawing SCOT diagrams.  The use of pilot studies to refine research design is 
supported by Bryman (2008) and Bazeley (2013) as a “dry run…to determine whether your 
data will generate analysable data that are relevant to your purpose” (Bazeley, 2013. p55). 
The framework of the pilot study was to conduct interviews with three people who much of 
experience of the practicalities of BIPV in construction projects.  It used interviews to identify 
some of the challenges that they had experienced in the incorporation of BIPV on a project 
and then analysed these interviews using a SCOT framework.  Semi-structured interviews 
were used because of their flexibility, which allowed exploration of the way in which the 
interviewee framed and understood the events and issues around the adoption of BIPV.  A 
sample interview schedule is given in Appendix A1.  The interviews lasted for approximately 
forty five minutes and each was recorded.  Afterwards each interview was transcribed, 
anonymised and then coded using NVivo 10 software.  The nodes were established using a 
provisional coding strategy which provided a “start list set of codes prior to fieldwork” (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994, p58).  These nodes were developed from the SCOT framework and 
focussed on actors and their interests, artefacts, issues, problems and solutions (Bijker et al, 
2012).  In addition to these nodes, other nodes were used to code for professional background, 
motivations for using BIPV on projects, previous involvement with BIPV, project 
descriptions, project procurement methods, project stages in which they were involved and 
potential case studies and contacts to follow up.  These additional codes were derived from 
the literature which indicated that all of these issues may be important in understanding the 
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context of the adoption.  For example, procurement methods have been shown to affect 
problem solving and attitudes to risk (Gruneberg et al., 2007) and innovation over the 
development of a project has been shown to vary (Harty & Whyte, 2010).  Figure 5-1 below 
shows a screen shot of the pilot project and the codes used. 
 
Figure 5-1: NVivo screen shot for pilot study 
The three interviewees were selected for their very different perspectives and experiences of 
the inclusion of BIPV in projects.  The first was a BIPV laminate supplier, the second a 
consultant and BIPV governmental advisor and the third a project manager in charge of the 
sustainable development programme of a large UK retail company.  Their long-term 
involvement with BIPV allowed them to comment on over 30 projects and gave insights into 
the accommodations made on projects in which BIPV is specified.   
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Table 5-1 summarises the characteristics of the interviewees in terms of their historical 
involvement with BIPV and the role that they currently filled.   
Table 5-1: Characterisation of pilot study interviewees 
The coding from these interviews was used to characterise the technological frames (the 
cognitive, social and technical elements that guide or constrain meanings and behaviours 
relevant to an artefact (Prell, 2009)  which were mobilised by project actors in the context of 
BIPV.  As indicated in Chapter 4, the determinants of a technological frame are: the actors’ 
goals; the types of problems they see; the types of solutions they offer; the strategies they tend 
to use in solving problems; the theories that they use; the tacit knowledge that they have; the 
testing procedures; design methods; and criteria that they use (Bijker et al., 2012).   
Each interview covered project experiences of the interviewee over many projects (32 
projects were discussed over the course of the three interviews).  Data were analysed to 
 Interviewee 1 Interviewee 2 Interviewee 3 
Years associated with 
BIPV 
15 30 10 
Roles undertaken  Façade Engineer 
Façade Sales 
Manager 
BIPV Sales 
Manager 
M&E Engineer 
Head of PV 
Business 
Development 
BIPV consultant 
BIPV Advisor to 
government 
Head of 
Sustainability 
Initiatives Manger 
Engagement and 
project Manager 
No of projects 
identified during 
interview 
10 15 5-10 discrete 
projects 
100+ related projects 
Involvement with 
BIPV research and 
development 
Yes Yes Yes 
Current main project 
role  
Supplier Consultant Project Manager 
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identify different ways in which the technology had been interpreted by different individuals 
on the projects discussed.  These different interpretations or understandings were explored in 
terms of the goals of the individual when they considered the technology, problems 
commonly experienced by the individual, strategies used to uphold the interest of the group, 
the knowledge that the individual uses to maintain the goal, what criteria the individual used 
to test the success of the goal, and how this was carried out and measured.  
As the interviews were analysed, common patterns of interests were seen across the 32 
projects and these were recorded on an outline table distilled from the SCOT approach 
outlined by Bijker et al. (2012).  Table 5-1 gives an example of how an individual’s 
interpretation of the technology was developed. 
 
As the analysis developed six common technological frames were identified from the data and 
these are outlined in Table 5-3 below and detailed in Appendix A.3.  These technological 
frames were named as; Green Guardian, Cost Watcher, Generation Maximiser, Design 
Aesthete, Design Optimiser and User. 
 Interpretation 1 
Goals - Buildings should generate energy 
- Reduction of carbon emissions 
Problems - Green solutions are often “casualties of war” 
- Green solutions generally cost more 
Strategies - Enshrine in planning regs 
 
Tacit Knowledge - Technology available 
- Planning requirements 
 
Testing procedures - Output figures 
- m2 of PV 
Design methods - BREEAM 
 
Criteria - Merton, KWh 
Table 5-2: Sample grid of individual interpretation of technology 
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The six technological frames each had distinctive criteria, concerns and interests.  Design 
Aesthetes were concerned with the look and feel of the building, seeing BIPV as being an 
integral part of the building identity and making a positive contribution to the design 
aesthetics.  Green Guardians were mainly concerned with carbon emission reductions and 
renewable energy generation.  Their concern was motivated mainly by the desire to meet 
planning or BREEAM requirements.  Design Optimisers were less concerned about the 
individual aspects of the project, but rather with ensuring that the design process was efficient 
and that details were clarified before construction started.  Generation Maximisers were 
concerned with ensuring that the BIPV assemblage generated as much electricity as possible - 
both in terms of fulfilling the planning conditions and of contributing to reduced running 
costs.  Users were the actors concerned with the final product - they required the PV system to 
supply electricity in a way which had no negative impact on the day-to-day running of the 
building.  These frames, together with their main interest are summarised in Table 5-3 
Technological 
Frame 
Main interest of Technological Frame 
Design Aesthetes BIPV is part of the building which is a flagship architectural 
design 
Green Guardians BIPV reduces carbon emissions of the building and meets 
planning requirements 
Design Optimisers The process of design is efficient 
Generation 
Maximisers 
The PV system generates to its maximum potential 
Cost Watchers Project costs are kept to a minimum and financial case is 
maintained 
Users The system is fit for purpose and the generation does not 
negatively impact facilities management. 
Table 5-3: Technological Frames and their interest 
The second task of the pilot study was the definition of the artefacts to be considered in the 
adoption of BIPV.  Prior to the pilot study, four artefacts had been identified: the building; the 
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BIPV panels; the BIPV wiring; and the inverters.  During analysis these were augmented by a 
finer division: the part of the building to which the BIPV system was attached (e.g. roof, 
façade, etc.); wiring (before the inverter); cabling (after the inverter); the G59 cabinet and 
meter; the PV cells; and the laminated glass PV panels. 
Once the technological frames and artefacts had been defined, coding was used to identify 
problems and solutions for the adoption of BIPV.  These four elements (artefacts, 
technological frames, problems and solutions) were then used to develop SCOT diagrams in 
line with the outline presented in Chapter 4.  Starting with the artefact, the technological 
frames concerned were added, followed by the problems that were experienced by the actors 
within the technological frames.  The solutions to the problems were then added and the 
unfolding network of artefacts, technological frames, problems and solutions was developed.  
One vignette from one of the interviews illustrates how the diagrams were developed and 
illustrates how the co-development of the BIPV system and the building occurred.  BIPV was 
included on the roof of a new football stadium.  Rather than being a roof-mounted system, the 
photovoltaic panels were integrated into the roof structure and the resulting opacity used to 
provide solar shading for the spectators.  The BIPV was designed to meet renewable 
generating requirements from the local authority, to use the opacity of the roof-integrated PV 
panels to provide shading to spectators, and to enhance the aesthetic appeal of the building.  
In this extract Interviewee 1 explains that this shading affected grass growth on the pitch and 
that, as a result, the spacing of the PV cells had to be adjusted to allow for even grass growth. 
Football stadia roofs are ideal - you put PV in, and it’s giving a nice bit of shading and 
it’s giving light, but [at] certain times of the year it’s also shading the grass, so the 
grass won’t grow evenly, so they’ve had to alter the spacing of the panels to make sure 
that there is the same level of light [on the grass]. 
Pilot study Interviewee 1 
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The interviewee went on to talk about the re-work that this required and the subsequent 
reduction in generation potential.  The artefact under consideration in this case was the panel 
assembly which included the façade configuration and generating characteristic.  The RSGs in 
this instance included Design Aesthetes (who were concerned with creating an interesting and 
pleasing roof construction as well as using green technology to generate electricity), Cost 
Watchers (who were concerned with minimising project costs and optimising generation 
potential) and Users (who were mostly concerned with the maintenance of the stadium and 
care of the grass).  The problems and solutions which were identified between RSGs and their 
effect on the parts of the assemblage are illustrated in Figure 5-2 below. 
Generating 
potential
Seated 
area 
shading
Design 
Aesthete
Cost Watcher
User
Boring 
Shapes
Boring 
facade
Want more 
than just 
bling
Use pv in 
shading
Colour 
panels
Reduce 
shading
Uneven 
grass 
growth
Cost/revenue 
per sq metre 
roof area
Less 
protection 
for fans
Reduced 
generation 
potential
Solution Actor
Technological 
Frame
Artefact Problem
Key
 
Figure 5-2: SCOT diagram for unanticipated shading 
As Figure 5-2 illustrates, the use of BIPV to provide shading as part of the façade 
configuration addressed the Design Aesthetes concerns and was supported by the Cost 
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Watchers.  The User group was unaware of the impact of the solution on grass growth, but 
when the stadium was brought into use, this became a major problem.  Shading was in tension 
both with the visual impact of the building (part of the aesthetic appeal of the panels) and the 
generation potential of the façade configuration.  Faced with this problem, it was decided to 
reduce the shading density of the roof by reducing the density of photovoltaic (PV) cells in 
the roof.  This decreased the generation potential of the stadium and so affected project 
payback - a direct concern of both Cost Watcher and User RSGs.  The solution also impacted 
the Design Aesthetes by changing the homogeneity of the design, decreasing the opacity and 
therefore the shading of spectators.  The solution was a result of the negotiations during which 
the User group’s need for a playable pitch was recognised by the other groups.  
The aim of the pilot study was to practice using the SCOT approach, to refine interview 
questions and to develop coding nodes for NVivo analysis and methods for drawing SCOT 
diagrams.  Appendix A.2 shows the development of the interview schedules - questions added 
included more contextual information, references to other actors involved and their roles in 
the solution or the raising of problems, knock-on effects of solutions and the particular stage 
at which problems occurred.  Nodes for coding were expanded to include: specific mention of 
interfaces with parts of the building; other firms or parts of the PV system; details about 
contracts used on the project; design evolution.  More nodes were also added to allow for the 
definition of technological frames (goals, meaning the actor ascribed to the technology, and 
tools used when dealing with the technology).  Figure 5-3 shows some of the changes made to 
the coding for the case studies.  The development of SCOT diagrams was not straightforward 
and it became clear that not only did every element of the BIPV system and the parts of the 
building which were impacted by the BIPV need to be included as artefacts, but that some 
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artefacts that were not present in material form, such as contracts and the project schedule, 
needed to be considered as well.   
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Figure 5-3: NVivo coding for case study 
The pilot study achieved its aims and further informed the main research by augmenting the 
definition of artefacts, developing and refining the concept of technological frames to be used 
in subsequent analysis and establishing the concept of co-development of the BIPV system 
and the building.   
5.3 Case Studies 
SCOT requires detailed analysis of the particular circumstances and developments around a 
defined technology.  Case study entails “the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case” 
(Bryman, 2008. p54) and focusses on the complexity and particular details of that case in its 
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own right.  For these reasons a case study approach was appropriate for this research.  A cross 
case analysis element was added to the research design to get a sense of type of variations and 
mechanisms which occurred during the adoption process.   
The research is concerned with commercial, new build projects which incorporate BIPV.  
Given the transient nature of project teams, the projects had to be recent so that the actors 
could be tracked down and interviewed.  In addition the BIPV technology used had to have 
similar characteristics in terms of the type of PV cell and substrate, so that a comparison 
could be made without the complication of a different set of technical problems arising from 
different technologies being used.  Finally the projects had to include some different 
applications of BIPV so that similarities and differences in the problems in the adoption of 
BIPV could be explored.  Having established the criteria for the selection of case studies and 
conforming to the SCOT approach of following the technology (Bijker et al., 2012), three 
manufacturers of BIPV laminate panels were approached and invited to participate in the 
research.  One of the manufacturers agreed to be interviewed for the pilot study and during the 
interview was asked to identify projects which met the criteria described above.  The 
manufacturer identified five possible cases which all used his PV laminate panels and passed 
on the details of five contacts - one for each project.  When contacted, three of the five 
contacts agreed to seek permission from their client to be part of the research, on the 
understanding that all data would be anonymised.  Permission was given in all three cases and 
these became the three case studies followed in this research. 
 Case study overview 5.3.1
Vogue Terrace is a commercial office building in Central London which was part of a three-
phase refurbishment project in which three adjacent blocks were reduced to a skeleton and 
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then reconstructed.  Although not exactly a new-build, the refurbishment was so extensive 
that it fulfilled the criteria of case selection.  BIPV technology was incorporated in the brise-
soleil louvres on the south elevation of the building.  The development started in the mid-
2000s, with Vogue Terrace being the last of the three buildings to be constructed.  Initial 
planning permission for Vogue Terrace was granted in 2007, work on site began in August 
2014, with work on the BIPV installation commencing in February 2015.  The project used a 
“Design and Build” contract  
Future Green is a commercial science hub set on a 24-acre site in a large science park 
development in Northern England.  The BIPV system was incorporated into the windows of 
the south elevation of the building.  Design for the project started in 2010, construction began 
in late 2013, the installation of BIPV was completed by August 2014 and the Future Green 
project was completed by November 2014.  The project used a Design and Build contract and 
was a joint partnership between a university, the City Council and several other partners.   
Synergy Court is an interdisciplinary biomedical research centre in Central London which 
was designed to serve a medical research partnership between three national research 
organisations and three universities.  The BIPV system was incorporated into roof fins on the 
building.  Project planning began in 2001, with planning permission being granted in 
December 2010.  Ground works began in April 2011 and BIPV installation began in 2014, the 
estimated completion date being early 2016.  The project used a Design and Build contract.   
Table 5-4 presents a summary of the three case studies in terms of their use, type of BIPV 
application and timeline of construction. 
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 Vogue Terrace Future Green Vogue Terrace 
Use Commercial Offices  Science Hub Medical Research 
Centre 
BIPV system Brise-soleil louvres Windows Roof fins 
Planning permission 2007 2009 2010 
Construction start 2014 2013 2011 
Completion date 2016 (estimated) 2014 2016 (estimated) 
Contract Design and Build Design and Build Design and Build 
Table 5-4: Summary of case studies 
 Sampling 5.3.2
The selection of interviewees and the boundaries of the sampling for each case study were set 
by the technique of “snow-balling” (Bryman, 2008), where initial contact was made with one 
project actor and this contact was then used to establish contacts with others.  Whenever no 
new contacts were identified by the project actors the case was considered complete.  This 
process of snow-balling and following the actors is advocated by Bijker (1999).  
The frame for sampling (Miles et al., 2014) was set by the SCOT approach, which calls for 
the research to follow the actors and to explore the issues that are identified by them.  In this 
way, the technology was thought of as an assemblage of components or artefacts, and the 
interviews followed these artefacts through the eyes of the actors, noting where the artefact 
was changed or where the interaction with another artefact brought about additional 
challenges. 
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 Interviews 5.3.3
Case study interviews followed the method outlined in the pilot study, in which semi-
structured interviews were demonstrated to provide adequate depth and to reveal rich data 
about the incorporation of BIPV into buildings.  The structure allowed the exploration of 
problems and solutions, with interviewees being encouraged to elaborate on each issue.  
Interview schedules were modified before each interview, to take into account any issues that 
had been raised in previous interviews.  This ensured that each actor could comment on the 
same issue and contribute their view of the situation.  Appendix A2 presents an example of an 
interview schedule used in case study interviews. 
A total of twenty eight interviews were conducted in addition to the three pilot interviews.  
Two e-mail correspondences were also entered into, to discuss particular aspects of the 
projects with project actors who were unwilling to be interviewed.  A comparable set of 
project actors from each case study was interviewed.  Most actors were only interviewed 
once, with the exception of the PV laminate supplier who was interviewed for both the pilot 
study and for the case studies, and the architect for Vogue Terrace who was interviewed four 
times as the design of the project progressed.  Table 5-5 details the actors interviewed and the 
dates of each interview.  The laminate supplier was common to all three case studies and was 
the only interviewee to cover all three case studies. 
All of the interviewees were assigned a unique identity (ID) number and transcripts of the 
interviews were anonymised and given the corresponding ID number.  Transcripts were 
checked to ensure that all projects, places, firms and actors referred to were anonymised.  A 
key of anonymised words was kept for all interviews.  All interviewees were thanked for their 
participation and - when requested - transcripts were offered to the interviewees for checking 
Chapter 5: Methods 
85 
 
to ensure that they were happy with the interview content being included in the research.  All 
interviewees agreed that their interview could be included.  
Vogue Terrace Future Green Synergy Court 
Position Date Position Date Position Date 
Laminate Supplier: 
Sales Manager 
10/02/2013 Laminate 
Supplier Sales 
Manager 
10/02/2013 Laminate 
Supplier: Sales 
Manager 
10/02/2013 
16/04/2015 16/04/2015 16/04/2015 
Architect 26/03/2014 Architect 19/08/2014 Architect 11/04/2014 
18/07/2014 Mechanical 
Design 
Consultant  
19/08/2014 Louvre Supplier 
Sales Manager 
14/03/2014 
15/10/2014 Electrical 
Design 
Consultant  
19/11/2014 Louvre Supplier 
Managing 
Director 
03/06/2015 
07/01/2015 Façade Design 
Director 
28/11/2014 Louvre Supplier 
Design Director 
03/06/2015 
Façade Sales 
Manager 
11/02/2015 Glazing Supplier 
Project Manager 
27/11/2014 Louvre Supplier 
Project Manager 
14/06/2014 
Façade Project 
Manager 
08/07/2015 Main Contractor 
Design Manager 
05/07/2014 M&E 
Consultant 
Associate 
Director 
11/06/2014 
Façade Consultant 23/06/2015 Main Contractor 
M&E Services 
Manager 
05/07/2014 M&E 
Consultant 
Electrical 
Engineer 
11/06/2014 
Main Contractor 
Design Manager 
25/02/2015 M&E contractor 
Project Manager 
19/11/2014 Main Contractor 
Package 
Manager 
14/10/2014 
Main Contractor 
M&E Manager 
25/02/2015 Site Electrical 
Contractor 
19/11/2014 Electrical 
Contractor Lead 
Engineer 
14/10/2014 
Wiring contractor 
Project Manager 
13/05/2015 Client Project 
Manager 
19/08/2014 Client 13/10/2014 
  Lettings 
Manager 
19/11/2014 Planning Officer 16/10/2014 
Table 5-5: Table of interviewees 
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 Documents 5.3.4
Interviewees were asked to bring supporting documents to their interviews and in most cases 
they did.  These documents were in the form of drawings, photographs and specifications.  In 
one case the interviewee brought his laptop and illustrated his points with the BIM model of 
the façade installation.  In another case an architect brought a power point presentation to 
illustrate the evolution of the building and BIPV system.  All of the documents that were 
given to the researcher were archived, after being assigned document numbers which 
corresponded to the interviewee ID number.  Photographs of each project were taken to show 
the context of the BIPV, the building into which it is incorporated and details of the PV 
installation.  Publically available documents in the form of PR reports and Company press 
communications were consulted to give context to the case studies. 
 Design and Build contracts used on the case studies 5.3.5
All three case studies used Design and Build contracts.  This type of contract follows very 
specific ways of working which govern the formal way that projects are managed and run.  
Design and Build (D/B) is a method of procurement where after sanction of a project all the 
design and construction services of a project are contracted to a single firm.  The client has a 
contract with the so-called main contractor who is responsible for managing all aspects of the 
project once it has been sanctioned by the client.  Prior to the D/B contract being put in place, 
the client engages the concept design team - usually consisting of an architect, design 
consultant and project manager (who is often the main contractor working on a fee basis in 
the initial stages).  This team scopes out the project, agrees the initial design and develops 
outline costings.  The client approves the design and then appoints the main contractor to run 
all aspects of the project from design through to construction and commissioning and 
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handover.  The concept design team may be novated to the main contractor, which means that 
they work on the project for the main contractor for the duration of the project.  In some 
cases, rather than being novated to the main contractor, the architect and design consultant 
continue to work as independent client advisors, liaising closely with the main contractor (this 
was the case for Future Green and Synergy Court).  The main contractor is responsible for 
detailing the design, appointing suppliers, managing the project and delivering the project on 
budget and on schedule (Gething, 2011; JCT, 2011).  
 Formal project procedures applying to the case studies 5.3.6
Each of the case studies was governed by similar formal procedures and systems.  Building 
projects in the UK are often described in terms of the Royal Institute of British Architects 
(RIBA) model.  These include: business justification (stage 1), feasibility studies (stage 2), 
project brief (stage 3), concept design (stage 4a and 4b), detail design (stage 5), production 
information (stage 6), mobilisation (stage 7), construction (stage 8), occupation and defects 
liability period (stage 9) and post-occupancy (stage 10 ) (Gething, 2011).  Each stage has a 
defined set of outcomes and procedures and the responsibilities are clearly set out within 
Codes of Conduct and individual project files.  Up to stage 6, the design team is usually 
comprised of the main contractor and its in-house design team, the project architect and a 
group of contracted consultants who advise, design and scope the project.  During stage 6 the 
design team, under the direction of the main consultant, bundles up the project into work 
packages and sends them to suppliers for tender.  It is at this stage that the project schedule or 
plan is drawn up.  Formal procedures for each stage include contractual arrangements, 
agreement of tender documents, sign-off procedures on designs and drawings etc.  
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It is normal for the main contractor’s firm to switch its representative during different stages 
of the project, so the project manager at concept design is likely to be a different project 
manager to the one at detail design and again during mobilisation and construction.  As well 
as this fragmentation of personnel, the supply chain can be long and complex.  Firms within 
the supply chain serve the main contractor or main suppliers, but also have their own ways of 
working and their own alliances and interests.  The main contractor has a great deal of 
flexibility to interpret the stages and procedures and this freedom to orchestrate the project in 
many different ways parallels the bespoke nature of BIPV. 
5.4 Analysis 
Analysis of the data for each case study followed the same steps.  After coding the interviews, 
SCOT diagrams were drawn up and a narrative written to reflect the different actor 
perspectives.  Then an exploration of the technological frames and how they played out 
through the project was carried out.  Following this, the co-development of the BIPV system 
and the building was examined and co-development diagrams were drawn up.  The final stage 
of analysis involved exploring the data for issues about BIPV and the challenges which it 
poses for project teams. 
The Coding of the anonymised transcripts used the provisional coding developed from the 
pilot study, which was further refined as coding and analysis continued.  A full list of nodes 
used is set out in Appendix A4.  One particular area of coding which emerged was the 
previous relationships between project actors, which seemed to affect decision-making on the 
projects.  Additional codes were added to take these factors into account.    
As the interview data was being coded, consideration was also given to the technological 
frames which had been developed from the pilot study.  It became clear that these were not 
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adequate to describe the full range of perspectives being recounted in the interviews.  As a 
result, two extra technological frames were added: Time Sentry and Risk Minimiser.  The 
Time Sentry’s main interest in the inclusion of BIPV on a project was to ensure that the 
project was not delayed by any part of the BIPV system.  The Risk Minimiser was concerned 
to prevent any risk in terms of contract breach, warranty invalidation or system operation 
arising from the incorporation of BIPV into the design.  Table 5-6 gives an updated table 
showing the main interests of all of the technological frames.  Appendix A3 gives a more 
detailed account of each frame. 
Technological 
Frame 
Main interest of Technological Frame 
Design Aesthete BIPV is part of the building which is a flagship architectural 
design 
Green Guardians BIPV reduces carbon emissions of the building and meets 
planning requirements 
Design Optimiser The process of design is efficient 
Generation 
Maximiser 
The PV system generates to its maximum potential 
Cost Watcher Project costs are kept to a minimum and financial case is 
maintained 
Users The system is fit for purpose and the generation does not 
negatively impact facilities management. 
Time Sentry To keep the project running on time  
Risk Minimiser Prevent risk in the form of warranty claims, broken contracts 
or poor performance 
Table 5-6: Additional Technological Frames 
For each case study, starting with a project stage (initial design, pre-tender design, tender, 
detail design, installation etc.) a search was made using the NVivo software and all examples 
of problems which occurred during that stage were identified.  SCOT diagrams for each stage 
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were then constructed, with consideration given to those artefacts, technological frames, 
problems and solutions which had been discussed in the interviews.   
As analysis proceeded, it became clear that the constitution of technological frames changed 
over time and that adding a note of which actor mobilised which frame at each time would 
allow for exploration of this dynamic.  In a departure from the recognised outline method 
(Bijker, 1999), technological frames were used in SCOT diagrams rather than the more usual 
RSGs and the actors within each of these frames at any moment were also noted.  Each 
project stage was covered, until a complete map of the project had been drawn and all the 
interview data on problems and solutions had been included.  Using the multiple actor 
perspectives from the SCOT diagrams, the narrative of the project was then drawn together 
and illustrated with extracts from the interviews.  
Once the SCOT diagrams had been drawn, a detailed exploration of the composition of the 
technological frames started.  This included developing an understanding of which actors 
were part of which frame at any time in the project, noting which technological frame or 
frames were involved in particular problem solving, and which frame was dominant at any 
one time.  This analysis of the shifting nature of the groups and their inter-relationships 
formed one of the main parts of the research findings.  
As the research question was to explore “how the mutual articulation of a building and the 
technology develop as BIPV is incorporated within a building”, the SCOT diagrams were 
considered in this light and co-development drawings were constructed, showing the changes 
made to the building and the BIPV system and the relationship between the two.  One of these 
diagrams was developed for each case study.  The method of development of these diagrams 
was experimental, but the format decided on is illustrated in Figure 5-4, where the first shaded 
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horizontal line of boxes represents stages of the building development and the second shaded 
line of boxes represents changes to the BIPV system.  The lines between them show the 
relationship between the two, whilst the white boxes mark key moments or outcomes in the 
project.   
 
Figure 5-4: Example of a co-development diagram 
Each project co-development drawing was studied and then broken down into discrete 
“episodes” of the co-development story.  These episodes were drawn out in greater detail and 
analysed so that the types of co-development and the decision-making process which led to 
this co-development could be understood. 
The final part of the analysis was to look at the data with a view to identifying issues about 
BIPV and the challenges which it poses for project teams.  Each case study offered examples 
of challenges which had particular relevance for the construction sector and especially for the 
standard procedures and practices encountered in construction projects. 
5.5 Cross case analysis 
The purpose of this research is to explore how the adoption of technology is a dynamic 
process between the local context, the actors and the technology.  Using SCOT to analyse the 
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three case studies allowed a micro-level analysis of what occurred during the incorporation of 
BIPV within each project.  SCOT does not allow for any comparison of similarities or 
differences in processes, mechanisms and outcomes which might inform an understanding of 
the process of adoption of technology.  To achieve this level of abstraction, a cross case 
analysis was carried out to explore the levels and types of integration occurring and the 
dynamics of adoption and co-development.  These two themes merged from the literature 
review and data from individual case study analysis. 
The case study data was re-analysed to identify factors of each case which might account for 
differences in integration in terms of technology integration, team integration and process 
integration.  This re-analysis was repeated to identify elements which might account for the 
dynamics of adoption in terms of the technological frames mobilised, the decisions taken and 
the types of co-development that took place within the case studies.  Together these 
comparisons brought into focus an understanding of some the mechanisms which occurred in 
the process of the adoption of BIPV in projects, and used these to consider stabilisation 
mechanisms and uses these to consider stabilisation mechanisms which fixed particular 
design features of both BIPV and the building. 
5.6 Limitations of the research design and blind spots 
When reaching conclusions in research it is as important to understand what the research will 
not show as it is to present what it does show.  These limitations can be considered in terms of 
“blind spots” of the theory used, limitations in the research design and “blank spots” (Wagner, 
1993. p17) or deficiencies in the research data or population included in the research.   
SCOT provides a framework to look at the unfolding development of a technological 
assemblage in terms of the artefacts, the actors, their frames, and the problems and solutions 
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which occur.  It is a micro-level approach which does not consider the firm level or 
institutional contexts within which the research takes place.  One of the major criticisms of 
the approach is that power relationships, economic and intellectual reasons for choices, and 
cultural factors are not taken into account (Winner, 1993).  In terms of this research these 
criticisms imply that the effects of economic policy, firm level strategy and contractual 
relationships between firms will not be taken into account.  Careful consideration of the 
technological frames to some extent mitigates the effect of these blind spots (Klein & 
Kleinman, 2002), but the purpose of the research is to explore the process of adoption and as 
such it merits a fine grained approach, rather than a broader institutional study. 
Limitations in the research design spring from two factors.  Firstly, the research relied on 
actors’ accounts to identify the relevant networks and events in the case studies.  This 
subjectivity means that some perspectives may have been missed because some relevant 
actors may not have been interviewed and some events may have been glossed over in the 
accounts of the case studies.  This limitation is addressed to an extent by the snowballing 
technique, which tries to pick up all the actors mentioned, but some accounts will inevitably 
have slipped through the net.  Second, the research relies upon the researcher’s subjective 
assessment of the interviews and documents, her individual perceptions of what happened and 
what was important.  The narrative developed is a patchwork of different accounts given at 
different times with individual bias.  Whilst this subjectivity is a feature of the approach, it 
does mean that checks or counter-balance in the form of a second point of view in coding and 
analysis were absent. Documents presented at interviews were used to support the accuracy of 
the narrative and to ensure that technical details were correctly presented. 
Finally, deficiencies in the research data or population should be considered.  As has been 
touched on above, finding the research population relied heavily on the nomination of actors 
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by interviewees.  Given the rapid turnover rate in the construction sector and the way that 
actors join and leave firms or projects, it was not possible to interview or contact all of the 
actors mentioned in interviews.  Sometimes the interviewees relied on historical memory 
passed on by predecessors and sometimes there were just blank spots in the data, when no one 
could remember the exact sequence of events, or all of the possible solutions that were 
suggested at the time.  Similarly, often because of inter-firm issues of confidentiality 
documentary evidence in the form of meeting minutes and evidence of specification or 
drawing revisions were not generally available.  These would have served as corroborative 
evidence to support accounts and fill in any gaps.  It was not possible to interview the 
tradesmen involved in the project and so the accounts from this particular front-line 
population are also missing from the data.  Despite these limitations, the number of actors 
interviewed for each case study and the broad level of agreement between the accounts would 
suggest that the data can be relied on and is as complete as practical. 
5.7 Ethics 
This research was conducted in line with the University of Reading’s Code of Ethics.  Prior to 
data gathering, the research design and methods were approved by the School of Construction 
Management and Engineering Research and Ethics Committee.  Sample information sheets 
and interview consent sheets were submitted and procedures for processing and storing data 
were approved.  Sample consent sheets and information sheets are included in Appendix A5. 
Prior to interview all participants were fully informed about the purpose of the research and 
were given an information sheet to read and a consent form to sign (Appendix A5).  All 
interviewees were given the opportunity to view transcripts of interviews and redact any parts 
they were unhappy with. 
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In line with the Code of Ethics, all data was anonymised immediately after transcription and 
before uploading into NVivo.  Case study names were chosen to hide the identity of projects, 
firms and individuals.  Direct quotes in papers arising from the research were attributed to 
formal roles, rather than company positions (for example: Architect rather than “Executive 
Partner, Architect”; or PV laminate supplier rather than “Area Sales Manager”) and all firms 
and contacts mentioned in the interviews were also anonymised.   
The impact of the interviews on the participants in terms of risk, balance and mental health 
were assessed as part of the ethics approval procedure.  No direct or indirect effects were 
identified.  All data was treated in line with the confidentiality and storage requirements 
which form part of the ethics protocol.  Data was stored securely either in a locked office and 
filing cabinet or on a password protected computer. 
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 Case Study - Vogue Terrace Chapter 6:
This chapter presents the first case study (Vogue Terrace).  After a general description of the 
project, the chapter then breaks down the case study into five key episodes which dominated 
the interviews: initial scheme; pre-tender and tender process; detail design; wiring; and 
installation.  For each episode the chapter provides a narrative account of what happened, 
focusing on the succession of problems and solutions, reflecting on the changing 
technological frames of the actors, and exploring the co-development of the building and the 
BIPV.  The chapter goes on to summarise the way that actors mobilised different frames at 
different times throughout the project, and explores the mechanisms of co-development 
between the building and the technology.  Finally the chapter summarises the issues and the 
challenges which the project team faced as BIPV was integrated within the project.   
6.1 Description 
Vogue Terrace is a commercial office building and forms part of a three phase refurbishment 
project in which three adjacent office blocks were reduced to a skeleton and then effectively 
reconstructed.  The phased development started in the mid-2000s with Vogue Terrace being 
the last of the three blocks to be constructed.  Initial planning permission was granted in 2007, 
but the project was mothballed during the recession which began in 2008.  Work began again 
in 2012, with tenders for the major contracts going out in early 2014.  Work on site began in 
August 2014, with work on the BIPV installation commencing February 2015.  BIPV was 
integrated into 672 brise-soleil louvres on the south elevation of the building.  The  BIPV 
system was thought to generate around 70kW peak. 
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The project used a “Design and Build” contract, with the client stipulating that the same 
design and construction team was to be used on all three projects.  Some of these project 
personnel were named in the client contract (in particular the main contractor’s M&E design 
manager).  
Interviewing took place over a two and a half year period, starting before construction with 
one interview with the PV panel supplier and three interviews with the architect.  This was 
followed by eight interviews with members of the project team during the construction period.  
Chapter 5 (Methods) gives detailed information about those interviewed.  In the following 
analysis interviewees are referenced by the firm they represent: architect (MH); main 
contractor (WR); M&E design consultant (DC); façade supplier (QC); façade consultant 
(WH); PV wiring contractor (DEP); and PV laminate supplier (LE).  The PV laminate 
supplier (LE) is a different company to the BIPV supplier (Myd).  A number is added to the 
reference as a unique identifier for each actor in the firm (for example: “main contractor 
(WR01)” represents the main contractor firm - WR, and is the first actor interviewed from 
that firm.  “Main contractor (WR02)” indicates the second person interviewed at the main 
contractor firm).  
6.2 Episode 1: the initial scheme 
The first episode covers the development of the concept design for the building to the point 
that the work packages for tender had been developed. 
 Episode 1: narrative account 6.2.1
The client commissioned a phased development of three adjacent properties.  To meet the 
local authority planning requirements for renewable energy, and as part of the client’s 
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commitment to carbon reduction, the client, architect (MH) and design consultant (DC) 
developed a sustainability strategy for the three buildings and this was agreed with the 
planning office.  The client and architect (MH) insisted that the sustainability strategy be 
based on an integrated mix of technologies.  The strategy included the provision of PV, a 
ground source heat pump and several other sustainable features (chilled beams, air filtering, 
LED lighting etc.).  Planning permission was granted on the basis of a coherent development 
plan which included the use of PV on the project.  At this point, in keeping with the early 
stage of the project, the technologies and building itself were considered in schematic form, 
with the technology being thought of as little more than “black boxes” within a broad design. 
The architect (MH01) illustrated this black-boxing of technologies when he explained how in 
the initial phase of the project the design team were unaware of the implications of the 
sustainability strategy. 
The planning condition is tied to the proposal of renewables rather than a 
figure….there is a figure in there, but I think if somebody challenged it we’d have a 
lot less on the building, just because at the time I don’t quite think everybody knew 
exactly what it meant to have 10% renewables. 
Architect (MH01) 
In 2007, following the successful completion of the first two phases of the development, the 
client wanted to ensure that the third phase proceeded as successfully as the other two (both in 
terms of efficiency of construction and the aesthetics of the final development) and insisted 
that the same project teams and major contractors be involved for the final phase (including 
the architectural practice (MH) and the façade supplier (QC)).  In some cases named 
individuals were requested (WR01).  None of the individuals who were nominated to the 
project had prior experience of BIPV. 
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They told us that they would like to go back only to the people which they worked 
[with] before, without competition. Obviously the price has to be right, otherwise they 
open up the competition to a wider field 
Façade supplier (QC01) 
As part of the contractual deal that we did with the client, where possible, members of 
the original team were asked to come back and complete [Vogue Terrace], so that’s 
how I got involved in it. 
Façade consultant (WH01) 
Although the project team for the third phase was appointed in 2007, the project was then 
mothballed until 2012 because of the recession.  During this time the client considered 
various options for the building to realise an economic return.  One was the conversion of the 
site to residential and student housing, but as the area was considered by the architect (MH) 
and planners to be unsuitable for residential development, the original plan for a commercial 
building was retained.  On re-opening the project in 2012, the client was concerned that the 
design remain current, and as part of the design review the architect (MH) suggested using PV 
cells in the external brise-soleil louvres on the south elevation of the building.  This had the 
advantage of using a technology which was already included in in the sustainability strategy, 
while also bringing an element of contemporary design.  The use of BIPV in the brise-soleil 
louvres became a central element of the external modern look of the building.  The purpose of 
the PV brise-soleil was encapsulated by the façade consultant (WH01). 
Vogue Terrace was a “stop and start” 3 times. I think on the rear elevation…it's about 
adding interest to the building more than anything else. Did it deliver anything else? 
No, not really. The glass, the design of the glass, the development of the façade did 
everything it needed to do. It did all the solar shading …heat gain, heat loss - that was 
all managed with the glass in the system. 
Façade consultant (WH01) 
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The architect (MH) had no experience of using BIPV, but worked extensively with the PV 
laminate supplier (LE) to establish a viable proposal.  The PV laminate supplier (LE) was 
keen to discuss the design with the architect (MH) to develop the potential business, but at the 
same time steered clear of any detailed work, as he was aware that his firm might not be 
awarded the contract and was not paid for this initial work.  It was at this point that the 
architect (MH) first became aware that BIPV was a system with many interconnected 
technologies and focussed on the PV panels, the frame into which they would fit, the way that 
wires would enter the building and the location of the inverters.  During discussions with the 
PV laminate supplier (LE) the architect (MH) realised that the users of the building would see 
an unsightly grid of grey PV cells on each louvre.  In response to the architect’s concerns 
about this, the PV laminate supplier (LE) offered the possibility of a white glass interlayer to 
improve the aesthetics.  As the design moved from outline to more detailed design the design 
input from the PV laminate glass supplier (LE) reduced because of the uncertainty of winning 
the tender.   
During the initial design stage, a mechanical and electrical design consultant (DC) carried out 
a rough sizing of the BIPV system by calculating the number of louvres that would be 
installed on the elevation of the building.  This design specified the number of brise-soleil 
louvres, the spacing of the cells within the louvres and the number of inverters required.  Prior 
to agreeing the initial design, the client, architect (LE) and main contractor (WR) carried out a 
review of project costings and found the project to be over budget.  A Value Engineering 
(VE) exercise took place and the PV panels were identified as a significant cost item.  The 
architect (MH) and client were intent on keeping the BIPV to keep the building up to date and 
to keep the sustainability strategy on track.  The compromise made was to squeeze an 
additional two PV cells into each louvre and so reduce the total number of PV louvres without 
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compromising the calculated generation potential of 70kW peak.  The client decided to reduce 
the finishes specification on the internal fixings, rather than get rid of the PV louvres.  This 
was highlighted by the architect when talking about the Value Engineering exercise. 
Without them being the client that they are, it wouldn’t be there. So they bought into 
it, and they’re now insisting on having it. So much so that when the contractors were 
pricing the scheme to build it, it was coming in over budget, and [the client] said well 
we’re not changing the photovoltaics, so the money went out of finishes, which was a 
good step. 
Architect (MH01) 
The discussions between the architect, PV laminate supplier (LE) and M&E design contractor 
(WR) were based on costs and the number of PV brise-soleil louvres, rather than how the 
electricity generated by the BIPV system would be integrated with the mains electricity 
supply.  The architect developed a scheme for the wiring from the PV cells which involved 
penetrating the façade through the window seals and running through the landlord riser to 
inverters sited by the lift shaft.  A major consideration for this decision was that the wiring 
should be invisible from the outside - the architect (MH) had concerns that the clean lines of 
the building should not be spoilt by visible external wiring wires and that the wires would sag 
if the cable runs were of any significant length.  The number and exact siting of the inverters 
was undecided and this meant that the wiring runs and floor plans were left open - the 
situation was summed up by the architect during the first interview.  
Any riser space is premium, so we’d like to have as few inverters as possible. If he 
came back and said oh, I need one every four floors, and it’s that big and we can put it 
in there, that would be great. But we think he’s going to come back and say I need two 
every floor, where can they go? And they’ll want to be in some random place. But that 
process has to happen, it’s unfortunate that there was nobody at the design stage to be 
able to give us that advice. 
Architect (MH01) 
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At this point the initial design was stabilised as the basis for appointing a main contractor 
(WR) and drawing up tender documents.  Given the delays on the project the client was keen 
to move forward and the main contractor (nominated by the client because of their 
involvement in the previous two phases) proceeded to draw up the work packages for tender.  
Neither the architect nor the main contractor was familiar with PV design so the detail of the 
layout and specification for the PV system was very loosely defined.   
The architect (MH) worked with the PV laminate supplier (LE) to optimise the spacing of the 
PV cells in each louvre in terms of the aesthetics of each panel.  The architect felt it important 
to have even an spacing of the cells with a precise margin of clear glass around the edges of 
the panel.  The PV layout was included in a two-page specification which was used by the 
main contractor as the basis for the tender document for the PV system.  The discussion 
around the BIPV system focussed on the aesthetics and design layout, rather than its 
generation potential.  This emphasis was underlined by the façade consultant (WH). 
Once LE got involved, it all became around what it looked like, how we were 
manufacturing it, how we were wiring it, more than what the output was. 
Façade consultant (WH01) 
The list of contractors to be approached for tender was based on those used in the previous 
two phases of the development, as specified by the client.  The main contractor (WR) divided 
work packages in a similar way to the previous phases.  The PV system was included in the 
façade work package. 
 Episode 1: technological frames 6.2.2
This section illustrates how the actors viewed the technology through different frames 
throughout this episode and how tensions developed between the RSGs over conflicting 
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goals.  Figure 6-1 shows how the network of actors, technological frames, problems and 
solutions played out during the initial design episode and the following description draws 
attention to the main highlights of the episode  
Chapter 5 (Methods) outlined the six distinct technological frames which were identified 
through the pilot study (Design Aesthete, Design Optimiser, Green Guardian, Generation 
Maximiser, Cost Watcher and User).  Two further frames (Time Sentry and Risk Minimiser) 
were added during the analysis.  Over the course of the project, the actors unwittingly 
mobilised these technological frames as they negotiated the problems and solutions on the 
project.   
At the start of the project the architect (MH) and client saw the project through the Design 
Aesthete frame as they developed a cohesive three stage design plan for the site.  Both the 
local planning representative and the client took on the Green Guardian frame, as they were 
concerned with ensuring that the building included sustainable technology and that there was 
sustainability strategy for all three buildings.  The architect (MH) also adopted the Green 
Guardian frame to develop sustainable solutions for the buildings - including a ground source 
heat pump, chilled beams, LED lighting and the use of PV power.  After the project had been 
mothballed for four years, the client and architect (MH) reviewed the project and mobilised 
the frame of the Design Aesthete, amid concerns that the building should not look dated.  
They viewed BIPV as an integral part of the building identity, making a positive contribution 
to the design aesthetics of the building.  The client mobilised the Risk Minimiser frame to 
maintain the team that had delivered the other two phases of the project, and so locked-in the 
supply chain.  As the initial design got underway the M&E design consultant (DC) mobilised 
the Generation Maximiser frame as he tried to maximise the PV generation of the system by 
Chapter 6: Case Study 1 – Vogue Terrace 
104 
 
fitting as many cells to as many louvres as possible on the south facing façade and sizing 
inverters to match the system.   
Just before the initial design was signed off by the project team the final cost estimate was 
drawn up by the main contractor (WR).  Viewing the project through the frame of the Cost 
Watcher, the client and main contractor called for a value engineering exercise to reduce 
costs.  During this exercise attention was drawn to the cost of the BIPV system and the main 
contractor (WR) proposed that the system be dropped from the project.  Using the Green 
Guardian frame, the client refused to follow this option, and instead chose to reduce the 
indoor finishes specification on the building, whilst maintaining the commitment to 
sustainability.  The architect (MH) adopted the Generation Maximiser frame as he worked 
with the M&E consultant (DC) to reduce the number of PV louvres on the façade and increase 
the number of PV cells in each louvre.  He also adopted the Green Guardian frame to work 
within the BREEAM guidelines to achieve an “excellent” rated building and to fulfil the 
planning authority requirements of the sustainable strategy for the project.   
Although the PV laminate supplier (LE) normally viewed the technology through the frame of  
Design Optimiser, he worked intermittently with the architect (MH), using the Design 
Aesthete frame to develop a workable, symmetrical cell layout on each louvre, and offered to 
provide a white interlayer to improve the appearance of the louvres to the occupants of the 
building.  Figure 6-1 summarises the changing pattern of problems and solutions as the initial 
design progressed and shows how the technological frames were mobilised by the actors. 
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Figure 6-1: Technological frames mobilized in episode 1 (initial design), Vogue Terrace 
The analysis above illustrates how the various technological frames were mobilised by the 
actors during this episode and that many of the actors related to the technology through more 
than one frame.  The analysis also demonstrates how conflicting goals between actors using 
different frames gave rise to problems and how solutions were developed through different 
mechanisms.  The following examples illustrate these points. 
Chapter 6: Case Study 1 – Vogue Terrace 
106 
 
- One particular frame was established as the dominant frame which drove the solution 
(the Green Guardian frame became the dominant frame when the client decided that 
BIPV had to be included in the design).   
- The design was revised to accommodate multiple frames (the revised design satisfied 
both requirements by cutting costs and satisfying the sustainability strategy).   
 Episode 1: co-development 6.2.3
This first episode illustrates how rather than the BIPV or the building being fixed, the BIPV 
system accommodated the building and vice-versa.  The summary of co-development during 
the whole case study is presented in section 6.7.2, but three important elements of the co-
development of building and technology occurred in this episode of the project.  
i. The early decision to use BIPV as a very visible statement about the modernity of the 
building, and the inclusion of PV technology in the sustainability strategy for the 
project, led to the privileging of BIPV over the standard of finishes in the building 
specification.  
ii. The decision to use the same supply chain for Vogue Terrace as for the previous two 
phases locked-in the expertise available for the development of the BIPV system.  
iii. The architect’s desire to ensure that the wiring could not be seen externally 
complicated wiring runs. 
6.3 Episode 2: pre-tender and tender 
The second episode follows from the initial design, where the use of BIPV as brise-soleil 
louvres had been agreed and the supply chain for the major building contracts had been 
determined.  The pre-tender and tender episode follows the development of the detailed 
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system and building design, and begins after the pre-tender design team had carried out a 
value engineering (VE) exercise to reduce project costs. 
 Episode 2: narrative account 6.3.1
The client-nominated façade supplier (QC) received the tender package and, together with the 
façade consultant (WH) (who had also been involved in the first two phases and was novated 
to the main contractor to liaise with the façade supplier), considered the PV element of the 
work package.  Although the façade supplier (QC) had occasionally dealt with roof mounted 
PV systems, the firm had no experience of BIPV and was concerned about the effect on water 
and air tightness of penetrating the façade with wiring.  The façade supplier (QC) had initial 
discussions with two PV laminate suppliers to scope out the bid.  The façade supplier was 
prepared to use the quote from one of them (LE) as part of their bid, but was not prepared to 
consider the wiring or inverters as part of the package.  This reluctance was summarised by 
the façade supplier 
That’s why we said that we don’t want to get involved in that, because otherwise we 
would need some kind of an electrical engineering assistance to check on that…and 
that’s not something which we wanted to get involved in. 
Façade supplier (QC01) 
Ultimately the façade supplier (QC) declined to include the PV system within their package.  
The main contractor (WR) discussed the decision with the façade consultant (WH), who 
supported the façade supplier (QC) in their decision.  The architect (MH) was uncomfortable 
with this decision, but the main contractor (WR) was comfortable that the façade and PV 
packages could be de-coupled. 
The main contractor (WR) had recently acquired a subsidiary (Myd) which had a PV business 
and because of this decided to take the PV system out of the façade contract and to appoint 
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Myd as the BIPV supplier.  The main contractor (WR), architect (QC) and BIPV supplier 
(Myd) discussed the PV package and identified five main issues: the type of cells used; how 
to get the wires from the cells to the inverters; how to group the wire; how to connect up the 
system in terms of strings; where to site the inverters; and how many inverters would be 
needed.  The BIPV supplier (Myd) was keen to substitute the monocrystalline cells with the 
cheaper alternative of polycrystalline, in order to reduce costs and increase their profit 
margins.  However the architect (MH) was insistent that monocrystalline technology was used 
as polycrystalline cells had a lower efficiency.  This interplay was described by the architect 
in his second interview. 
They’re trying to rationalise this, because the first question this guy asked is well, 
we’ll just use the polycrystals, and we said well, why? And he said oh, because they’re 
cheaper, but we didn’t want cheap ones, we wanted the monocrystals, because they’re 
a lot better quality. And he said yeah, but nowadays they’re so close. And we said 
well, but are they the same? And he said no, the monocrystals still do have that little 
bit of quality, but it’s marginal. I said well, over 672 times, there’s 22 cells per louvre, 
times 672, so anything that’s marginal, is big. 
Architect (MH01) 
The BIPV contractor (Myd) suggested that two inverters per floor would be needed in the 
landlord riser, but the main contractor (WR) was unhappy with the space that this number of 
inverters would take up in the already congested riser.  The architect (MH) was concerned 
that the wires would not detract from the aesthetics either internally or externally and came up 
with several designs where the wires would penetrate through the bracketry or through the 
join line of the glass in each bay of four louvres.  The main contractor (WR) and PV laminate 
supplier (LE) were interested in minimising costs and wanted to run the wiring horizontally 
across the façade, penetrating the façade at just one point.  Because of the relatively low cost 
of the PV system (compared to the total project cost) and because of the in-house relationship 
between the main contractor (WR) and the BIPV supplier (Myd), the detailed design issues 
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remained unresolved and Myd was left to develop the design.  The main contractor (WR) 
assumed that Myd had the necessary expertise to deliver the design and install the system.  
This in-house relationship was described by the main contractor (WR) as follows:  
At the time we owned a chunk of that [Myd] so I think where we were sitting there 
feeling all blasé and thinking well, we own a company who does this, it’s going to be 
a piece of cake. 
Main contractor (WR02) 
After these discussions the BIPV supplier (Myd) became very hard to reach and no design 
information was made available.  In the intervening weeks the BIPV supplier (Myd) was sold 
by the main contractor (WR), but the main contractor still expected the PV system to be 
supplied by Myd.  Finally the BIPV system designer at Myd contacted the main contractor 
(WR) and said that he was leaving the company.  It became clear to the main contractor (WR) 
that Myd would no longer provide the PV system.  This put the PV system behind schedule 
and rather than risk further delays, the main contractor (WR) made the decision to split the 
PV procurement into two parts - the panels and the electrical system.  This decision was made 
to keep the project schedule on track.  As the schedule was pressing for the PV panels to be 
procured and fitted to the façade brackets, the main contractor approached the original PV 
panel supplier (LE) to ask for a quotation for the panels.  The electrical part of the PV system 
was put on hold, as the main contractor (WR) considered that it was non-critical and could 
wait until later in the project to be designed and procured.   
Façade design is complex and complicated; second to M&E this is the second biggest 
package on any job. So they always want to procure M&E early and they always want 
to procure the façades early. 
Façade consultant (WH01) 
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The laminate panel supplier (LE) quoted for the panels and as the cost for these was much 
lower than the package price from Myd, the main contractor decided to increase his profit 
margin by “free issuing” the PV panels to the façade supplier (QC), and to use the façade 
consultant (WH) as an intermediary between the PV laminate supplier (LE) and the façade 
supplier (QC).  The driving force for the decision was a financial one for the main contractor 
(WR), but the decision also suited the façade supplier (QC).  This situation is illustrated in the 
following extract. 
It was implied that QC would be quoting it and QC made it quite clear they didn't 
want to do all that...And it was financially beneficial for...we’re trying to get some 
benefit in the end. I mean it was a matter of getting a price for the job that the client 
could say, yes I can commit to that. 
Main contractor (WR02) 
The façade contract was changed to include all the bracketry and frames for the PV louvres, 
on the understanding that the laminated PV panels would be supplied as “free issue” to the 
façade supplier (QC). 
 Episode 2: technological frames 6.3.2
The following analysis illustrates how tensions between actors with different technological 
frames led to conflicts.  Figure 6-2 shows how the network of actors, technological frames, 
problems and solutions played out during the tender episode and the following description 
draws attention to the main highlights of the episode 
In line with the client’s requirement, the main contractor (WR) drew up the tender packages 
and issued them to the previously agreed supply chain.  The BIPV system was included 
within the façade supplier’s package (QC), even though the façade supplier had no experience 
of BIPV other than roof-top (BAPV) installations.  Looking at the work package through the 
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Design Optimiser frame, the façade supplier (QC) was concerned that the PV design was 
unfamiliar and began to investigate ways to accommodate wiring without risking the integrity 
of the façade.  Concerned with unknown costs (Cost Watcher frame), unfamiliar technology, 
and problems of integrating it without risking weather-tightness (Risk Minimiser frame), the 
façade supplier (QC) refused to include the BIPV system within the package.  It is interesting 
to note that the tender document itself (in the form of a contract) played an important part in 
making clear the potential risks of agreeing to supply the BIPV system and in the façade 
supplier’s decision not to include the system in their quote. 
The main contractor (WR) accepted this refusal both because the client had insisted on the 
façade supplier as part of the project contract and also because it was an opportunity to reduce 
costs by appointing a BIPV supplier (Myd) who was a subsidiary to the main contractor 
company (Cost Watcher frame).  The BIPV supplier (Myd) agreed to take the work package 
and worked through the Design Optimiser frame to develop solutions to get the wires inside 
the building, to determine the sizing of inverters and to decide where to site them.  The 
architect (MH) had concerns over reducing the visual impact of the BIPV wiring (Design 
Aesthete frame).  Conflict arose when the BIPV supplier (Myd) wanted to reduce the 
specification of the technology to polycrystalline cells (in an effort to reduce costs).  The 
architect (MH) was sufficiently invested with the Generation Maximiser frame to insist on 
monocrystalline cells and refused. 
Once the BIPV supplier (Myd) disengaged from the project, the main contractor (WR) was 
concerned about the project schedule (Time Sentry frame) and made the decision to decouple 
the BIPV system by “free issuing” the PV louvres to the façade supplier (QC) and putting the 
electrical work for the BIPV system into a new work package to be sent out to tender with 
wiring contractors.  One other factor in this decision was to reduce costs by dealing directly 
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with the PV laminate supplier (LE) and free issue the PV panels to the façade supplier (QC), 
thereby improving profit margins.  This combining of the Cost Watcher and Time Sentry 
frames forced a decision to be taken which had huge impacts on the delivery of the BIPV 
system, with very little consideration of the consequences. 
This episode is characterised by a series of tensions which arose when an actor viewed the 
technology through multiple frames - the façade supplier (QC) saw the BIPV both as a 
potential source of profit, but also as source of risk.  The main contractor (WR) saw the BIPV 
contract as a problem with regard to time and as an opportunity to reduce costs.  It is 
interesting to note that in both cases decisions were taken in isolation from other project 
actors and this “silo-ing” effect obscured the full implications of these decisions on the 
project. 
During this episode there were very few instances when actors from one frame could see the 
technology through other frames and could then present their ideas in such a way that it 
became acceptable to those using other frames.  This marks a characteristic of the project - it 
was run generally as a series of separate tenders, with very little understanding of how the 
various tender packages were connected.  The analysis above illustrates how the Cost 
Watcher, Time Sentry and Risk Minimiser frames had a particular influence on non-
collaborative decision-making during this episode even though the artefacts they represent are 
not physically present.  The analysis also demonstrates how technological frames can explain 
how conflicting goals between actors using different frames gave rise to problems and how 
solutions were then developed through different mechanisms.  
Figure 6-2 summarises the changing pattern of problems and solutions as the initial design 
progressed and shows how the technological frames were mobilised by the actors.  
Chapter 6: Case Study 1 – Vogue Terrace 
113 
 
Main Contractori  tr ct r
Façade supplier
Main contractor
Main contractor
Architect
Main Contractor
Myd
Main Contractor
low profit 
margins
Façade 
integrity 
risk
PV design 
unfamiliar
PV design 
unfamiliar
Façade
How to get 
the wires in
Exclude PV 
from façade 
design
Façade supplier
Design 
Optimiser
Embrace 
challenge 
and 
integrate
Cost Watcher
Cost Watcher
PV falls 
outside 
design 
packages
Free Issue 
Panels to 
façade 
supplier
Appoint PV 
contractor
PV 
contractor 
disengages
Appoint wiring/
electrical 
subcontractor
Main 
subcontractors 
pre-defined
De-couple 
panels and 
wiring
Can’t find 
contractor
Schedule 
at risk 
Time Sentry
Time Sentry
Cost Watcher
Schedule
Profit 
margins 
tight
Keep looking 
for contractor
Wiring 
through 
facade
Invertors in 
landlord 
riser
How to 
group 
cables
How to wire 
them up: 
series/parallel
How many 
inverters?
Location 
of 
inverters
Through join 
line of glass 1 
per bay of 4
Use 24mm 
joint, 
cluster
Inverter
Wiring
Two 
every 
floor
Minimise 
number
Value of 
space
How to get 
wires to the 
inverters?
Physical 
size of 
inverters?
Cost Watcher
Design 
Aesthete
Cables 
shouldn’t 
detract
Wire up the 
side of the 
building
Risk Minimiser
Solution Actor
Technological 
Frame
Artefact Problem
Key
Wiring
Panels
Second PV work package 
First PV work package: included in façade 
package
Panels
Wiring
Free issue of panels
 
Figure 6-2: Technological frames mobilized in episode 2 (pre-tender and tender), Vogue Terrace  
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 Episode 2: co-development 6.3.3
During this episode of the project, four elements of co-development between the building and 
the BIPV system were apparent - two were process related and two were design related. 
Process 
i. The refusal by the façade supplier to include the BIPV system in the tender for the 
building façade work package led to the de-coupling of the BIPV system from the 
building façade contract. 
ii. The decision by the main contractor to de-couple the elements of the BIPV system 
into free issue louvres and an electrical system meant that the BIPV was not designed 
as an integrated system, rather as a series of disparate parts.  This had major 
implications for its design, installation and performance.   
Design 
iii. The need to include BIPV wiring within the frames and brackets led to a re-design of 
all the brise-soleil louvres on the south elevation of the building - whether they were 
PV louvres or not. 
iv. The façade supplier’s refusal to allow the BIPV wiring to penetrate the façade by each 
louvre, because of the risk to the integrity of the façade, meant that the wires for the 
system had to run along the external cladding and then penetrate the façade at each 
floor in order to be connected the two inverters.  The result of this co-development 
was that the wiring would be visible and that increased length wiring runs at low 
voltage would increase system losses. 
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6.4 Episode 3: detail design  
This episode starts when the work packages had been scoped and the decision taken to free 
issue the PV laminate panels to the façade supplier (QC). 
 Episode 3: narrative account 6.4.1
This episode focusses on three detail design issues which involved the BIPV system.  These 
were; glass thickness and notching; white laminate interlayer; and frame and bracket design.  
These three elements of the design brought the co-development of the building and BIPV 
system into focus.  An account of the development of each of these issues is presented.  
Glass thickness and notching 
The original specification to the PV laminate supplier (LE) was for 672 louvre panels of 
laminated glass, 5mm thick, with an interlayer of white laminate and monocrystalline cells.  
Each panel was to fit into a 3-sided frame, to give the effect of the louvres floating out of the 
façade with no visible front edge.  Each glass panel was to have a notch in the centre of the 
rear long edge to allow for a good key when fitting the glass to the three sided “razor blade” 
frame.  However the façade supplier (who was making the frames) offered a bonded joint 
between the frame and glass to reduce the complexity of the frame, but which would make the 
bracket slightly thicker.  This option was accepted by the main contractor on grounds of cost 
and time savings and the architect reluctantly agreed.   
The façade supplier (QC) submitted drawings for the frame to the main contractor (WR) and 
architect (MH) for approval of the extrusion design for the frames.  The architect (MH) was 
concerned that the louvres might bow and spoil the aesthetics of the building.  This had 
happened to the non PV brise-soleil on the adjacent buildings and he was keen that this should 
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not happen again, particularly as the PV panels were heavier than those used in the adjacent 
buildings.  The façade supplier (QC), main contractor (WR), PV laminate supplier (LE) and 
façade consultant (WH) were all concerned on different levels that they might become liable 
should bowing occur and each made a set of calculations based on different methods, each of 
which suggested different glass thicknesses.  The façade supplier (QC) suggested redesigning 
the frames to a “picture frame” design, so that the glass would be supported on all sides and 
minimise the risk of bowing.  The main contractor (WR) felt that this would increase the cost 
of the frames and the architect maintained that this was outside the agreed design in terms of 
aesthetics and the planning permission (although the planners were not approached to give a 
view on this).  The main contractor (WR) had no desire to revisit planning permissions, both 
because of time constraints and because by that time the renewables requirement from the 
Borough Council had changed and new planning permission would possibly require re-
visiting the renewables strategy on the building.  The picture-frame idea was therefore 
rejected and the original “razor blade” frame was retained.   
The main contractor (WR) was unsure whether to insist on 6mm glass laminate to address the 
issue of bowing glass and at the same time the architect (MH) had raised concerns over glass 
strength on impact.  The main contractor (WR) therefore commissioned a series of impact test 
calculations to be undertaken.  The issue of risk and responsibility became heightened, with 
the PV laminate supplier (LE) requesting sign off of the specification, and different firms 
carrying out different calculations.  This situation was resolved when the PV laminate 
supplier (LE) offered to supply the glass at 6mm for no additional cost (it emerged 
subsequently that the PV laminate supplier had already decided, as company policy, to supply 
all laminates at 6mm thickness, so moving from 5mm to 6mm laminate on this project, made 
life simpler for them).   
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A result of this decision was that the façade supplier (QC) had to strengthen the razor-blade 
frame design to support the thicker and consequently heavier louvres.  The change in frame 
dimensions meant that the PV laminate supplier had to adjust the spacing of the individual 
cells in the panel so that the frame did not shade the cells and reduce generation.  The 
fragmented way that this issue was resolved is summarised by a discussion between the two 
main contractor team members (WR01 and WR02). 
We placed the order direct with LE, so to a large extent QC were out of the 
equation…. We had LE do some drawings for us which we then sent to the architect to 
say, are you happy with the sizes, that this fits into the QC system? Once he said, yes 
I’m happy with that. We then sent that to QC …and they overlaid their framework 
onto it with the containment on the back, and then at that particular stage we realised 
that the connections and everything were likely to be affected by the structure of the 
framework … So we then back to LE and said, can you adjust those dimensions by, I 
think it was about 20mm or 30mm. 
Main contractor (WR01) 
QC, they overlaid their framework that they knew, because they knew obviously that 
the PVs were coming, they’d already designed a framework and then it became clear 
by overlaying that that the connectors and the diode were not quite in the right place. 
So then go back to LE and say, right we need to move those in, any problems? No. 
Fine, done, move them in by that much. That drawing then gets sent for final approval. 
QC say, yes. We say, yes. Architect says, yes. Done.  
Main contractor (WR02) 
Interlayer 
The specification for the PV laminate panels included a white interlayer which was to be 
bonded onto the glass between the under-layer of glass and the PV cells.  This had been 
offered by the PV laminate supplier (LE) as a result of discussions with the architect (MH) 
about the aesthetic appearance of the cells to office users.  The aesthetic considerations for 
this design were outlined by the architect (MH). 
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So in the office place they’re looking at three or four of these, and, they’re big -.so it, 
it’s quite a large part of their view. Also, because of the solar shading element, we’re 
going to look at a white interlayer. But what I want to do is make it about 80% so that 
you can still see the squares, so just because they’re there, so you might as well make 
it look nice, or else it just looks like a painted plank outside. 
Architect (MH01) 
As production of the laminate louvres began, the PV laminate supplier (LE) contacted the 
architect (MH) to inform him that the production process was causing the white interlayer to 
be speckled with very small, irregularly occurring dark spots where the interlayer fused to the 
glass in the annealing process.  The PV laminate supplier (LE) offered two solutions: to 
continue with the process and accept the small spots (as they would be virtually invisible once 
installed); or to adopt a screen printing process which would give a more opaque finish, but 
which would be spot free.  The architect (MH) discussed the options with the client and main 
contractor (WR) and they decided to accept a screen printed louvre. 
Frame and Bracket 
The PV laminate panels were to be shipped from the PV laminate supplier (LE) to the façade 
supplier (QC), where the louvre would be fitted into a frame and bracket assembly.  This 
interface was under-scored by the architect: 
I’m trying to arrange a meeting with the cladding contractors, because they need to 
interface. So there’s a buildability issue when this bracket goes through that mullion, 
who’s fixing it, how is it being fixed? You’ve got…the cladding contractor is dealing 
with the unitised cladding, and the photovoltaics guy is dealing with that fixing. 
Architect (MH01) 
The PV louvre, frame and bracket assembly would be packed into specially designed stillages 
and transported to site where they would be bolted directly onto the window just prior to 
installation.  Each laminate PV panel had two electrical connectors and trailing electrical 
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wires which had to be connected to the next panel and thence to the inverters.  The architect 
(MH) had initially wanted the wires to penetrate through the frame and penetrate the façade 
seal at each window.  The façade consultant (WH) had rejected this idea and proposed that the 
cables be run horizontally across each floor of the external façade, and enter the building in 
one location on each floor.  In the following two excerpts the façade consultant (WH) 
summed up his view of the situation and the frustration of trying to resolve the issue. 
Its a lack of listening on the main contractor’s part sometimes. They don't listen when 
you tell them we're not penetrating the curtain wall all the way through. And you get 
the usual, well we've done it before, we've done it before, well yeah you have but you 
haven't done it on one of my jobs and I won't let it happen. So, and QC agreed with 
me, they wouldn't let it happen. So in the end a bit of common sense prevailed and 
[the client] are very good like that because they'll step in and say, no we don't want 
loads of cabling coming inside, if ever there's a problem, we’re disrupting tenants on 
floors etc, etc, it makes more sense to keep all the cabling outside, take all the 
inverters to the roof, there's plenty of room, put them up there. 
Façade consultant (WH01) 
I said that all the wires, floor by floor should run horizontally, outside, in tracks which 
was easy to do, to the end walls which are rain-screen, so there's a cavity of 300mm, 
straight up to the roof, no problem, across into the inverters wherever they're going to 
be. That for me was easy. Alternatively group them as groups…whether it be 
horizontal groups, or whether it be vertical groups, and run up in the same way.  
Façade consultant (WH01) 
The architect (MH) was concerned with the idea of visible external wiring and with the 
possibility of sagging cables being seen and suggested an arrangement of frame and bracket 
where the wires were hidden within the frame and connected to the inverters through the 
mullion by the bracket holding up each frame.  The façade supplier (QC) rejected the idea of 
penetrating the façade at each window, but accepted the idea of accommodating the wires 
within the frame and bracketry.  The process of evolution of the frame was described by the 
façade supplier. 
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When I start with the job it was already clear that the panels were not part of our 
package and that we should take care of the frame, and also study the way how to run 
the cables, In the beginning they were supposed to run in our joints, in the joints of our 
units, then we saw that is not a good idea, and then we developed together with the 
design team a special cable tray to run the cables inside in a way that was to have less 
visual impact.  
Façade supplier (QC02) 
The main contractor (WR) decided to adopt the idea of incorporating the wiring within the 
bracketry, but sided with the façade supplier (QC) in running the wiring in horizontal groups 
externally.  Considerations of buildability, reduced installation time and scaffolding schedules 
were key drivers for this decision.  The façade supplier (QC) had to allow enough room 
within the louvre frames and brackets to accommodate the wires. The PV wiring contractor 
had not been appointed at this stage and so the diameter of the wiring, the connection types 
and the configuration of the strings were all unknown.  This lack of detailing was highlighted 
by the façade supplier. 
But at that stage, that was at the tender stage, nobody knew the size of the cables, the 
amount of the cables, if it’s going to be one cable or three cables, ten cables, though it 
was a little bit in there. 
Façade supplier (QC02) 
The architect (MH) and PV laminate supplier (LE) made best guesses of the wiring diameters 
and stipulated that the frames should not crimp the wiring and that the wiring should not be 
squeezed into tight turns and should not become too congested.  The façade supplier (QC) had 
to specify the size of extrusions to be used in the frame and bracket and opted for larger 
bracket sizing to ensure there was enough room to take the wiring.  This entailed more 
material usage and a more solid design, but the façade supplier (QC) was constrained by the 
lack of solid information with which to refine the design.  Drawings were sent to the main 
contractor (WR), who passed them to the architect (MH) for approval.  The architect (MH) 
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refused to sign them off because the sizing of the brackets and frames could not be finalised 
until the wiring contractor had been appointed and had given the final sizing of wiring.  This 
refusal began to put the schedule behind and the main contractor (WR) began to look for a 
wiring contractor in earnest. 
Four months into the build the main contractor (WR) found a wiring contractor (DEP) who 
was willing to procure and install the electrical side of the PV system and he became involved 
in the final design of the system.  Over 600 wires had to be incorporated into the design and 
the sizing of the brackets and frames were too small.  The limitations of the outline wiring 
design became apparent as the new contractor came on board.  The wiring contractor (DEP) 
summarised the situation in the excerpt below. 
“No, well, I don’t know what the history of the previous PV installer was, but there 
was obviously somebody involved in design and I think specifying the right inverters 
for the job and giving them some idea of where they might go and possibly where the 
wires might go. But it was very sketchy, and not a very good design when I picked it 
up...They asked me to go to three design meetings to clarify what would happen to the 
wires, to the DC wires and what inverters we would use, how we were going connect 
the whole thing together.” 
Wiring contractor (DEP01) 
The wiring contractor (DEP) suggested the use of higher specification wiring to allow for 
smaller diameter wires, and although more expensive this allowed the accommodation of all 
the wires within the frame and bracketry already designed.  The wiring contractor summarised 
the issue in the quote below - there is a hidden implication that this was just one of a number 
of issues that came up at the start of his involvement. 
We go back and say, look, here’s our limited zone, can you get it all in here? Difficult, 
I’ll tell you what, I’ll change the wiring, I’ll change the connector - I can do that then.” 
Wiring contractor (DEP01) 
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The main contractor (WR), wiring contractor (DEP), façade contractor (QC), façade 
consultant (WH) and architect (MH) had a meeting to agree the wiring configuration and 
finalise bracket design.  At this meeting the wiring contractor (DEP) suggested that the wiring 
be run vertically up the outside of the building and the inverters sited on the roof.  The 
dynamics of the meeting are described in this extract from the interview with the main 
contractors. 
We had firmly gone with the route we had two rain-screen planks, we wanted it taken 
all the way back to the end walls and straight up. Which would actually reduce the 
visual impact because all you get is the horizontal  I quite liked it, QC were happy 
with that, it made sense. There was a slightly difficult transition to the ends but that 
wasn't that difficult to resolve…DEP didn't want to do it that way. They wanted to just 
run straight up, in fact they wanted to run straight up literally on every row which was 
an absolute no, no. And then we took what they suggested and managed to group it 
between us. That was a joint thing, that was an architectural thing, a WR thing, they 
were quite good actually at listening to what was being said to them…Once we knew 
the wire ways that everybody was technically happy with then it was just finding the 
method to house them which was quite easy actually. “ 
Main contractor (WR01) 
As the meeting progressed, a design evolved which integrated a rear mounted riser behind the 
bracket which housed an almost invisible cable tray running vertically up the elevation.  The 
risers were designed with a small cross-section (because of the smaller diameter wiring) and 
were to be painted the same colour as the brackets.  The wiring contractor (DEP) realised that 
the PV louvres had been specified with the wrong type of connectors, but managed to find 
new connectors that satisfied regulations, and were smaller than the original ones.  The wiring 
contractor outlined the issue below. 
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They didn’t have a connector. Well, they had a connector but it wasn’t a connector 
that was going to work. There was MC3, as a connector which is fairly small, but it 
pushes together and there’s no positive click to hold it together and you don’t need a 
tool to disconnect it, and both those things are requirements nowadays…for safety 
reasons…So I specified a type of connector which is unusual, I’ve never seen one in 
this country before…which clicks together and is site assemble-able and is the 
diameter of a pen, it’s quite a small thing. …Because space is all very tight. 
Wiring contractor (DEP01) 
During the bracket and frame design the façade supplier (QC) thought about maintenance of 
the system and replacement of any broken louvres.  The façade supplier designed a two part 
fixing mechanism so that the bracket could be removed after installation if access was needed.  
This design change necessitated slight reinforcement to the corners of the brackets and when 
the PV laminate supplier (LE) sent layout drawings of the panels to the façade supplier (QC) 
they found that the brackets and the PV connecters now interfered with each other.  The PV 
laminate supplier (LE) was asked to move the PV connecters.  To allow for access to cables 
within the brackets, the façade supplier (QC) designed a cableway and cover-plate system 
which clipped into place.  The architect (MH) specified that the clips and cover-plates should 
be black to match the bracketry.  The brackets had to be modified to allow for additional bolt 
connectors to be fitted which would push the Building Maintenance System (BMS) cleaning 
cradle away from the laminate panels when the laminate was being cleaned as part of 
maintenance (dirt reduces PV generation). 
 Episode 3: technological frames 6.4.2
In this episode the only technological frame not to be mobilised was the Generation 
Maximiser frame.  Design hinged around the visible artefact of the PV louvre blade as the 
façade consultant (WH), façade supplier (QC), architect (MH) and PV laminate supplier (LE) 
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adopted a more cooperative approach to the detail design and share a common frame of the 
Design Optimiser. 
As the façade supplier (QC) and main contractor (WR) adopted the Cost Watcher frame, they 
wanted to change the way that the glass fitted into the frame, by bonding the frame rather than 
notching the glass.  The resultant increase in thickness of the bracket caused friction, as the 
architect adopted the Design Aesthete frame and wanted the more streamline frame offered by 
the notched solution.  The difference in views between the architect (MH) and the other actors 
are illustrated in the two following quotations - the architect was concerned with the 
robustness of the fixing and the aesthetics of the frame design, the façade supplier (QC) with 
the buildability and cost of the frame, and the main contractor (WR) with the cost. 
So this was tendered and the cladding package went to these guys, then they 
developed that design further and they’ve got rid of that [the notch]. They’ve 
essentially brought the bracket up to there and they’ve removed the notch in the glass - 
so it looks a lot more solid but aesthetically it’s not as nice as what we had. 
Architect (MH01)  
The architect wanted just to have a little notch on the glass so that it would be held in 
by the framework so it couldn't, as he put it, slide out. And we said, we’re not doing 
that because that added a significant amount to the cost of BIPVs and...[the façade 
supplier] said, no need to...they’re bonded in here, they’ll never fall out. So we said to 
[the architect], that’s what happening, you’re not having that, then it all went away but 
it was a little bit of a worry for a while because it added a substantial sum to our costs. 
Main contactor (WR02) 
In this case there was no consensus and the main contractor imposed his decision to adopt the 
bonded solution. 
The tension between Design Aesthete frame and the Cost Watcher frame occurred again as 
the issue of bowing of the glass was considered.  The façade supplier (QC) proposed a 
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cheaper “picture” frame (rather than the “razor blade” frame designed by the architect) to hold 
the glass in position.  Although the main contractor (WR) could see the proposal through the 
Cost Watcher frame, he could also appreciate the implications in terms of the need to re-
submit planning applications for the new design and therefore with the Time Sentry frame to 
the fore decided against the cheaper solution.  The issue came to a head when the façade 
supplier (QC) asked for approval of the drawings for the frame extrusions and the resulting 
disagreement over the strength of the glass and the bowing of the louvres became difficult as 
the façade consultant (WH), PV laminate supplier (LE) and architect (MH) all mobilised the 
Risk Minimiser frame over concerns that they would be liable for any louvres which might 
deflect.  The PV laminate supplier (LE) then mobilised the Time Sentry frame and took the 
decision to offer thicker glass at no extra cost.  The following quotations show how the 
situation was understood by different project team members. 
I was worried that it’s a 2m piece of glass...I was worried it’s going to bow, [5mm 
laminate] sounded thin. It sounded really thin. 
Architect (MH01) 
Everybody said, oh it could sag, it could fall off the building, it could kill people. And 
I [said] well I don’t agree with any of you.... So we said we’d test it in our own 
factory….the glass never broke, never bent, never shattered, in fact we bent the 
bracket and a 12 millimetre stainless steel bolt, and the glass still did not crack or split 
...QC are lovely to work with, they’re very good engineers, but they are cautious. QC 
said they wanted thicker glass and it’s QC’s choice because it’s a D and B contract”.  
Façade consultant (WH01) 
The original glass thickness specified was two layers of 5mm. On the other two 
buildings we’ve got two layers of 5mm on just brise-soleil and they sag in the middle. 
So more or less just on a whim we said, although we’re going to support on three 
sides, we’ll up the glass thickness to two layers of 6mm. But that wasn’t calculated. 
Main contractor (WR01) 
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I think LE did it as a kind of almost a gesture - they’re not bound by this impact load, 
because what they were saying is, the frame’s adding an awful lot to the strength of 
our glass so we can’t control that. But it’s almost like they just said, look we’ll give 
you another mil on each glass - you’ve got over the top now. 
Main contactor (WR02) 
In both of the cases above, considerations of time dictated the solution.  Another interesting 
point is that conflict can arise between actors sharing the same frame - in this case the façade 
supplier (QC), architect (MH) and PV laminate supplier (LE) shared the Risk Minimiser 
frame but could not agree on a solution until the PV laminate supplier (LE) broke the 
impasse.  The resultant increased weight of the laminate and the need to increase the bracket 
sizes (and the subsequent bending of the brackets under their weight) was not anticipated by 
the façade supplier and architect and was of no concern to the PV laminate supplier (LE). 
The architect (MH) adopted both the Design Aesthete and the User frame when he specified 
the white interlayer on the laminate to mask the rather “blocky” appearance of the PC cells 
within the laminate.  When the PV laminate supplier (LE) reported a problem with the process 
and the appearance of irregular small spots on the interlayer, the architect (MH) viewed the 
problem through the Design Aesthete frame and asked for a printed screen layer instead - 
even though the spots would have been almost invisible to the users of the building.   
As the project proceeded, the actors became more aware of the interconnection between the 
PV louvres, frames, wires and brackets.  They adopted a Design Optimiser frame and this 
focussed them on more collaborative problem solving.  This meant that the positions of 
connectors were defined, the cell layout was altered slightly to allow for the panels to locate 
properly in the frames, and the façade supplier (QC) was made aware that the frames needed 
to allow the PV wires within them to be curved slightly rather than crimped around sharp 
corners.   
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This collaborative approach extended into the decision of where the cables would enter the 
building and the architect (MH) was forced to abandon his objections to an external cable run 
(Design Aesthete) in the face of combined problem solving using the Design Optimiser frame.  
This focus on design optimisation allowed the team to accept the view of the architect (MH) 
for the wires to be concealed as much as possible and led to some innovative solutions for 
concealing wires within the frames and bracketry. 
During this episode, actors mobilising the Design Optimiser frame were open to 
understanding the requirements of actors using other frames, and to a large extent 
accommodated them.  The main contractor (WR) was concerned about the scaffolding 
schedule and how the wiring could be installed.  The façade supplier (QC) designed a system 
of removable capping in the frames, brackets and cable-ways, to allow the wiring to be fitted 
by using the building maintenance system (BMS) cradle hoist after the façade was complete.  
He was also motivated to do this by adopting the Risk Minimiser frame so that the façade 
contract could be signed off as complete before the BIPV wiring was installed.  It is 
noticeable that the willingness of actors adopting the Design Optimiser frame to collaborate in 
finding solutions masked the lack of a wiring contractor at this time.  The late appointment of 
a wiring contractor meant that details of wiring thicknesses, bracket extrusion details and 
cable way dimensions could not be finalised.  The situation was brought to a head when the 
architect (MH) adopted the Risk Minimiser frame and refused to sign off extrusion drawings 
for the façade supplier.  The architect’s refusal and the resulting delays made the main 
contractor see the project through the Time Sentry frame and he began to look for a wiring 
contractor with renewed vigour.  Figure 6-3 shows how the network of actors, technological 
frames, problems and solutions played out during the detail design episode. 
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Figure 6-3: Technological frames mobilized in episode 3 (detail design), Vogue Terrace  
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In this episode the need to solve problems arising from the interdependence of artefacts 
dominated the problem solving, and the Design Optimiser frame dominated.  The Risk 
Minimiser frame had a specific role to play in bringing problems to a head and forcing 
solutions.  Tension between the actors also came from the presence of the schedule as a social 
artefact which represented and reinforced the Time Sentry frame.  
 Episode 3: co-development 6.4.3
Four instances of co-development occurred in this episode of the project. 
i. The decision to bond rather than notch the PV louvres into the frames increased the 
size of the frames and altered their appearance. 
ii. Increasing the thickness of the PV laminate glass led to changes in the design of the 
brackets and a re-positioning of PV cells within the laminate.  The eventual deflection 
of the louvres impacted the appearance of the building. 
iii. The interrelationship between the louvre brackets and frames and the BIPV system 
was particularly apparent in the episode.  The BIPV wiring needed enough space 
within the frames and brackets to avoid crimping, the bolting system for the brackets 
interfered with the position of the PV connectors so these had to be moved, and the 
design of the extrusion sections for the brackets could not be finalised until the wiring  
contractor was appointed. 
iv. Restrictions in terms of space available inside the frames and brackets meant that 
higher specification cables (smaller diameter) and different connectors had to be 
specified for the BIPV system.  
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6.5 Episode 4: wiring 
This episode continues from the detail design of the frames and brackets and details how the 
wiring design was carried out. 
 Episode 4: narrative account 6.5.1
The use of higher specification cables and the choice of the vertical wiring route reduced the 
electrical losses in the system.  The wiring contractor (DEP) calculated that rather than 
needing two inverters per floor the system would need just four larger inverters sited on the 
roof.   
The main contractor (WR) and the façade supplier (QC) were happy that the wiring would run 
up to the roof level and penetrate the façade just at the parapet level through four smallish 
holes in the gasket, so negating concerns over water tightness.  The main contractor (WR) 
was worried that the inverters - despite being waterproof - should be located undercover so 
that maintenance could be carried out in safety.  He set about trying to find a suitable location 
on the roof space or failing that was content to build a small containment area on the roof.  
This issue had not been settled at the conclusion of this research.  The following dialogue 
describes the dynamic nature of the decision-making process. 
Well they were going in the riser originally but then, because the wiring had to go up 
they were going to go on the roof. But I was never going to leave them on the roof, I 
always had an idea where I want to put them. I still haven't got them there yet, I’ve 
still got a bit of negotiation with the commercial people and find some space for them. 
I’ve found a space; I’ve just got to negotiate now. 
Main contractor (WR02) 
It’s a departure from the original concept idea.  
Main contractor (WR01) 
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The wiring contractor (DEP) had the responsibility to run cables as far as the inverter and G59 
cabinet, but had had no contact with the main project wiring contractor in the design phase.  
This disconnect is summarised by the wiring contractor (DEP) and main contractor (WR), 
both of whom were expecting to have some issues over compatibility and duplicated work 
once installation started.   
So, we’ve got a cabinet which has got the G59 relay in it, and WR will wire to that 
and put in the metering. We might tell them what sort of meter to put in, but the 
incoming meter is nothing to do with us …we provide a generation meter, which will 
be in our G59 cabinet, and whether they want to monitor it or not is up to them. It’ll 
have a modbus output, so they can connect it into their building. 
, Wiring contractor (DEP01) 
But again that sort of thing had to be packaged up and worked out who was doing 
what. But [the main electrical contractor] left us an inverter to do that, but at that 
isolator, the electrical consumption sort of responsibility has ended…but there wasn’t 
a consultant responsible, sort of thing, but fortunately we’ve got DEP. 
Main contractor (WR02) 
 Episode 4: technological frames 6.5.2
The wiring contractor (DEP) adopted the Design Optimiser frame to work through the 
problems facing him when he came on board the project.  His suggestions of: higher 
specification wires; smaller connectors; four inverters to be sited on the roof; and a new way 
of running the wires up the building instead of across, all took account of the constraints on 
other actors in terms of limited space inside the brackets and frames, and aesthetic concerns 
over external cabling.  For the first time the main contractor (WR) was seen to view the 
technology through the User frame and insisted that the cabinets be housed inside the roof’s 
plant room so that maintenance could be carried out safely.  This is illustrated by the extract 
below.  
Chapter 6: Case Study 1 – Vogue Terrace 
132 
 
They are going, yeah, they’re weatherproof, but they are going inside, I don’t like the 
idea of having people to work on them if they ever do, outside.  
Main contractor (WR02) 
This again illustrates the power of the Design Optimiser frame to enable collaborative 
problem solving.  Figure 6-4 summarises the changing pattern of problems and solutions as 
the wiring design progressed and shows how the technological frames were mobilised by the 
actors. 
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Figure 6-4: Technological frames mobilized in episode 4 (wiring), Vogue Terrace 
Chapter 6: Case Study 1 – Vogue Terrace 
133 
 
 Episode 4: co-development 6.5.3
One clear example of co-development of the building and the BIPV system occurred during 
this episode of the project.  It undoubtedly affected the appearance of the building and led to 
improvements in the efficiency of the BIPV system.   
The number of inverters was reduced to four and could be easily accommodated at roof level.  
This led to a redesign of the bracketry system to allow for the wires to be run vertically up the 
building within an innovative containment and capping system.  This rerouting of the wiring 
meant that the visibility of the external wiring runs was very much reduced. 
6.6 Episode 5: installation  
This episode continues from the detail design of the wiring of the BIPV and deals with the 
installation of the BIPV system. 
 Episode 5: narrative account 6.6.1
As there was a separation between the façade contract and the electrical contract, the two 
systems were installed separately.  The façade (including the PV brise-soleil), was to be 
installed first and then the wiring system put in place.  The scaffolding around the south 
elevation had to be dismantled just after the façade had been installed and this meant that the 
electrical installation work had to be done without scaffolding.   
The contract specified that each PV panel be tested for generation before being installed, 
using a simple voltage test.  On site, each brise-soleil panel was removed from its stillage and 
tested to prove a current was being generated.  After that the façade supplier’s (QC) fitters 
bolted the louvre assembly to the window and the whole assembly was hoisted into place on 
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the façade using a crane.  Once all the façade had been installed the PV wiring installation 
was carried out using the building maintenance system (BMS) cradle.  This required the PV 
wiring contractor (DEP) to remove the clips from the brackets and cableway, fit connectors to 
the trailing ends of wire from the PV panels, connect the wiring to the connectors, and feed 
the wiring into the cableway and replace the clips.  The BMS cradle was used to gain access 
to the louvres, two at a time.  Once this was done, the wiring was taken to the top of the 
building via the cable ways, laid through the slot in the parapet gasket, and taken to the 
inverters.  This process had not been started by the time the research finished.  
Once the façade was erected the architect (MH) noticed that the brise-soleil brackets were 
deflecting and asked for this to be corrected.  The façade supplier (QC) had to replace the 
two-part pin assembly holding the brackets with thicker pins and reflected that this was 
probably due to the increased weight from the thicker laminate panels. 
 Episode 5: technological frames 6.6.2
During this episode the collaborative problem solving was less in evidence and the actors 
worked in silos, mobilising the Risk Minimiser frame to ensure that their parts of the contract 
were completed.   
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Figure 6-5 summarises the changing pattern of problems and solutions as the installation 
progressed. 
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Figure 6-5: Technological frames mobilized in episode 5 (installation), Vogue Terrace  
 Episode 5: co-development 6.6.3
The scaffolding schedule and the separation of façade and wiring packages meant that the 
installation of the two systems occurred in series - the electrical work being carried out using 
the BMS hoist once the façade had been completed. 
6.7 Summary 
This final section of the chapter brings together the five episodes to examine the case as a 
whole, exploring the technological frames and RSG’s, the co-development of the BIPV and 
the building as the project proceeded, and the issues and challenges which were particular to 
this project. 
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 Technological frames  6.7.1
The analysis for each project episode has illustrated how the technological frames were 
mobilised by the actors in the project and has explored how tensions played out between the 
actors mobilising different technological frames as they found solutions to problems.  This 
section summarises the pattern of technological frames used and investigates the way that 
actors mobilised different frames at different times throughout the project. 
As this analysis suggests, RSGs are composed of project actors who share a view of the 
technology rather than those who occupy common positions or roles.  For example, the two 
main contractors (WR01 and WR02) adopted different frames over the issue of wiring runs.  
The design manager (WR01) was more concerned with aesthetics (Design Aesthete) with the 
M&E manager (WR02) being concerned about design efficiency (Design Optimiser). 
While most actors clearly identified with a particular frame, they also accepted the views of 
actors who saw the technology through other frames.  In some cases this, together with an 
unfolding network of problems and solutions, allowed them to move or shift between frames.  
For example, during the initial design phase the architect (MH) was concerned with the 
aesthetics of the building, but was also interested in establishing building’s green credentials.  
Later, during talks with the PV laminate supplier (LE), the architect (MH) became more 
invested in the energy generation of the panels. The client at the start shared the architect’s 
concern with green credentials and aesthetic concerns, but as the project advanced the client 
began to think about the users and their concern to minimise disruptions during maintenance 
of the inverters.  
The analysis clearly shows that project actors do not stay frozen in one frame, but switch 
around as the project progresses.  The pattern of shifting frames can partially be ascribed to 
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changes in actors’ responsibilities and interests as the project progressed.  In this case study 
the pre-contract project manager (WR) initially supported BIPV as part of the total 
sustainable design of the building, and designed panels accordingly.  As the project entered 
the construction stage and the pre-contract project manager took on the role of the main 
project contractor (WR), cost became an issue.  In his new role and new context, the main 
contractor suggested replacing the BIPV panels with conventional glass.  The proposal to 
remove the BIPV panels from the façade would have met cost reduction targets, but would 
have totally missed the Green Guardian’s desire to generate green electricity, and would have 
failed to satisfy planning conditions.  From the perspective of SCOT, this shift can be 
analysed as a movement from one RSG to another.  This example suggests that the 
reconfiguration of RSGs often occurs as the contractual relations between client, main 
contractor and suppliers change and that these shifts can affect problem resolution.   
A number of elements contributed to this seeming movement between technological frames: 
different project actors coming to understand the other actors’ perspectives; changing 
responsibilities of actors; changing contractual relations between actors; shifting problems 
around which views are formulated; and changes in design of BIPV and the building as 
certain features get stabilized.  What is clear is that it is this shifting of frames seemed to 
encourage the resolution of problems and allowed acceptable solutions to be developed.   
Membership of a technological frame is not exclusive - one actor can be a member of more 
than one RSG at any one time, and loyalty to the group is very transient.  In the initial design 
phase the actors involved had two different requirements for the technology - it should be part 
of a cohesive plan for the three buildings and it should satisfy renewable energy planning 
requirements.  The actors involved were the project manager (WR), client, architect (MH) and 
planning officer; the latter mainly had an interest in the renewable energy targets, but the 
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architect and client also shared a desire for an aesthetically pleasing, forward looking 
building, whilst the project manager (WR) was also interested in the buildability of the 
project.  For example, as the architect (MH) was novated to the main contractor (WR), the 
dominant focus frame switched from Green Guardian to Design Optimiser.  The PV laminate 
supplier (LE) was concerned with Maximising Generation at the tender stage, then shifted to 
the Design Optimiser frame during detail design and then switched back to the Generation 
Maximiser frame as he became responsible for testing the output from the panels.  It is 
interesting to note that the weight that an actor ascribed to a technological frame bore a 
relationship to the stages of the project at which key contractual points are reached.  This 
point is illustrated in Figure 6-6 which shows how the actors mobilised different technological 
frames as the project proceeded. 
Three key observations about the role of certain technological frames indicate a link to 
mechanisms of problem solving.  First, the frame of Generation Maximiser appeared very 
rarely and in general it was the PV laminate supplier (LE) who used the Generation 
Maximiser frame, even though his contract had no generation figures attached to it.  This 
might be considered surprising given the initially assumed primary function of BIPV to 
produce electricity, and points to a need to explore further the reasons or motivations for the 
original specification of BIPV on the project and its apparent influence on the development of 
the system.  Secondly, the Time Sentry and Risk Minimiser frames had a disproportionally 
high effect on problem solving, with the effects not always visible to the whole team.  For 
example, the pressure of meeting the tender package deadlines and concerns over risk led the 
façade supplier (QC) to decide not to include PV within the package.  This decision shaped 
the future development of the BIPV and the building, but the reasons behind the decision 
were not visible to the other project actors.  Thirdly, the Design Optimiser frame had an 
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inherent quality which promoted a more collaborative problem solving mechanism, which 
allowed integrated decision-making around both the building and the BIPV system.  
When mapped onto the conventional project stages (Figure 6-6), it is apparent that some shifts 
in the dominance of a technological frame occurred at transition points, where the project 
changed from design to installation, or from concept to pre-tender design.  The composition 
of Design Optimiser, Risk Minimiser and Time Sentry frames in particular were very fluid, 
with nearly every actor mobilising these over the course of the project, but at different times.  
The dominance of an RSG appeared to vary over the course of the project but approximated 
to the stage of the project (for example, the Design Optimiser frame dominated during the 
detail design stage etc.).  The façade supplier (QC) adopted the Design Optimiser frame 
during the design stage, but switched to the Time Watcher frame as the installation phase 
approached.  The client first adopted the Green Guardian frame when defining his 
requirements for the building, but once the tenders were approved adopted more of the Time 
Sentry frame.  The Risk Minimiser frame appeared at contract transition points in the project - 
the façade supplier (QC) viewed the tender document through the Risk Minimiser frame and 
decided to reject the idea of including the BIPV work package.  Similarly, the architect 
adopted the Risk Minimiser frame once he was novated to the main contractor and was asked 
to sign off drawings.  It is notable that in this project the Risk Minimiser frame closed down 
innovation opportunities rather than encourage them.  Chapter 9 will explore these factors 
further by comparing the different case studies. 
Figure 6-6 lists the project actors and shows how the frames that they mobilised shifted over 
the course of the project.  
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Figure 6-6: Movement of actors between technological frames as project proceeds 
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 The co-development of the BIPV and the building 6.7.2
The discussion of the five episodes of this project signalled a number of key moments of co-
development; the discussion which follows explores the co-development story of the building 
and the technology in greater detail and shows how this mutual articulation occurred.  Three 
types of co-development of the BIPV system and the building were identified during the 
analysis: lock-in, interdependence of appearance, and mutual adjustment and adaptation. 
These are discussed in greater detail in the following section.  In addition to the analysis of 
co-development, examples of unfolding innovation are highlighted as the BIPV system was 
integrated within the building.   
Figure 6-7 illustrates the co-development story by showing the interconnectivity between the 
elements of the building and BIPV.  The analysis which follows describes the co-development 
of the BIPV panels and the building from the perspective of key design decisions and the 
socio-technical network which supported them.  The diagrams below were derived from a 
SCOT analytical framework, which focussed on the problems experienced by the actors over 
the project and identified the range of solutions used to resolve them.  Enlarged sections of 
the diagram are used to illustrate specific points in the discussion which follows.  Each 
rounded, shaded box represents a decision or action which shaped either the building (the top 
line of boxes) or the BIPV (the bottom line).  The unshaded square boxes mark key points in 
the co-development story.  
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Figure 6-7: Co-development diagram Vogue Terrace 
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Lock in 
Lock-in (in terms of the co-development of the building and the BIPV system) occurred when 
a decision or series of decisions pushed the design into a direction from which there was no 
turning back.  Two examples of this type of co-development occurred in this project 
Firstly in the initial stages of the design, when the client elected to use BIPV as part of the 
building identity and as a result chose to reduce the finish quality in the building rather than 
replace the BIPV system with a roof mounted system.  Figure 6-8 shows this interdependence. 
 
Figure 6-8: Co-development - lock-in part 1 
Second, the decision to use the same supply chain as used in the previous phases of the 
development set in train the procurement decisions which separated the BIPV system from 
the building and decoupled the BIPV panels from the electrical BIPV system.  The client tried 
to ensure project efficiency by specifying that the same major contractors be used in this 
project.  This resulted in the façade supplier (who had no previous expertise in BIPV) 
rejecting the BIPV system from his work package.  As a result, the main contractor tried to 
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find a BIPV system supplier, but when this failed, decided to decouple the BIPV system - 
both from the building and from itself.  Thus the BIPV system was broken down into the 
laminated panels and the electrical system.  From then on the BIPV system as a whole 
became invisible to the project team and instead became two artefacts - the louvres and the 
miscellany of wiring.  The second part of lock-in in this example is when the façade supplier 
refused to allow the wires from the BIPV system to penetrate the façade at the locations of the 
louvres and insisted that the wires be run externally to collection points where they could 
penetrate the façade in smaller, controlled ways.  This led to a complicated interrelationship 
between the frames, brackets and wiring and also meant that the wires were visible on the 
external face of the building.  Finally, the de-coupling of the BIPV system meant that no-one 
was responsible for delivering a particular electrical output from the building and so 
commissioning was just an “on-off” exercise.  Figure 6-9 illustrates this co-development 
mechanism. 
KeyPV becomes hidden 
as panels are free 
issued and wiring 
contract is not let
De-risking dictates 
external wiring runs
PV is rejected from 
façade package
Expertise of 
contractors set
No commissioning 
requirements of 
output.
Decoupling of panels 
and Wiring
Delay appointment 
of wiring contractor
Frames and 
bracketry to conceal 
wiring
Wiring will not 
penetrate façade at 
each louvre
Rework and redesign 
after wiring 
contractor comes on 
board
decision or action 
which shaped either 
the building or the 
BIPV system
key point in the co-
development story
Building
BIPV
 
Figure 6-9: Co-development - lock-in part 2 
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Homogeneity of appearance 
The second series of co-development events relates to homogeneity of appearance of the 
BIPV and the building.  This is where the BIPV system directly affects the appearance of the 
building in some way and vice-versa.  This type of co-development is not necessarily on a 
very large scale, but occurs at an externally visible level.  The first and most obvious example 
of this co-development is with the initial specification of BIPV brise-soleil louvres on the 
south elevation of the building.  The design of the frame to hold the laminated PV panels 
determined the shape and look of all the louvres on the elevation - not just the PV ones.  A 
second example of this type of co-development is when the BIPV wires ran on the outside of 
the façade and so changed the flat appearance of the façade to one which had cableways 
running vertically up the building.  The project team in the end managed to design the cable-
ways to look as though they were part of the window bracketry, but the façade looked 
different from the architect’s intention.  The final example of this interdependence of 
appearance is the effect of the thicker glass laminated PV panels on the frame and bracketry 
sizing and the resulting deflection of the louvres which affected the appearance of the 
building - both because the bracketry and frame design were chunkier than before, but also 
because the louvres were not straight on the façade because of the deflection.  Figure 6-10 
illustrates these interrelationships. 
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Figure 6-10: Co-development - homogeneity of appearance 
 
The mutual adjustments of the building and BIPV  
The mutual adjustment of building shape and BIPV design occurred when the often small 
scale adjustments were made to accommodate the BIPV system and the building to each 
other.  The best illustration of this is the mutual development of the frames and bracketry.  At 
the start of the project, these artefacts were not thought of as part of the BIPV system - rather 
as part of the façade work package.  Indeed the façade supplier had been very keen to separate 
the façade design from the BIPV system.  As the project progressed, the decision not to allow 
individual wires to penetrated the frames or façade meant that the frames and brackets became 
the carriers of the wires and so had to be designed to accommodate them.  Considerations 
over providing enough room within the frames to prevent the wires being crimped, shifting 
the position of the BIPV connectors to allow for bracket corners, and changing the PV cell 
layout to accommodate larger frames, are all examples of these mutual adjustments.  Figure 
6-11 illustrates this process.  
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Figure 6-11: Co-development - mutual adjustment 
It is interesting to note that the process of mutual adjustment gave rise both to the innovative 
cableway and capping system and to the inclusion of thinner, higher specification cables 
which not only reduced the number of inverters, but also improved the system efficiency by 
minimising power loss through the wires.  This shows that unfolding innovation is part of the 
process of adoption of BIPV within a project. 
In summary, Vogue Terrace illustrates three types of co-development: lock-in; homogeneity 
of appearance; and mutual adjustment and adaptation.  The case study also has examples of 
unfolding innovation as the BIPV was integrated within the building.  These mechanisms and 
their importance on the adoption of innovation are discussed in the Chapter 9. 
6.8 Issues about BIPV and the challenges which it poses for project teams  
As part of this analysis, there were several issues which have particular relevance for project 
teams.  The architect, M&E consultant (DC), façade supplier (QC) and main contractor (WR) 
were relatively unfamiliar with BIPV and this led to several decisions which had profound 
implications on the subsequent direction of the project.  The lack of familiarity of the façade 
supplier with BIPV led to a decoupling of BIPV panels and the rest of the technical system 
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associated with BIPV.  The main contractor was not aware of the interdependence of the two 
aspects of design and so used standard ways of dividing work packages to allocate BIPV 
work.  This led to late decision-making over wiring runs and disconnected decisions about 
brackets and frames, glass sizing and inverter location.   
The main contractor was unfamiliar with the electrical requirements of the BIPV system and 
assumed that the main electrical contractor was the expert.  As the following extract shows, 
this was not the case and the main contractor ended up having to develop the electrical 
specification as the project continued.   
He is one person who we thought might have had more input, the electrical 
consultant hasn’t picked up everything he needs to…It’s just that because these 
weren’t part of his specification, he’s just left the connection for them, that’s it. 
So we’ve virtually written the [BIPV electrical] spec our self. 
Main contractor (WR02)  
The unfamiliarity also led to the façade supplier rejecting involvement with the new 
technology and the eventual de-coupling of the BIPV system. 
During the project there was no single source of expertise for the BIPV system.  The PV 
laminate supplier advised about panel layouts, but did not get involved with the wiring or 
configuration for strings.  The façade supplier assumed that the PV laminate supplier supplied 
the system and the main contractor relied on the electrical contractor to understand the G59 
connections.  The architect and main contractor did not have a single “go-to” expert and relied 
on gaining knowledge from suppliers of different parts of the system at different times, 
leading to a fragmented approach and disconnected design.  The following small quotation 
illustrates the belief that there is one person who will answer the questions, but the “he” in 
this extract does not exist!  It was only at the end of the project that the BIPV wiring 
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contractor became the “expert”, but his expertise was in fact with only part of the BIPV - he 
had no knowledge about the PV panels and their design or output. 
But we think he’s going to come back and say I need two every floor, where, where 
can they go? 
Architect (MH01) 
The visible part of BIPV dominated the design and the lack of understanding that the 
technology is a system led to ad-hoc decisions being taken, with little to no appreciation of 
the knock-on effect of these decisions.  An example is the re-sizing of the PV louvre thickness 
which led to thicker frames and eventual deflection of the holding pins.  The lack of 
understanding that the 672 panels would need over 600 wires to be accommodated meant that 
in the end the wiring was fixed on the outside of the building rather than being truly 
integrated.  The façade supplier was adamant that the inverters were nothing to do with his 
system, although the location of the inverters dictated where the cables were to run and how 
they were to be contained within his frames and bracketry. 
One other issue arising from the analysis which has implications for the inclusion of BIPV in 
projects is the effect which the motive for adopting the technology had on design decisions.  
For example, the desire to use BIPV as a statement of modernity led to greater importance 
being given to the aesthetics of the design rather than the generation potential of the 
technology.  This distinction between the visual characteristics of the system and its function 
of electricity generation led to decisions being taken which made the integration of the system 
more problematic and certainly had an impact on the overall efficiency of the generation 
system.  
An observation about project teams is the effect of artefacts such as the project schedule.  
These artefacts are not present in a material form and are constructed as part of the project 
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management process, rather than being part of the technology or the building.  They will be 
referred to as social artefacts in the discussion which follow.  Social artefacts at times 
dominated the decision-making, and appear to have huge effects on the stabilisation and 
closure of problems and solutions. 
Standard construction processes and practices also had a large effect on the integration of 
BIPV on the project.  Three main issues of contracts, the effect of continuity and 
collaboration of the project teams appear to be particularly important.  Firstly, in construction 
projects, the way that contracts are placed is usually part of a critical path which establishes 
the order in which contracts should be let.  With a new technology there are new 
dependencies which are not obvious and this can lead to tensions.  Second, lack of continuity 
in personnel over key project stages led to misunderstandings and losses of information.  
Third, collaboration is often a very valued commodity in construction, but in this project 
using the previous project team locked-in unfamiliarity in the area of BIPV and also locked-in 
a collaborative element to the relationships.  This possibly led to the main contractor 
acquiescing to the façade supplier’s refusal to include BIPV in the tender.  Similarly, the fact 
that the new BIPV supplier was a subsidiary of the main contractor led to a very relaxed 
relationship.  The past collaboration between the façade supplier and main contractor appears 
to have made the decision to free issue the PV panels a very simple one, but with a more 
formal relationship it might have been inspected more closely before agreement was reached.  
The façade supplier agreed to have the PV panels free issued in order and understood that this 
would allow the main contractor to make more of a profit margin.  Finally, the long time span 
of the project and the fast changing nature of parts of the technology allowed technology to 
catch up with inconsistencies in the design.  So newer, more efficient wiring specifications 
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allowed for reduced extrusion sizing to accommodate the wires and more developments in 
inverters paved the way for roof mounted inverters. 
These challenges for construction practices are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.
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 Case Study - Future Green Chapter 7:
This chapter presents the second case study (Future Green), with a general description of the 
project, followed by the case study being broken down into five separate episodes: initial 
scheme; pre-tender design; tender process; detail design; and installation..  For each episode a 
narrative account of what happened focuses on the succession of problems encountered and 
solutions developed, reflecting on the changing technological frames of the actors and 
exploring the co-development of the building and the BIPV.  The chapter then summarises the 
way that actors mobilised different frames at different times throughout the project and 
explores the mechanisms of co-development, between the building and the technology.  
7.1 Description 
Future Green is a commercial science hub which was the first building to be erected on a 24-
acre site in a large science park development.  The project was a joint partnership between a 
University, City Council and several other strategic partners.  Future Green is a seven-floor 
mixed space, with the ground floor being an exhibition hub and with office accommodation 
on the upper floors.  The University occupies the entire second floor and has moved some of 
its continuing professional development (CPD) facilities into the building.  The clients renting 
the offices are expected to be start-up businesses within the field of sustainability.  Although 
predominantly owned and run by the Council, the building is operated by a private company 
which is responsible for letting space and running building on a day-to-day basis.   
The project was promoted by the client as a flagship for sustainability and BIPV was used to 
demonstrate this commitment.  BIPV panels are incorporated into ten of the twelve windows 
on the south-west elevation of the building and other sustainable features include a small solar 
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thermal installation on the roof of the building, a green wall on the west elevation and natural 
ventilation on the upper floors.  The building features many irregularly spaced, tall, narrow 
windows, which make a bold architectural statement against gold cladding and green vertical 
brise-soleil panels.  The project used a Design and Build contract.  The City Council had a 
significant say in defining the functional use of the building, but the University was more 
influential in the early design stages, particularly regarding the building envelope and the 
technologies employed. 
Design for the project started in 2010 and the construction of Future Green began in late 
2013.  The installation of BIPV was completed by August 2014 and the project was 
completed by November 2014.  Twelve interviews with members of the project team were 
conducted over a one and a half year period.  The first was conducted just as installation of 
the PV windows had taken place and the last just after handover of the building to the client.  
Chapter 5 (Methods) gives detailed information about those interviewed.  In the following 
analysis interviewees are referenced by the firm they represent: letting manager (FS); 
architect (NW); main contractor (TH); M&E design consultant (SAW); façade supplier (RR); 
glazing supplier (WA); M&E contractor (BSW); and PV laminate supplier (LE).  The PV 
laminate supplier (LE) supplied PV laminate panels to the glazing contractor (WA).  A 
number is added to the reference as a unique identifier for each actor in the firm (for example: 
“main contractor (TH01)” represents the main contractor firm - TH, and is the first actor 
interviewed from that firm.  “Main contractor (TH02)” indicates the second person 
interviewed at the main contractor firm).  
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7.2 Episode 1: the initial Scheme 
The first episode covers the development of the concept design for the building to the point at 
which the initial design for both the outline shape of the building and the configuration of the 
BIPV system had been defined.  
 Episode 1: narrative account 7.2.1
The clients (City Council and the University) commissioned the building as the first stage of a 
mixed development of science hub, commercial offices, retail outlets and residential housing.  
They were keen to attract European Regional Development Funding (ERDF)
1
 for the project 
and therefore had to demonstrate at least BREEAM Very Good and preferably BREEAM 
Excellent rating.  This necessitated achieving an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) rating 
of at least “B” and preferably “A”.   
Initial discussions about the layout and requirements of the building were held between the 
client, the letting manager (FS), M&E design consultant (SAW) and architect (NW).  During 
these meetings, the client was concerned with obtaining EU funding and was keen to use 
renewable energy to promote and sell the building to start-up companies interested in 
sustainability.  The letting manager (FS) was keen to have a flexible space on the ground 
floor, with lettable offices above.  The architect wanted the building to make a statement and 
for the sustainable element to be part of the fabric of the building.  The M&E design 
consultant (SAW) and architect (NW) developed ideas for the sustainable element of the 
project and these included the inclusion of a biomass boiler, the use of a geothermal heating 
system, the use of heat recovery fins, various schemes for a green roof and walls, and the use 
                                                 
1 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9455/National_ERDF_handbook.
pdf 
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of solar energy (both solar thermal and PV).  At this stage the architect (NW) and M&E 
design consultant (SAW) were more concerned with establishing the green credentials of the 
building rather than with costs, detail schemes or time frames. 
The client, architect (NW) and M&E design consultant (SAW) held a review of the 
sustainability options with a view to selecting which technologies to use.  The M&E design 
consultant (SAW) identified his role to present the options and help the client to make an 
informed choice both in terms of cost and of meeting BREEAM and EPC requirements. 
So the client plays a role in terms of setting the ultimate brief…our building has to be 
a flagship of sustainability; that in itself is not much of brief, it’s quite vague. So it’s 
our job to interrogate that requirement and then help the client make an informed 
choice in terms of how they move that forward. 
M&E design consultant (SAW01) 
The client was not keen on the biomass option because of operational issues and planning 
concerns over increased traffic congestion from fuel deliveries.  
Certainly biomass was just frowned upon, right from the outset. They didn’t want the 
hassle of deliveries and manual maintenance and manual handling. 
M&E design consultant (SAW01) 
Despite over £1m being already spent on a borehole with a view to extracting geothermal 
energy (this had been done during site clearance), the scheme was no longer held to be 
feasible in the short term and so the idea of using geothermal heating was dropped.  However 
the M&E design consultant (SAW) made provision for future connection to any local district 
heating system which might be built as the remaining site was developed.  He described how 
the specification was initially defined by the client requirement for a flagship building for 
sustainability and then by costings. 
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It soon became very apparent that all of these novel, innovative approaches that we 
were proposing to help them market this building as a flagship for sustainability, were 
not affordable.…as all of the innovative solutions were falling by the wayside, 
because of cost, I think the client was thinking, well, we’ve got to have something to 
say for this project….They wanted something up there that was visible so the general 
public could see that there was something that made this building special. 
M&E design consultant (SAW01) 
In order to obtain a BREEAM Excellent rating, the building was designed to include natural 
ventilation where possible, mechanical ventilation heat recovery, and innovative lighting.  
The inclusion of a PV system did not directly gain energy credits for the BREEAM Excellent 
rating, but reflected how the client’s desire for both a visible form of sustainability statement 
and for an integrated design drove the decision for BIPV. 
The only mandatory credit was the fact that we had to do this report. The PV itself, as 
far as I know, we didn’t get any extra credits for putting that in, in terms of the 
BREEAM. It was something we wanted architecturally as well, and it was specifically 
to get it integrated into the build, so it wasn’t just a bolted on PV, it was integrated as 
the window system. Just in terms of the architecture. Just the look of the building.  
Architect (NW01) 
The architect (NW) and client were intent on using highly visible forms of sustainable 
technology and favoured the use of green walls and roof, and PV panels.  This choice meant 
that siting PV on the roof would be difficult.  Firstly a lot of roof space had been taken up 
with the planting and well-watering system.  Second, using PV technology would necessitate 
puncturing the roof membrane to fix the brackets for the PV panels, which might impact 
water tightness of the roof membrane used with green roof technology.  Finally, the parapet 
designed to enclose the green roof was quite high and would have shadowed the PV panels.  
To counter this, the panels would have had to be mounted above the parapet height, and as 
they would then be seen over the parapet, this would be unacceptable to the planners.  
Because of these concerns and because of worries of risk over water-tightness, the architect 
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(NW) took the decision to use BIPV on the building façade.  He summarised his decision as 
follows: 
And if we’re into that, it’s extra steel work..a lot of time you’ve got to puncture 
membranes, you’ve got to puncture your roof. So doing it integrated through the 
[façade] system took away a lot of necessary coordination and risk. 
Architect (NW01) 
The architect (NW) had decided to use BIPV on the building elevation and wanted to 
incorporate it on the large south-east elevation which was visible from the street.  The M&E 
design consultant (SAW) advised the architect (NW) that this would not be a good choice as 
the façade had already been designed with extensive brise-soleil fins to shade the windows.  
These would have shaded the panels and reduced efficiency.  The M&E design consultant 
(SAW) and the architect (NW) considered the idea of incorporating the PV into the fins, but 
rejected this on cost grounds and eventually settled on using BIPV on the smaller south-west 
elevation, which had no brise-soleil fins.  Part of this decision was driven by a discussion with 
the client over the likely EPC rating of the building.  The client was keen for the building to 
be “A” rated and as it stood, despite achieving BREEAM Excellent, it would only have 
achieved a “B” rating.  The M&E design consultant (SAW) investigated how the BIPV 
system could improve this rating and calculated that 260 square meters of PV panels would 
have been required.  The client considered the cost implications of using this area of BIPV 
and decided that a “B” rating would be acceptable, but still insisted on having BIPV as part of 
the project.  A figure of 50 square meters of BIPV was calculated to fit comfortably on the 
south west façade and the window sizing on the building was designed accordingly.  The 
M&E design consultant (SAW) described the compromise. 
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If they put in 260 square meters of roof mounted PV with a hundred square meters of 
vertically mounted, they would have got an A rated building. But they weren’t 
prepared to pay for that. So what they’ve ended up with is a PV array of 50 square 
meters on that southwest façade… The client was still keen to have the PV in one 
form or another, just to underline the environmental credentials of the building, so it 
was more visible to the general public.  So 50 square meters was like a comfortable fit 
on that façade; to accommodate 260 square meters on the roof would have been quite 
a massive undertaking and costly as well.  
M&E design consultant (SAW01) 
 Episode 1: technological frames 7.2.2
This section illustrates how the actors viewed the technology through different frames through 
this episode and how tensions developed over conflicting goals.  Figure 7-1 shows how the 
network of actors, technological frames, problems and solutions played out during the initial 
design episode and the following description draws attention to the main highlights of the 
episode.  
At the start, the client and the architect (NW) mobilised three different technological frames; 
Green Guardian (wanting the building to be sustainable), Cost Watcher (wanting to obtain 
EDRF funding) and Design Aesthete (wanting the building to make a statement).  The user 
(the lettings manager (FS)) shared the Green Guardian frame, as did the M&E design 
consultant (SAW).  In order to get both EDRF funding and be an accredited sustainable 
building the project team needed to achieve a BREEAM Excellent rating and this became a 
project goal.  As the team carried out the sustainability assessment needed for the BREEAM 
rating, the M&E design consultant (SAW), architect (NW) and client mobilised the Design 
Optimiser frame to consider the options for sustainable for technology.  As they considered 
the options, the team used the Risk Minimiser frame to assess the possibilities and BIPV 
technology.  The use of the technology as integrated windows met the criteria of both the Risk 
Minimiser frame (that the risk for installation would be defrayed onto the contractor, and that 
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BIPV windows were less risky than using BIPV brise-soleil louvres), and the Design Aesthete 
frame (the building would have a highly visible form of renewable energy which would make 
a statement of sustainability).  The Design Optimiser frame was mobilised by the team to 
calculate the total area of BIPV cells necessary to achieve a both “A” and “B” EPC ratings 
and the Cost Watcher Frame led the team to choose the lower rating, and so the design for 
BIPV system was settled on 50 square metres of cells.  
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Figure 7-1: Technological frames mobilized in episode 1 (initial design), Future Green 
 
The analysis above illustrates how the technological frames of Green Guardian, Design 
Aesthete, Cost Watcher, Risk Minimiser and Design Optimiser were all mobilised by the 
actors during this episode, and how many of the actors related to the technology through more 
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than one frame.  This discussion shows how the different goals between actors using different 
frames gave rise to a combined solution of BIPV windows and a BREEAM Excellent rated 
building.  In this episode, there were no dominant frame and it is interesting to note that the 
frame of the Generation Maximiser was absent.  The Green Guardian frame and the Design 
Aesthete frames became aligned, with the design satisfying both of these groups, and the 
BREEAM and EPC ratings of the building becoming a social artefact around which the team 
focussed. 
 Episode 1: co-development 7.2.3
This episode illustrates how rather than the BIPV or the building being fixed, the BIPV 
system accommodated the building and vice versa.  The summary of co-development during 
the whole case study is presented in section 7.8.2 but two important elements of the co-
development of building and technology occurred in this episode of the project.   
i. The two client requirements of a building that made a sustainable statement and a 
building that qualified for an EDRF award led to the inclusion of BIPV in the building 
and its integration into the windows of the south west façade. 
ii. The use of BIPV in the window glazing directly shaped the dimensions of the 
windows and their appearance (detailed in episode 2).   
7.3 Episode 2: pre-tender design  
This second episode follows from the initial design, where both the outline shape of the 
building and the configuration of the BIPV system had been defined.  The pre-tender design 
episode follows the development of the more detailed system and building design through to 
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the definition of work packages and tender documents.  The account begins at the point where 
the BIPV technology was detailed. 
 Episode 2: narrative account 7.3.1
The architect (NW) started talks with a glazing supplier (WA) who proposed a thin film PV 
technology which could be applied to the window glazing and would provide some 
transparency with a brown, wood-bark appearance.  The generation potential of the system 
was less than conventional monocrystalline technology, but as generation of the PV system 
was not critical - only the square meterage installed - the architect (NW) adopted this 
technology as part of an integrated glazing solution.  These discussions took palace 
approximately one year before the tender documentation was released.   
The architect (NW) developed details of the elevations of the building and sent elevation 
drawings to the glazing supplier (WA) to check that the PV glazing would be compatible.  
Based on his layout, the total area of PV glazing was forty-two square meters.  The glazing 
supplier (WA) indicated that the height of the windows on the drawing would require two 
panes of glass for each PV window, as the thin film technology had limits on the size of each 
panel, and suggested standard-sized glazing panels that would fit the outline design.  The 
design was adapted to suit the glazing units, with each PV window having transoms to allow 
for two standard sized thin film glazing panels to be used, one on top of the other.  The 
glazing supplier (WA) produced initial calculations of the generation potential for the forty-
two square meters of PV.   
The M&E design engineers (SAW) consulted with the façade supplier (RR) over the PV 
system and developed a specification for the BIPV, passing this to the main contractor (TH) 
who had been appointed once the initial design was agreed.  The architect (NW) had specified 
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the thin film system from the glazing supplier (WA), and so the main contractor (TH) decided 
to include the BIPV in the building “envelope work package.”  The decision-making process 
was described by the main contractor. 
That was a contractor decision that we put it into that package, purely because it was 
specified as a WA system, and WA do double glazing, it was specified as a [WA] PV 
unit by the architect. So in that sense it made perfect sense to us to put it into the 
envelope package, because it’s no different to installing any other window, it’s just got 
the PV components within it. 
Main contractor (TH01)  
The specification of the “envelope work package” was entrusted to a design consultant (the 
envelope design consultant) who had no experience of BIPV.  He was given the M&E design 
engineer’s (SAW) specification for the BIPV, which included a requirement for a design 
portion to be included in the package to indicate that some degree of electrical design and 
coordination would be required.  The envelope design consultant was advised by the architect 
(NW) and main contractor (TH) to treat the BIPV as essentially a glazed standard window.  
These two views are illustrated in the following quotes. 
I think there’s a clause in our specification that suggests that they have to liaise quite 
closely with the architect over the installation details, because it would ultimately be 
part of the façade installation; the two would have to come together and form an 
integrated solution. 
M&E design engineer (SAW01) 
Essentially, the way those PV plans have been put in is they’re just into a double 
glazed system, so it’s just like installing a window. 
Main contractor (TH01) 
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The glazing supplier (WA) had an ongoing relationship with a façade supplier (RR) and 
suggested to the architect (NW) that the façade supplier be included in the list of potential 
suppliers. 
The envelope consultant divided the envelope contract into two parts - the architectural part 
(façade) and the electrical component which included the wiring and inverters.  The electrical 
design portion was included in the main Mechanical and Electrical contract for the building. 
 Episode 2: technological frames 7.3.2
The following analysis illustrates how the different perspectives of actors in different 
technological frames gave rise to decisions which paved the way for the problems which 
arose in the later stages of the project.  Figure 7-2 shows how the network of actors, 
technological frames, problems and solutions played out during the pre-tender episode and the 
following description draws attention to the main highlights of the episode. 
The architect (NW) mobilising the Design Aesthete frame had no understanding of BIPV 
glazing technology and brought in the glazing supplier (WA) to fix the glazing specification.  
Both these actors mobilised the Design Optimiser frame to develop a solution for the size 
limitations for the glazing panels.  The main contractor (TH) adopted the Cost Watcher frame 
and elected to split the work packages using standard demarcations between electrical and 
façade suppliers.  This was primarily because he did not adopt the Design Optimiser frame to 
understand what the technology involved.  At this point the BIPV system was split into two 
assemblages: the glazing; and the electrical system.  The contracts or work packages became a 
social artefact and these three artefacts (the electrical system, the glazing and the contracts) 
shaped the main contractor’s (TH) understanding of the BIPV system.  Interestingly the 
Generation Maximiser frame was not mobilised at all in this phase.  
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In this episode one difference to highlight from the previous case study is the lack of 
understanding between actors adopting different technological frames.  The main contractor 
(TH) was fixed on the goal of getting work packages assigned quickly and so missed an 
opportunity to keep the BIPV system as one package.   
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Figure 7-2: Technological frames mobilized in episode 2 (pre-tender), Future Green  
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 Episode 2: co-development 7.3.3
During this episode of the project there was one example of the mutual articulation of the 
building and the BIPV system, and one example of a standard procedure influencing the 
design of the BIPV system.  
i. The use of thin film PV technology restricted the size of glazing panels that could be 
used.  This meant that the architect modified the window design for the whole 
building to accommodate this restriction.  He designed double windows with glazing 
bars between the glazing panels, to achieve larger window openings. 
ii. The main contractor chose to include the BIPV glazing panels within the “envelope 
work package” and to separate out the electrical work into the main electrical 
contractor’s work package.  This standard procurement process for work packages de-
coupled the BIPV system and shaped the design (or non-design) of the whole BIPV 
system from then onwards. 
7.4 Episode 3: tender process  
This episode follows on from the point at which the tender documents were sent out to 
contractors and continues up to the point when work contracts were awarded. 
 Episode 3: narrative account 7.4.1
Over the period of the tender process, the UK feed-in-tariff for solar energy was cut and the 
UK demand for solar panels fell by seventy percent.  The glazing supplier (WA) dramatically 
scaled back its involvement in solar panels and stopped offering thin film technology.  The 
glazing supplier (WA) offered the architect (NW) traditional monocrystalline laminated PV 
panels, which would provide slightly superior PV generation but which were more like a 
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chess board in appearance.  The PV cells in the laminate would be black squares (16cm
2 
each) 
and transparency would be provided by the spaces between the PV cells, rather than as a 
general translucency across the whole panel. 
The architect (NW) was unfamiliar with the differences in the two technologies and accepted 
the change in technology.  He summed up his view of the situation as follows. 
The only difference as far as I know with that is  the graphical display of the cells, 
…the traditional PV stuff, the original specification that we had, was more of a bark 
wood type. It wasn’t a massive issue, we just went back to an alternative specification. 
Architect (NW01) 
The architect (NW) and main contractor (TH) were keen to keep to the schedule and agreed 
that the new technology be used.  The new PV glazing units were available from different 
suppliers and the choice of glazing unit supplier was left to the façade contractor (RR). 
The envelope consultant who developed the M&E contractor package was unfamiliar with 
BIPV.  He drew up the specification to include spurs to the inverters and included a clause in 
the tender document requiring the use of a specialist installer who was familiar with BIPV.  
The M&E contractors who were selected to submit tenders were also all unfamiliar with 
BIPV. 
 Episode 3: technological frames 7.4.2
In this episode the Design Aesthete frame and the Green Guardian frame were not evident.  
The other technological frames of Design Optimiser, Cost Watcher and Time Sentry were 
mobilised by the actors who were concerned with getting work packages drafted and tender 
packages worked out.  The architect (NW) viewed the substitution of technology as a risk to 
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time, rather than as an aesthetic or user matter and did not understand the impact that the new 
technology would have on the aesthetics or functionality of the building.   
The SCOT diagram of the mapping of frames, artefacts, problems and solutions Figure 7-3 
reflects the apparent isolation with which decisions were taken and shows the surprising 
absence of input from actors adopting the Design Optimiser and Generation Maximiser 
frames.  It would appear that the most dominant frames in this episode were those of Cost 
Watcher and Time Sentry and the social artefacts of contracts and tender documents. 
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Figure 7-3: Technological frames mobilized in episode 3 (tender), Future Green  
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 Episode 3: co-development 7.4.3
The architect (NW) paid little attention to the single co-development event in this episode, but 
it dramatically altered both the building and the BIPV system and it clearly illustrates the co-
development.  When the thin film glazing was replaced with conventional monocrystalline 
laminate panels, the BIPV system characteristics changed, but so also did the physical 
appearance of the building.  Before, the windows were to have been a translucent bronze and 
afterwards the windows had a black, chess board appearance.  The difference from within the 
building was even greater.  Previously users would have been looking through the windows 
with a bronze translucency.  Now they would see a dark matrix of PV cells and junctions 
within the laminate. 
7.5 Episode 4: detail design 
This episode starts at the issuing of contracts and follows the design of the BIPV system and 
façade.  It finishes at the point that the façade system (including the BIPV glazing units) were 
delivered to site for installation.  
 Episode 4: narrative account 7.5.1
The contract for supplying the façade was won by RR who used the glazing supplier (WH) as 
a sub-contractor for all the glazing units on the envelope.  The BIPV units formed a very 
small part of the glazing sub-contract.  The façade supplier (RR) confirmed the dimensions of 
the BIPV glazing units and asked the glazing supplier (WA) for layout drawings showing the 
layout of the PV cells (the grid) and the offsets where the PV wires would enter the frames.  
The façade supplier (RR) was concerned to agree the visual effect of the BIPV panels with the 
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architect (NW), and to get the go-ahead for placing an order for the glazing units.  The façade 
supplier (RR) describes the importance of the layout. 
If you want to have even spacing on the photovoltaic squares then you’ve got to take 
into account that that window’s going to glaze in there by say 80mm, or whatever. So 
you’ve always got to produce a set of elevation drawings, so when that one sits on top 
of that one and gets glazed into the window you get left with what should be an even 
margin all the way around the edge of the frame. So there’s a bit of setting out has to 
go on between both companies and also with [the architect] as well, because they were 
very particular that they wanted to keep an even band around the edge. 
Façade supplier (RR01) 
The architect (NW) was very concerned about the detailing of the cell spacing and in 
particular about the placing of a small logo with the PV laminate supplier’s name (LE) and 
the kite mark for toughened glass.  The architect was insistent that the logos should all be at 
the top of the glazing on a particular side.  This entailed moving some cells around and 
making sure that each panel was individually laid out.  The PV laminate supplier (LE) had to 
spend time in optimising cell spacing to try to maximise output, and then liaised with the 
glazing supplier (WA) to ensure that the wiring connectors were located in the correct place.  
The PV laminate supplier (LE) went on to describe the way that the architect (NW) drove the 
layout from the aesthetic perspective. 
I remember he wanted the LE logo in a certain place on each panel. So that means we 
had to alter something else…[it was]: Oh, no, I want them all in that corner. So where 
we could have made six panels and you could have had some there and some there we 
then had to say, right, well, six individual panels, so we can put them all there.  So we 
had to alter cell spaces like that as well so we got the look he wanted. There was, 
definitely, [a lot of to-ing and fro-ing] over 5mm here, 5mm there. Logo position here, 
logo position there.  
PV laminate supplier (LE01) 
This level of detailing and layout considerations of symmetry put back the signing off of 
drawings and delayed the delivery of the PV laminate panels.   
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I think the delay was because of the spacing that the architect wanted round the panels, 
because...if they want different connection arrangements we then have to make new 
drawings. 
PV laminate supplier (LE01) 
From the façade supplier’s (RR) point of view, the main issue around layout was to agree the 
position at which the wires from the PV laminate were going to penetrate the frames.  It is 
clear from the following quote that he viewed the discussions as part of the normal process of 
window design, rather than anything particular about BIPV. 
So the setting out was all very discussed…so it did go back and forward a couple of 
times as any setting out does, and just a wee bit of tweaking here and there, and just 
where the wires were going to come out for getting wired up within to the window 
frame. 
Façade supplier (RR01) 
As the drawings were going through the approval process, the main contractor (TH) asked for 
a check on the generation potential of the panels against the original specification from the 
glazing supplier.  At this point the glazing supplier (WA) saw the side elevation drawings of 
the façade rather than just the front elevations and realised that the architect (NW) had 
designed all the windows with a 250mm reveal.  The glazing supplier (WA) ran a new set of 
calculations and these showed that during substantial periods of the day the reveals would 
shade the PV cells and reduce generation in each affected window to almost zero.  This 
problem was discussed by the architect (NW), glazing supplier (WA), M&E designer (SAW) 
and main contractor (TH) and each had a different view of the problem and how it should be 
resolved. 
The architect (NW) was clear that the windows were there to make a statement, that the 
reveals were a necessary part of the design, and that the PV panels within the windows were 
part of the statement. 
Chapter 7: Case Study 2 – Future Green 
172 
 
So by pushing those windows forward it would have obviously had a major impact on 
the elevation; it would have had a major impact on the actual construction sequence, 
because the whole detailing would have changed with the envelopes; or it would have 
had big impacts on the appearance and on the construction detailing anyway…And we 
didn’t want to go back and just start sticking things on the roof, because they weren’t 
there to provide electricity. If we put them on the roof no one would know they were 
there anyway. So that was the bigger issue on the main building façade in public view 
everyone could see them and it’s a selling point of the building. 
Architect (NW01) 
The M&E designer (SAW) took the view that the windows should be redesigned to allow the 
system to work properly. 
It was discovered that the [PV] panels had been recessed too far into the windows. So, 
for a large amount of the year, they’re going to be overshadowed and won’t be 
generating very much. ..My advice was, well we can’t stand by a solution which we 
know isn’t going to work. We know that it’s not going to generate much electricity, 
but if you’re spending a few thousand pounds on the installation, you want it to 
generate as much as it possibly can. You want to get the most out of the installation, 
acknowledging that it’s not going to be a lot. As opposed to if it’s not going to 
generate anything, you might as well rip out all the electrics behind the scene and just 
have it there as a billboard…Well my view was, we have to solve this problem and we 
can’t sweep it under the carpet, we have to be open and honest about it...I suggested, 
could it be pushed forward? Could it be put on some sort of bracketing system that 
would make it flush with the façade, as opposed to recessed? And I think that was just 
considered not viable. 
M&E design consultant (SAW01) 
The main contractor (TH) was concerned on two fronts - firstly that the client should be well 
served by the technology and second that the schedule would not allow for any changes to the 
system of mounting the glazing units.  The glazing supplier (WA) remembered the 
calculations but was not aware that this had caused major issues.  
There are issues with shading on the panels and reducing the efficiency of the 
panels.… it was never there to create a certain amount of energy it was never really 
such an issue on that one ….to some extent I think it could almost wipe out a whole 
run of cells that are all linked together.  It didn’t just affect a certain percentage. 
Glazing Supplier (WA01) 
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The reduction in electricity output could not be quantified, as the generation figure had not 
been revised when the technology had changed from thin film to monocrystalline cells, and 
the architect did not feel able to resolve the issue.  
That’s when the conversation started - well this is what we said originally, but then no 
one told us what we then were going to get so we couldn’t make a comparison 
anyway. We never found out those figures….the original specification was [thin film] 
and that was what that original figure was based on, so we had [not] got the figure. 
Architect (NW01) 
The design of the windows and glazing was left as it was and the design continued to 
installation. 
During the design phase the main electrical contractor was not given wiring diagrams for the 
window strings and was also not provided with any details of PV outputs to allow sizing of 
the inverter.  The M&E contractor (BSW) delayed appointing a PV wiring specialist and 
effectively shelved the design of the BIPV wiring. 
 Episode 4: technological frames 7.5.2
As the façade supplier (RR) and glazing supplier (WA) worked through the detail of the 
layout of the PV cells, connectors and junction boxes, they shared the Design Optimiser frame 
and as in other cases this appeared to result in a collaborative mode of problem solving, very 
different from the isolated modes seen in previous parts of the project.   
However the architect (TH) stuck to the Design Aesthete frame and became very taken up 
with the minutiae of the position of the laminate supplier logo.  So much so, in fact, that the 
laminate supplier had to request sign-off on the drawings in order to meet time and cost 
issues.  Contracts in the form of social artefacts became an important factor again when the 
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main contractor (TH) asked for the generation figures to be checked against contract.  At this 
point the team realised that there were no target generation figures in the design - no-one had 
calculated a revised generation forecast after the technology had been changed.  The glazing 
supplier (WA) tried to check the figures - mobilising the Design Optimiser frame - and then 
realised that the reveals on the windows would over-shadow the PV glazing units and at 
particular times of each day would reduce generation to almost zero.  When trying to resolve 
this issue a polarising of technological frames happened - the main contractor (TH) wanted to 
give the client a working PV system (Green Guardian) whilst also wanting to keep the project 
on track (Time Sentry).  The architect (NW) also wanted to keep the project on track, but 
mobilised the Design Aesthete frame to insist that the design remain with the large reveals, as 
they made a strong architectural statement.  The M&E design consultant used the Green 
Guardian frame as he argued that the technology should generate electricity.  The impasse 
was broken as the main contractor and architect prevailed, mobilising the Time Sentry frame, 
and the deep window reveals remained in the design.  This is reflected in the SCOT diagram 
(Figure 7-4) which shows that the dynamics of these decisions. 
This episode demonstrates that collaborative problem solving appeared to occur when the 
Design Optimiser frame was shared by two or more actors and that conversely, when an actor 
stuck rigidly to his single frame, then delay or an impasse was likely to arise.  The impasse 
over the serious issue of reduced (almost zero) generation was moved forward by the Time 
Sentry frame which focussed attention on the schedule.  This again illustrates the role of 
social artefacts in the decision-making processes. 
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Figure 7-4: Technological frames mobilized in episode 4 (detail design), Future Green 
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 Episode 4: co-development 7.5.3
Two clear examples of co-development of the building and the BIPV system occurred during 
this episode of the project.  Neither was particularly noticeable when viewed from ground 
level, but both had very major implications on the installation and performance of the BIPV 
system.  
i. Minor examples of co-development occurred as the position of PV connectors, 
cells and connector strips determined the position offsets and junction boxes of the 
frames and vice versa.   
ii. The deep reveals around the windows shadowed the PV cells within the glazing 
and reduced the performance of the BIPV system.  Although not an example of 
physical co-development, the reveals had a major impact on the BIPV system 
performance. 
7.6 Episode 5: installation  
This episode starts as the façade was delivered to site and continues through the installation 
and commissioning process. 
 Episode 5: narrative account 7.6.1
This episode started as the PV glazing arrived on site and the main contractor faced the job of 
trying to understand how the BIPV cables would fit together.  The main contractor (TH) 
described the situation in the extract below. 
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These turned up onsite with the tails, and that was the first time we really realised, oh, 
right, so we’ve actually got, we’ve got four tails sticking out of all of these units that 
we need to connect up…Now we didn’t know that it was going to come like that till it 
landed onsite. So part of the challenge for us was working out, what does that connect 
to? Is that coming down to this one? 
Main contractor (TH01) 
The glazing units had been delivered to site by the glazing supplier (WA), but installation was 
to be carried out by the façade supplier (RR).  The glazing supplier had not been asked to 
provide wiring details and had simply supplied layout drawings showing the points where the 
flying leads would be positioned. 
Because we also then had to drill our frames to let these wires come out so somebody 
else could wire them up. We don’t get involved in any of that, we purely put the 
window in and leave a tail for somebody else to come along, which is M&E. …we 
dealt with [the main contractor] and we handed over all these drawings, obviously the 
sectional drawings and they dealt with it direct for themselves under the M&E 
contract because at the end of the day we just leave a tail and they take it from there. 
Façade supplier (RR01) 
The initial wiring details had been worked out worked out between the glazing supplier (WA) 
and the PV laminate supplier (LE) in some detail. 
Then we had to design that to fit, but also the [electrical] connections so they then 
interlinked from panel to panel. So there’s quite a bit of design work in that…we work 
with WA. They would say, right, this is how we think we’re going to wire it together, 
so then we had to look at our cell layout and then alter where we put the junction 
boxes so we could connect it together. 
PV laminate supplier (LE01) 
This had not been passed onto the main contractor (TH) who had to try to judge the best way 
of running the cables. 
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Because the windows are staggered as well, we couldn’t just wire them up this way 
and then do a loop and come back down. So they had to cut across…..we actually had 
to drill through all of the window frames to bring the cables out, and then put the 
glazing beads on... So the cables are actually coming through the frame. They were 
then linked, and there’s a spur. Now is it on every window - to the left hand side we 
have a spur. And they were all jointed to the wiring, and then basically all linked back 
down. 
Main contractor (TH01) 
The issue was to try and connect wires between the irregularly spaced windows in a way that 
minimised the number of penetrations though the façade and which allowed efficient 
connection of the strings of cells.  The architect (NW) did not see this as an issue and was 
concerned with reducing the appearance of any internal wiring. 
But the wires within the glass itself…we didn’t have any major problems with. As 
long as it was done effectively, neat and tidy and to the best ability, I don’t think we 
have any problems with it. And obviously the wires could be concealed the best way 
we can; but if they’re an integrated part of the system and they have to go where they 
need to go that’s the system itself. 
Architect (NW01) 
The solution to the problem was to drill through the glazing frames, pull through the wires 
and chase them into the surrounding plasterboard.  The holes in the frames had to be large 
enough to pull the connectors through and to minimise the size of the holes, the main 
contractor (TH) was tempted to cut off the connectors and refit them once the wires had been 
pulled through, but decided not to do this because of worries of risk and responsibility. 
The issue of the wiring configuration and method of getting the wires from the outside to the 
inside of the façade involved the coordination of four contractors and a delay of over six 
weeks to the internal finishing.  For the main contractor (TH) the issue was delay.  Until the 
configuration and method had been agreed, the internal finishing could not be completed. 
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But it did delay us internally, in that we couldn’t close up this elevation on the 
inside…Because we hadn’t foreseen any of these things, it probably held up this 
elevation about six weeks…. But it meant we had to leave all of this off internally. We 
couldn’t seal any of this up until all these were in, all of this was drilled through, these 
were all wired up. We couldn’t actually close off internally any of these units until all 
that wiring was done.  
Main contractor (TH01) 
The leads were all positioned at the centre of the top of the widows so each one had to loop 
around to the internal plasterboard  
It would’ve been much better if the tails had been top and bottom. Which would’ve 
been very simple for them to do. Why do they come out of the middle? I don’t 
understand that. 
Main contractor (TH01) 
The design of the two-part windows proved even more problematic, as the number and 
location of the flying leads precluded the option of hiding the leads in the plaster work. 
Well what was even worse is where you’ve got these double lights fixed together. And 
so you’ve got that…got four tails there …in the middle of the glass. So we’re saying, 
all right, we can take these out into the plasterboard, and hide them. How are we 
supposed to connect these up? Because it was just purely on the glazing and the 
window frame…So we ended up having to drill holes top and bottom, feed this one 
up, kind of take it up between the gap between the glazing and the actual frame itself. 
We had to feed the cable up like that, pop it through, back down, and do the same on 
both sides to connect them up. 
Main Contractor (TH01) 
When the façade supplier (RR) came to fit the stop beads to the glazing panels it became clear 
that the beads were of the wrong size. 
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The other issue that hadn’t been picked up…is those units are a slightly thicker unit. 
So all the stop beads that came were wrong. And these were anodised. So they all had 
to be shipped away and new stop beads made. … So we ended up having to timber 
chock them all in for about six weeks while the stop beads were [re-made], and you 
can’t fit those until all the wiring’s done. 
Main Contractor (TH01) 
The glazing supplier (WA) and façade supplier (RR) had designed the stop beads using the 
normal thin film glazing thickness rather than the monocrystalline technology which used 
laminated PV panels which were 2mm thicker. 
Once the panels were in place and the wiring configuration had been agreed, the M&E 
contactor (BSW) began to connect the cables.  It then became clear that the M&E contactor 
(BSW) had forgotten to order the inverter and had not employed a specialist PV wiring 
contractor.  The PV wiring contractor was employed, but could not order the inverter as the 
output of the PV system was needed to size the inverter and maximise the system efficiency.  
In the end a pragmatic solution was agreed between the main contractor (TH) and the PV 
wiring contractor.  The inverter was sized for a theoretical maximum output from the square 
meterage of the glazing panels.  
They’d got a window with the PV on it, but nobody took the design any further, to say 
well, what size inverter are we going to put on this thing? ..So basically we had to get 
an individual company in, and we give them the square meterage of the windows and 
asked RIAS [a specialist inverter supplier] what sort of inverter that we would put on 
that, because they’re the specialists. They advised us of the inverter based on that 
square meterage, providing it was based on a nice sunny day and it was in the right 
position. They couldn’t do the calculation with it in situ as it was. 
Main Contractor (TH02) 
The inverter location had not been decided in the initial design.  There had been talk of having 
a panel on display in the foyer of the building, but as the very small amount of electricity 
generation became apparent, this idea was shelved and the architect (NW), M&E design 
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consultant (SAW) and main contractor (TH) decided to put the inverter in an area which 
would not be seen.  This process was described by the M&E design consultant (SAW). 
TH02 came up with the idea of locating the inverters within some of the rooms which 
became spare after the ICT strategy changed. So there were some small rooms that run 
up alongside the staircase where he suggested putting in the inverters for the system. 
In terms of monitoring the electricity production, originally there was, I think, a 
proposal to have some sort of kilowatt hour meter within reception. When this 
problem came to light I think the kilowatt hour meter was value engineered out. 
M&E design consultant (SAW01) 
It was left to the main contractor (TH) to site the inverter and to find a place that was 
inconspicuous but which would keep the cable runs as short as possible to reduce system 
losses.  
The siting of the inverter was never shown on a drawing, we’ve tried to put that close 
as we can to the cable, and then run from there back to the distribution. 
Main contractor (TH02) 
The M&E contractor (BSW) queried the proposed siting of the inverter and suggested that it 
was too far away for an efficient system, but the electrical contractor’s site supervisor decided 
to stick with that location. 
We had an electrical project engineer who also raised that query i.e. the distance as 
well. It got raised and it got OK-ed, so basically it was up to BSW02 to decide how he 
was going to run those cables. 
M&E Project Manager (BSW01) 
The inverter was eventually sited in a cleaning cupboard off the entrance foyer of the 
building. 
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 Episode 5: technological frames 7.6.2
As the glazing units and façade assemblies arrived on site, the main contractor (TH) was 
concerned with delivering the installation schedule and was invested in the Time Sentry 
frame.  When the façade supplier site supervisor (RR) tried to install the glazing panels in the 
frames, he realised that the two trailing wires would not fit within the frame in such a way 
that would allow the wires to end up on the inside face of the panels.  The glazing supplier 
(WA), façade supplier (RR) and main contractor (TH) all shared two frames - Time Sentry 
and Design Optimiser.  They were keen to solve the problems and move on with minimum 
delay.  This combination of frames appears to have pushed a solution through and allow the 
project to move forward.  Interestingly the one solution that might have been the simplest - 
cutting off the connectors and pulling the bare wires through before reconnecting the 
connectors was ruled out because the main contractor (TH) perceived it as possibly 
invalidating a contract (Risk Minimiser). 
In a similar way, the issues with the missing parts of the electrical design were solved as the 
M&E contractor (BSW) and electrical subcontractor adopted a combination of Design 
Optimiser and Generation Maximiser frame to determine cable runs and the inverter size.  
Interestingly, this was the only occurrence of the Generation Maximiser frame in this episode.  
This reflected in the SCOT diagram Figure 7-5 which shows that the dynamics of these 
decisions 
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Figure 7-5: Technological frames mobilized in episode 5 (installation), Future Green 
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 Episode 5: co-development 7.6.3
In this episode there were three examples of co-development between the building and the 
BIPV system  
i. The minor mutual adjustment between the frames and glazing units and glazing bars 
to bring the wires to the inside of the frames resulted in major delays to the closing off 
of the internal elevation.  The origin of these difficulties was in the original discussion 
of the layout of the frames between the façade supplier and the glazing supplier.  They 
had not appreciated that the arrangement that they settled on would make the wiring 
difficult for the double height windows.  The change in technology actually made the 
double window design unnecessary, but the architect had not picked this point up and 
kept the double height window feature.  
ii. The inverter sizing depended on the output of the BIPV panels, but the deep reveals 
shaded the panels at some points during the day and made the output variable.  The 
contractor sized the inverter for his estimate of the maximum output, but this 
oversizing for other parts of the day further reduced the efficiency of the system.   
iii. The reduced performance of the BIPV system affected the siting of the BIPV meter 
and changed the focus of the building from a prominent generation meter, to a meter 
hidden in a cupboard away from public view. 
7.7 Reflections on the finished building 
This case study was the only project to be finished and handed over to the client during the 
interview period.  Many of the interviewees reflected on the finished building and had very 
different views about the inclusion of BIPV, its execution and appearance.  These reflections 
inform the analysis and are therefore included below. 
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The architect (TH) was satisfied with the statement that the cells made and did not see a great 
difference between what would have been delivered by the thin film technology and what the 
monocrystalline cells delivered.  
It was exactly the same…as far as we know it’s just a filling which is applied to the 
glass within the glazing, but it’s just what that looks like...It was more of a bark wood 
type that we originally specified…. but WA stopped doing that product as this come to 
site, so it wasn’t a massive issue, we just went back to an alternative specification. 
Architect (NW01) 
The main contractor (TH) was unhappy about the lack of generation potential and was 
concerned about the internal visual appearance of the windows.  The M&E design consultant 
(SAW) felt that the visible BIPV and the poor generation figures were in tension and would 
cause issues in the future. 
The building is going to be flagship of sustainability and [if] you get some experts in 
the field who might look round the building, they will spot this issue straightaway. It’s 
sort of a cardinal sin to have PV which are almost permanently overshadowed. …you 
don’t want it to become a laughing stock of the industry press, saying a flagship 
sustainability building doesn’t generate any electricity using photovoltaics. 
M&E design consultant (SAW01) 
The M&E design consultant (SAW) had seen the windows in situ and commented on the 
opaque nature of the windows. 
It’s lots of strips, you don’t have any panoramic views… you don’t have a single piece 
of glazing which has got any width to it… you’ll see a lot of light coming through the 
gaps between the cells but, which makes the cells look black. It doesn’t look 
ideal...you certainly notice that you've got something on the window, because it is a 
very substantial black, if that makes sense.” 
M&E design consultant (SAW02) 
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The client and letting agent felt very ambivalent about the panels - the letting agent 
understood that the BIPV had been part of the solution to obtaining ERDF funding, but felt 
that the appearance of the panels was actually a hindrance to letting the offices. 
The reason these offices are let is simply because they're non regular…not cellular, 
unlike ordinary offices on the floor. So it's just a little bit different and it makes it a 
good open-plan kind of space. It's nothing to do with the PV panels, I would say that 
has reduced the let-ability of it, rather than improved it. 
Lettings manager (FS01) 
7.8 Summary 
This final section of the chapter brings together the five episodes to examine the case as a 
whole - exploring the technological frames and RSG’s, the co-development of the BIPV and 
the building as the project proceeded, and the issues and challenges which were particular to 
this project 
 Technological frames  7.8.1
The preceding analysis for each episode within the project illustrated how the technological 
frames were mobilised by the actors in the project.  It went on to explore how tensions played 
out between the actors mobilising different technological frames as they found solutions to 
problems.  This section summarises the pattern of technological frames used and investigates 
the way that actors mobilised different frames at different times throughout the project. 
This case study was dominated by the Design Aesthete and Cost Watcher frames.  After a 
very brief appearance, the Green Guardian frame disappeared and only appeared on one 
further occasion, when the issue of the deep window reveals was brought into focus by the 
glazing supplier.  The Generation Maximiser frame surprisingly only appeared once - at the 
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end of the project, as the electrical contractor tried to size the inverter.  Three of the most used 
technological frames were those of the Cost Watcher, Time Sentry and Risk Minimiser and 
the mobilisation of these frames resulted in finding solutions which followed typical 
construction project procedures.   
There were several examples of actors seeing the technology through more than one frame 
and this increased interpretive flexibility and aid problem solving.  Collaborative problem 
solving occurred when the Design Optimiser frame was shared by two or more actors; 
conversely, when an actor stuck rigidly to his single frame, delay or an impasse was likely to 
arise.  This is illustrated in particular in the case of co-development of the frames and glazing 
units, when the façade supplier and glazing supplier used the Design Optimiser frame to 
develop solutions, whilst the architect stuck to the Design Aesthete in detailing the cell layout 
and caused delays to the project.   
Another striking feature of this case study is the effect of social artefacts such as the contracts 
and schedules and how these affected decision-making.  In this case study, it was clear that 
the BIPV system was represented as different artefacts to different actors - the architect saw 
the BIPV system as glazing panels, the main contractor viewed it at one point as windows, 
and at another as two contracts or work packages.  It was never viewed as a system of 
components. 
Unlike the first case study, there were few examples of actors changing the technological 
frame through which they viewed the technology during the course of the project.  This 
relative stability echoed the lack of understanding between actors adopting different 
technological frames, and resulted in the relatively isolated mode of decision-making that was 
striking throughout the project.  The architect in this case study primarily mobilised the 
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Design Aesthete mode and occasionally the Time Sentry frame.  There are a few examples of 
him adopting the Design Optimiser frame, but these are rare.  In general, if the actors 
mobilised a second frame, it was generally one of the Time Sentry, Cost Watcher or Risk 
Minimiser.  The different frames mobilised by the actors at different times of the project is 
illustrated in Figure 7-6 below.  Actors (the right hand column) moved between frames as the 
project progressed (the time element of the project being represented on the horizontal axis at 
different project stages).  Some examples of an actor adopting a second or even a new frame 
did occur - for example the client from Green Guardian to Cost Watcher frame after the pre-
tender phase was completed.  These shifts could be accounted for by several factors: the 
natural change in focus of the project actors as the project moved through RIBA stages from 
concept to installation; the stabilisation of certain elements of the design (for example the size 
of the glazing panels); and shifts in the nature of the problem (as the PV glazing panels 
became an aesthetic design issue and then became a constraint for the installation of the 
frames).  Chapter 9 will explore these factors further by comparing the different case studies. 
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Figure 7-6: Movement of actors between technological frames as project proceeds 
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 The co-development of the BIPV and the building 7.8.2
The discussion of the five episodes in this case signalled a number of key moments of co-
development.  The discussion which follows explores the co-development story of the 
building and the technology in greater detail, and shows how this mutual articulation 
occurred.  The three types of co-development identified in the previous case study (lock-in, 
homogeneity of appearance, and mutual adjustment and adaptation) were also present in this 
case, together with unfolding innovation, as the BIPV was integrated within the building.  The 
analysis which follows describes the co-development of the BIPV system and the building, 
from the perspective of key design decisions and the socio-technical network which supported 
them.  The diagrams below were derived from a SCOT framework of analysis which focussed 
on the problems experienced by the actors over the project and identified the range of 
solutions used to resolve them.  Figure 7-7  shows how the process of co-development 
occurred over the project and illustrates the key stages of the story.  
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Figure 7-7: Co-development diagram Future Green
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Enlarged sections of the diagram are used to illustrate specific points in the discussion which 
follows.  The integration of BIPV is analysed as a succession of problems and solutions which 
led to the integration of BIPV within the windows as a distinctive element of the glazing.  In 
the early stages, the architect proposed using thin film PV technology.  During the tender 
phase, procurement problems led to their replacement with conventional monocrystalline 
cells.  However the knock-on effects on frame design and glazing beads were not picked up 
until well into construction, resulting in delays and re-work.  The discussion below traces this 
co-development and decision-making process as it unfolded. 
Lock-in 
Lock-in occurred right at the beginning of the project when the clients were keen to attract 
European Regional Development Funding (ERDF), which meant that the building had to 
achieve a BREEAM Excellent rating as well as an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) 
rating of at least “B” and preferably “A”.  EPC ratings of both “A” and “B” required the use 
of renewable technology.  At the same time the architect and client became intent on using 
highly visible forms of sustainable technology so that future tenants and the general public 
would see that the building was “green”.  Lock-in occurred when the client and architect saw 
that BIPV on the south elevation could deliver both requirements and therefore selected the 
technology.   
The M&E designer calculated that the building would need 260 square metres of photovoltaic 
technology to achieve an EPC rating of “A”, but only 50 square metres to achieve a “B” 
rating.  The client elected to go for the “B” rating and after discussions with the M&E 
designers the architect locked-in the decision to use BIPV in the windows of the South 
elevation of the building.  The architect also locked-in the decision to use thin film 
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technology.  Figure 7-8 shows how the choice to use EU funding and the client’s wish to 
make a strong visible sustainability statement drove the inclusion of BIPV on the project.  
This decision then changed the frame through which the actors viewed the technology from 
one of electricity generation to one of visibility, which drew the architect and designers to 
using BIPV in the windows and so made the choice of thin film technology logical. 
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Figure 7-8: Co-development-lock-in 
 
The mutual adjustment of building shape and BIPV design 
The mutual adjustment of building shape and BIPV design occurred mostly on site and 
resulted from problems in the lack of integrated design between the glazing panels and façade 
frames.  These were mostly caused by the change in BIPV technology, from thin film to 
monocrystalline laminate.  Figure 7-9 shows how during the construction phase the lack of 
design and coordination of the BIPV system led to decisions being taken rapidily over frame 
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modifications, glazing beads and wiring configurations.  The glazing panels were delivered to 
site with two trailing leads on each unit.  The units had to be assembled into the frames with 
the leads ending up on the internal face of the frames.  As a result the frames had to be drilled 
to allow the leads to enter the building and connected to the BIPV wiring.  In addition, the 
monocrystalline laminate glazing panels were thicker than the standard glazing panels and the 
specified glazing beads for the window units were too thick.  This series of adjustments 
resulted in delays to the schedule and internal finishing of the south elevation. 
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Figure 7-9: Co-development - mutual adjustment 
This process of co-development by mutual adjustment led to some moments of unfolding 
innovation as the installation team developed new ways of integrating the frames and glazing 
into the building.   
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Homogeneity of appearance 
The second series of co-development events relate to homogeneity of appearance of the BIPV 
and the building and are shown in Figure 7-10.  At the initial stage of the project the decision 
to use BIPV in the windows dictated the choice of thin film technology.  This technology 
could achieve a blend of aesthetics and functionality.  The brown colour of the panels would 
resemble wood bark and contrast with the gold façade, while the semi-transparent finish 
would provide light through the windows.  The thin film technology had limitations in terms 
of the dimensions that could be manufactured and this meant that most of the PV windows 
would be made from two panels, one above the other.  In addition, the standard glazing panel 
sizing for non PV windows dictated the window layout and sizing.  During the tender process 
the thin film technology became unobtainable and the supplier proposed to substitute it with 
conventional monocrystalline laminated PV panels which would provide slightly superior PV 
generation but which were very different in appearance.  Transparency would be provided by 
the spacing between the PV cells, rather than as a general translucency across the whole 
panel.  The architect and main contractor were keen to keep to the schedule and agreed that 
the new technology be used.  The architect (NW) was unfamiliar with the differences in the 
two technologies but recognised that the monocrystalline cells would affect the external 
appearance of the windows and worked with the glazing supplier (WA) to optimise the layout 
of the cells and logo, allow an even border and symmetrical cell spacing. 
The knock-on effect of this decision was that the changes to cell spacing affected both the 
generation potential of the technology and the aesthetics of the windows from the inside.  
Instead of a semi-transparent brown film, up to 80 % of each PV window now had blocks of 
black opaque cells.  The other thing to pass without notice was that the restriction on the 
dimensions of the glazing panels (resulting from the specification of thin film technology) 
Chapter 7: Case Study 2 – Future Green 
196 
 
would not apply when monocrystalline technology was used.  This meant that the windows 
could have been specified as one panel, thus reducing the number of joins and flying leads.  
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Figure 7-10: Co-development - homogeneity of appearance 
This series of mutual articulations between the appearance of the BIPV system and the 
appearance of the building seemed minor to the project actors, but resulted in the sub-
optimised generation potential of the system, delays and re-work, and a set of windows which 
were opaque.  In addition, an aesthetic detail for deep window-reveals resulted in shadowing 
of the PV cells during significant periods of the day, which dramatically reduced generation 
potential further. 
Procedures of working 
As in the previous case study, an aspect of co-development occurred as a result of the 
procedures of working used during the project.  During the pre-tender stage, the M&E design 
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consultant (SAW) and architect (NW) developed the technical specifications and the main 
contractor decided how the contracts for tender were to be allocated.  When dividing up the 
work packages for tender, the main contractor decided to include the BIPV panels in the 
envelope tender package and place all the other parts of the BIPV system into the mechanical 
and electrical package for the internal work of the building. 
It made perfect sense to us to put it into the envelope package, because like I said, it’s 
no different to installing any other window, it’s just got the PV components within it. 
Main Contractor (TH01)  
The M&E design consultants drew up the tender packages accordingly and included 
substantial design portions in each tender package for development of the design: the 
configuration of connections for the panels; location and sizing of the inverters; and wiring 
from the panels to the inverters.  The consultant was very clear that further integrated design 
between the M&E contractor and the façade supplier would be necessary to make the 
technology work. 
The packages went out to tender and were duly awarded.  The main contractor (TH) was not 
aware of the requirement for detail design of the system and the potential suppliers had not 
read the detail of the specification.  The façade supplier viewed the PV panels as just another 
sort of glazing panel and this resulted in the PV panels arriving on site with two flying leads 
on each panel and no plan about how they were to be incorporated into the façade and 
penetrate the building.  Some windows were mounted one above the other and this double 
height design made the installation problems even more difficult.  At the same time the M&E 
contractor (BSW) had neglected to design how the wiring was to run from the frames and had 
been unaware that the inverters needed to be ordered.  Figure 7-11 shows how this 
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progressive lack of integration and design eventually led to a delay of the internal finishing of 
that elevation of the building of six weeks. 
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Figure 7-11: Co-development - procedures 
In summary, the four examples of co-development in Future Green illustrate the three types of 
co-development identified in the previous case study (lock-in; interdependence of appearance; 
mutual adjustment and adaptation), together with examples of unfolding innovation as the 
BIPV was integrated within the building.  These mechanisms and reflections of their 
importance on innovation are discussed in Chapter 9. 
7.9 Issues about BIPV and the challenges which it poses for project teams  
Several issues in this analysis have particular relevance for the construction sector: 
unfamiliarity with the technology; BIPV expertise; system considerations; the motive for 
including BIPV on the project; the role of social artefacts; and construction practices.   
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Unfamiliarity with the technology 
Unfamiliarity of the project actors with the technology led to several unanticipated 
consequences which had profound implications on the subsequent direction of the project.  
Neither of the main contractors had previous experience of BIPV which meant that when they 
were placing the work packages for tender, they placed the BIPV into the envelope package.  
They were unaware that the envelope consultant had parcelled the electrical part of the BIPV 
into the electrical contractor package and had included a considerable design portion within 
the tender document.  When the main contractor (TH) considered the electrical package 
tender bids, no attention was paid to the requirement for design of the BIPV electrical system, 
either by the main contractor or by the electrical contractor.  This meant that there was no 
coordination of the whole BIPV system and that when the packages reached site there was 
confusion over how to wire up the cables, where to run the wires to, and who should have 
ordered the inverter. 
But the coordination and understanding the wiring and the schematics fell into 
nobody’s package, because the PV was in the envelope guy’s package, and BSW, who 
are doing all the M&E on the job, [were] bringing a few spurs to it and an inverter. In 
fact the inverters we completely missed, and went into nobody’s package, because it 
had fallen in this gap in between the two. And RR, who are doing our envelope, have 
no experience in PV, so they didn’t know to raise those questions with us. 
Main contractor (TH01) 
This led to a six-week delay in finishing the interior for the south west elevation, as the wiring 
issues were resolved.  The need to drill the glazing frames and cladding to allow the wires to 
penetrate the building also raised issues of airtightness targets for the EPC certification. 
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That’s our vapour control layer. So everywhere these cables had to come through, we 
had to penetrate through. And given that we [had] an air permeability of three, which, 
well you probably know is quite a stringent target; any of those kind of penetrations 
were a real worry for us. So for every one of those [holes] we were frantically going 
back and having to patch the VCL around and make sure that that was all sealed. 
Main Contractor (TH01) 
Expertise 
In this project, in a similar way to Case study 1, there was no single source of expertise for the 
BIPV system.  The electrical design engineer viewed the PV as a packaged system that would 
be procured as a whole system, whilst the mechanical design engineer thought that his 
colleague was providing the design specification.  
Because the PV tends to be a fairly packaged system…someone will provide a whole 
system and then we’ll have a box on the wall that we need to connect into; to a large 
extent, so the limit of my involvement might be I’m providing a 16 amp way on the 
main switchboard and providing a sub main cable that is suitably sized up to their 
controller; everything downstream of the controller will be the packaged contractor. 
M&E design consultant (SWA02) 
We’re the mechanical and electrical designers. So my electrical colleagues would have 
been fully aware of the requirements in terms of photovoltaics, and they may have 
incorporated their requirements onto a schematic diagram, as opposed to something 
that was more of an installation detail; the reason why we didn’t look at the 
installation detail is because we consider that to be outside of our remit. 
M&E design consultant (SAW01) 
The façade supplier was clear that the wiring fell outside their remit although the main 
contractor was sure that the façade supplier had a plan for the installation. 
We let these wires come out so somebody else could wire them up. We don’t get 
involved in any of that, we purely put the window in and leave a tail for somebody 
else to come along, which is M&E. 
Façade supplier (RR01) 
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The PV laminate supplier advised about panel layouts, and tried to ensure that the architect 
was happy with the layout and that the connections within the panels were efficient, but did 
not get involved with the wiring or string configuration.  The façade supplier assumed that the 
site M&E contractor would install the system (although no one had designed it) and the main 
contractor relied on the design engineers to have done the initial design.  In this case, not only 
was there no single “go-to” expert, the project actors did not seek the expertise but relied on 
someone else to be the expert.  This small quotation illustrates the belief that there is one 
person who will answer the questions, but similar to the “he” in case study 1, the “PV guys” 
in this extract do not exist. 
And I think again they were kind of coming to us and saying, we need the information 
off your PV guys. 
Main contractor (TH01) 
System considerations 
In this project the visible inclusion of BIPV was the key consideration - the architect was 
clear that the most important thing was for the panels to be seen.  When the glazing supplier 
calculated that the generation potential would be severely reduced by the deep reveals on the 
windows, the architect was adamant that the design would stay as it was.   
The change in technology from thin film to monocrystalline cells almost passed without 
comment or thought - they both provided the visual element for the building, but the effect of 
the change had a very large impact on the final aesthetics of the building.  The frustration of 
this choice was articulated by the lettings manager.  
in terms of the specification which are these solid panels, that's a product which would 
never be specified now, because there are newer products which are transparent and 
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basically preserve the view but still do a job, and one would imagine do a better job 
than these in terms of generating power. 
Lettings manager (FS01) 
The project team focussed their attention on the visible element of the BIPV system (i.e. the 
glazing panels) and this focus led them to ignore electrical package.  The main contractor 
illustrated this point when talking about the perception of BIPV. 
But essentially, the way those PV plans have been put in is they’re just into a double 
glazed system, so it’s just like installing a window. Actually installing it onsite is no 
different than just glazing a standard window. 
Main contractor (TH01) 
Motive 
The motive to include BIPV on the project was purely based on the desire to have a statement 
of sustainability as a selling feature on the building.  This led to a focus on the architectural 
contribution that BIPV could make and a total disregard for its potential to generate 
electricity.  This in turn led the architect to pay attention to the cell layout on the windows 
with a view to getting a regular pattern of cells with an even border around the windows, 
rather than trying to optimise how the connectors would fit within the façade.  
In this case study there was very little consideration of the technological assemblage of the 
BIPV system - rather it was conflated with the glazing panels.  At the detail design stage in 
the project the artefact of the glazing panel was sub-divided into glass, cells and connectors, 
but this was only done in discrete meetings, between architect and PV laminate supplier, or 
between the façade supplier and glazing supplier.  The main contractor and M&E contractor 
were not part of this discussion and when the units came on site any agreed wiring 
configurations were changed to allow the units to be integrated into the façade.  Even when 
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the wiring work was done, this was not perceived to be related to the BIPV system - rather as 
an addition to the M&E contract.  This lack of clarity over what exactly constituted the BIPV 
system gave rise to confusion over which actor was responsible for which part of the 
technology.  For example the M&E contractor considered the BIPV element as a black box 
which had to be connected to the G59 panel, rather than realising that the inverter had to be 
sized and procured as part of the package. 
Social artefacts 
Social artefacts such as the project schedule, funding criteria and EPC criteria and contracts 
played an important part in shaping the co-development of the building and technology.  The 
actors tend to defer to these artefacts as immutable truths rather than as tools which were 
developed to assist the smooth running of the project.  These social artefacts significantly 
impacted the stabilisation and closure of problems and solutions. 
This analysis reviews four main issues surrounding the adoption of BIPV in the building 
which were present throughout the project: lack of familiarity with the technology; the 
presence of a PV expert; the motive for the inclusion of BIPV; the effect of social artefacts.  
These four issues were present in the other case studies and will be discussed in greater depth 
in the Chapter 9. 
Construction Practices 
The three themes of contracts, continuity and collaboration, and change orders which were 
apparent in the first case study also run through this case study. 
The way in which the work packages were divided was decided by the main contractor, but 
the content of each specified by the M&E pre-tender design engineers.   
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In terms of the level of design that we are responsible for, we are responsible almost 
for the strategy and the performance requirements. In terms of the final installation 
details, that would be over to the M and E contractor and that is captured within the M 
and E preliminaries. 
M&E design consultant (SAW01) 
The BIPV was considered by the main contractor to fall into the envelope work package and 
so the M&E design engineers’ tender specification for the BIPV was developed in such a way 
that the façade (or envelope) package included the PV glazing and the M&E contract for 
internal fixings included the electrical portion of design for the PV system. 
The PV was quite difficult in the sense that because it was procured as part of the 
envelope package, it went into the envelope contractor design... Actually installing it 
onsite is no different than just glazing a standard window. So in that sense the 
installation onsite has been quite easy. …In fact the inverters we completely missed 
and it went into nobody’s package, because it had fallen in this kind of gap in between 
the two. 
Main Contractor (TH01) 
We’ve done a specification sheet for the photovoltaics so we will have liaised with the 
manufacturer and with [the glazing supplier], extracted specification based on their 
advice, incorporated that into our specification and then the job goes out to tender. 
…And then [the main contractor] who ultimately were the successful contractor, they 
would have then employed [the M&E contractor], who would have taken our 
specification and implemented it. And I think there’s a clause in our specification that 
suggests that they have to liaise quite closely with the architect over the installation; 
details, because it would ultimately be part of the façade installation, the two would 
have to come together and form an integrated solution. 
Mechanical Design Contractor (SAW01) 
The M&E design contractor had included a substantial design portion within the work 
packages, but the main contractor (who approved the tender packages and awarded the 
contracts) was not aware of this and did not check that that design work had been which had 
been done.  This lack of continuity meant that the electrical element of the BIPV design was 
not done and the inverters were not ordered.  
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So in that sense it made perfect sense to us to put it into the envelope package, because 
like I said, it’s no different to installing any other window, it’s just got the PV 
components within it. But then all of the wiring, and what have you, just became all a 
bit of a, not a nightmare, I just don’t think anybody really understood what we were 
installing until it landed onsite; and then we could actually physically see it and go, oh 
right, we’ve got cables coming out here, here, and here, and how are we going to 
connect all of these? 
Main contractor (TH01) 
In this project there was a history of past collaboration between the façade supplier and the 
glazing supplier and the glazing supplier and the architect.  In the case of the façade supplier 
this familiarity led to an assumption that the glazing supplier had prior knowledge about the 
technical specification of the job which in turn led to a lack of questioning and checking of 
drawings.  These assumptions meant that neither party checked that the gaskets holding the 
PV panels in position were of the correct thickness, nor that the reveals in the window were of 
the correct size.  The following quotation illustrates the closeness of the relationship. 
Well probably a starting point would probably be from when the tender comes into 
[the façade supplier], now that can sometimes come from maybe [the glazing supplier] 
have put us forward on a job, or told us about a job, and then we’ll look into what’s in 
the tender specification. And in this case there was the photovoltaic units, [so] we will 
then go back and ask [the glazing supplier] if they want involvement. 
Façade supplier (RR01) 
Similarly, the ongoing relationship between the architect and glazing supplier meant that even 
when the glazing supplier could no longer offer the original specification of technology, the 
architect was inclined to stick with the glazing supplier and use inferior technology rather 
than choose to break with the glazing supplier to source better technology (thin film 
technology was available from other suppliers).  The following quotations illustrate the 
closeness of the relationship and how this led to lock in of the technology. 
 
Chapter 7: Case Study 2 – Future Green 
206 
 
So then we basically took that forwards with [the glazing supplier] because obviously 
the curtain wall subcontractor who we use quite a lot now, they obviously have two 
systems, or they had two systems; the original system that we specified stopped as the 
job was going out to tender, so we had originally specified a different system but they 
had stopped doing it, so we had to move back to the normal PV. 
Architect (TH01) 
…we do a lot of work with NW over the years and this came out... 
Glazing supplier (WA01) 
And that’s when I think it came about that you [glazing supplier] had already been in, 
or had been asked to go in, to speak to [the architect] about it before we were even 
involved…you’ll find in [the architect] specification it’s probably said that the job is a 
[glazing supplier] spec and the photovoltaic units; and probably because [glazing 
supplier] had involvement from day one, he knows about it, and he would be quite 
happy to just deal direct with WA to be honest. 
Façade supplier (RR01) 
In this project the PV laminate supplier was clear that his quotation was based on a loose 
assessment of the probable generation potential of the panels (plus or minus ten percent). 
Changes in layout of the cells and header bars affect the efficiency of the panels, but often 
advancements in technology are used to keep the generation potential within the agreed 
margins.  The panel supplier explained how the long span of a project makes the use of these 
advances in technology possible. 
Because what happens, what you have to remember all this happening over 
two or three years and the cell that we’ve quoted at the beginning is not the cell 
that’s going to be installed at the end, because hopefully the technology is 
better. 
PV laminate supplier (LE01) 
Changes to the location of the inverter also allowed the rather embarrassingly low generation 
output to be hidden rather than, as was first specified, displayed in the foyer of the building. 
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These examples of changes in design illustrate the positive contribution of change, rather than 
the negative one often portrayed.   
These challenges for construction practices when new technology is introduced are common 
to all three case studies and are discussed in Chapter 9.   
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 Case Study - Synergy Court Chapter 8:
This chapter presents the third and final case study, giving first a general description of the 
project and then breaking down the case study into five episodes: initial scheme; pre-tender 
and tender process; pre-contract design order; detail design; and installation.  For each 
episode it provides a narrative account of what happened, focusing on the succession of 
problems and solutions, reflecting on the changing technological frames of the actors and 
exploring the co-development of the building and the BIPV.  The chapter goes on to 
summarise the way that actors mobilised different frames at different times throughout the 
project, explore the mechanisms of co-development between the building and the technology, 
and finally summarises the issues and the challenges which the project team faced as BIPV 
was integrated within the project.   
8.1 Description 
Synergy Court is an interdisciplinary biomedical research centre which was designed to serve 
a medical research partnership between three national research organisations and three 
universities.  It is located at the junction of three neighbourhoods: a grade 1 listed (1967) 
railway station built in 1868, a grade 1 listed (2015) public library built in 1999 and a 
community of council housing and schools.  This mixed neighbourhood made the council 
very sensitive about the design, and as a result the process of gaining planning consent was 
long, requiring extensive community and planning authority engagement.  Project planning 
began in 2001, with a first architectural practice submitting several plans for planning consent 
which were rejected by the council.  A second architectural practice was appointed in 2005 
and new plans were submitted in April 2008.  Planning permission was granted in December 
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2010.  Ground works began in April 2011 and the building was “topped out” in June 2013 
with an estimated completion date of early 2016.  The project used a Design and Build 
contract. 
The building has a curved roof which conceals the heating and cooling units and incorporates 
photovoltaic fins on the south elevation.  In addition to the photovoltaic panels the building 
uses a combined heat and power plant to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.  Large 
cantilevered bay windows and tall glass atria increase natural lighting and water efficient 
fittings reduce water consumption.  One third of the building is below ground level to 
minimise its visual impact.  The laboratories are arranged over four floors, each floor having 
four interconnected blocks to encourage researchers from different fields to collaborate.  The 
laboratories are designed to be adaptable to change as new scientific opportunities emerge in 
the future. 
Ten interviews with members of the project team were conducted over a sixteen month 
period, starting just as installation of the PV louvres had begun and finishing just before 
commissioning of the BIPV system.  Chapter 5 (Methods) gives detailed information about 
those interviewed.  In the following analysis interviewees are referenced by the firm they 
represent: architect (SL); main contractor (BP); M&E design consultant (FS); louvre supplier 
(FD); electrical contractor (CAT); and PV laminate supplier (LE).  A number is added to the 
reference as a unique identifier for each actor in the firm.  For example: “louvre supplier 
(FD01)” represents the louvre supplier firm - FD, and is the first actor interviewed from that 
firm.  “Louvre supplier (FD02)” indicates the second person interviewed at the louvre 
supplier firm, and so on.  
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8.2 Episode 1: the initial Scheme 
The first episode covers the development of the concept design for the building to the point 
that of initial design, where both the outline of the building and the configuration of the BIPV 
system had been defined.  
 Episode 1: narrative account 8.2.1
In 2001 the client (a collaborative research charity) commissioned an architectural practice 
(Anglia) to develop plans for a new collaborative research space for the research partners.  
The client brief was for a building of four interconnected towers which would encourage 
collaboration.  The architect (SL) described the client vision as follows: 
The client body saw science moving...to be a lot more collaborative...they looked back 
and all their best innovations, all their real breakthrough moments were when people 
had chance encounters and met each other…So the idea was that there were four main 
blocks to the building and that within that there was a big atrium space and that atrium 
space helped to draw people in, …they really wanted to show that science is now 
something that’s very much at the forefront in this country, that it’s something we’re 
very good at. But they want a more public face. Science buildings are normally, 
historically aren’t pretty…they’re in basements and they’re very formal and the idea 
was that the institute is more of an outreaching building, that they want public 
engagement, that they want people to see what they’re doing.  
Architect (SL01) 
The project is located in a London borough and was subject to the London Plan Part L 
renewables contribution (commonly referred to as the Merton Rule).  Briefly, the Merton 
Rule (developed by Merton Council in 2003) required new developments above a threshold of 
1,000 square metres that could incorporate on-site renewable energy production equipment to 
generate at least 10% of their energy needs (Merton Council 2015).  As the research centre 
would use considerable amounts of electricity to carry out its research, the figure of 10% was 
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felt to be unrealistic by the client and so negotiation took place between the Council and the 
clients and architect, to agree a more realistic figure of 1% for renewable energy generation. 
With this base electricity demand…we demonstrated that we couldn’t feasibly meet 
[the 10%]…So within the planning documentation, it's a commitment for 1%. 
M&E consultant (FS01) 
Within the four-tower design, the architects included a combined heat and power plant, PV 
roof mounted panels and integrated BIPV in the cladding of the upper floors of the south 
elevation, and submitted plans accordingly.  The council did not feel that the building design 
fitted into the architecturally sensitive area and over the next four years refused planning 
permission.  The client engaged a second architectural practice (SL) to rethink the design and 
develop a scheme that would be acceptable to the council.  As the second architect (SL) 
explained:   
This particular one was a sensitive location with the relationship to listed buildings, 
very large institutional type libraries, a station, and then a much lower scale residential 
feel. And trying to balance how a building of this scale would sit within an urban 
context of that nature was [challenging]. 
Architect (SL01) 
The architect (SL) then went on to describe how the original plan was altered to create the 
final design of two curved roof wings of different heights which covered the four towers.  
These curved wings were made from ribs of louvered fins, which created an architectural 
balance with the nearby station.  The purpose of the curved roof was not just as an 
architectural device to allow the building to fit in with the surroundings, but also a way to 
hide the air handling plant at roof level. 
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…the building has an awful lot of plant...there’s five times more air handling kit and 
electrical kit than you’d normally expect in an office building of this size, so it’s a 
huge challenge to try and encapsulate that in a building form that is seductive …so we 
came up with this curved roof form which actually also mirrors the old railway.  
Architect (SL01) 
As the new architectural team developed the plans for the building, it became clear that 
although the council were very much in favour of the new design, they were intent on keeping 
the initially agreed generation figure. 
That number that the array had to give out then became almost set in stone…so it 
already had a target it had to meet, which at the time was Part L 2010…so when we 
came on board we knew we had to hit a certain output and to get to that output we had 
to prove that we could incorporate that many PVs.  
Architect (SL01) 
This caused a series of iterations in the design, as the architect (SL) and M&E consultants 
(FS) endeavoured achieve the agreed PV generation figures with the new design of the 
building.  The location of the building, the reduced massing and the new curved roof shape 
made it difficult to incorporate BIPV into the building façade. 
There was a debate about whether they should be incorporated in these, in the main 
claddings…We felt that was probably not the most appropriate place for them because 
we have lots of shading on the south side. 
Architect (SL01) 
The challenge of achieving the generation target with the curved design was highlighted by 
the M&E consultant (FS) as he spoke about the issue of incorporating PV cells into the curved 
fins and the shading issues that were involved. 
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One of the things we did, were quite wary of was over-shading because of the 
design…the architects did quite a lot of rendering to make sure, so it actually fed back 
into the design of the panels because they are 750mm wide, but we only used the front 
650mm for the actual active area to avoid the over shading.  
M&E consultant (FS01) 
As part of the original outline design - before the second architect joined the project - a room 
had been set aside in the roof to house the BIPV inverters. 
[When] we joined this project at a midpoint there was already identified a place where 
the inverter room was going to be. It had to be somewhere on the roof and…how all 
the wiring goes back to that was already fairly well known and well understood.   
Architect (SL01) 
The negotiations over the new design and the percentage generation figure took over two 
years and at the end of 2010 planning permission was granted.  The an agreed revised 
renewable energy target was 221MWh of electricity, which was a little less than 1% of the 
predicted energy use of the building. 
 Episode 1: technological frames 8.2.2
As in the previous two case studies, this section illustrates how the actors viewed the 
technology through different frames through this episode and how tensions developed 
between the groups over conflicting goals.  Figure 8-1 shows how the network of actors, 
technological frames, problems and solutions played out during the initial design episode and 
the following description draws attention to the main highlights of the episode.  
The technological frame of Design Aesthete was evident at the start of the project when the 
planning officer demanded a building to fit in with the surrounding environment, and the 
second architectural practice (SL) was engaged to carry out this instruction.  Similarly, the 
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frame of User was mobilised at the start of the project when the client was intent on creating a 
space which would encourage collaboration between scientists, and insisted on some 
arrangement of four interconnected buildings.  The client also wanted to engage the public 
with an accessible building which invited interaction.  These aims were more important than 
the desire for a show-stopping design.  It is clear that the first architect understood the client’s 
User frame and worked with it to come up with the initial design, but that the second architect 
(SL) also understood the planner’s frame of Design Aesthete and worked to incorporate the 
requirements from the User frame, the Design Aesthete frame and the Green Guardian frame 
into the successful design.  
The Green Guardian frame was evidenced by the planning officer’s insistence that the 
building generate 1% of its energy consumption through renewable technologies.  The M&E 
consultant (FS) and architect (SL) began to see the technology through the frame of 
Generation Maximiser, as they started to calculate the generation output from the curved roof 
and take shading of the panels into account.  Tension between the frames of the Design 
Aesthete and the Green Guardian in terms of their goals surfaced when the main goal of the 
Design Aesthete was the fit with the local environment, while the Green Guardian frame was 
focussed on the need for renewable energy.  The two frames became aligned when an outline 
scheme included BIPV in the curved roof louvres, but as the Green Guardian requirement to 
maintain agreed generation output remained unchanged, tension increased between these two 
groups.  It was only when the problem was seen through the Generation Maximiser frame that 
the actors could share a focus for these concerns.  
Chapter 8: Case study 3 – Synergy Court 
215 
 
Initial Scheme
Architect
Planner
rc it ct
l r
Architect
M&E consultant
rc it ct
 c s lt t
Plannerl r
Clientli tCollaborative 
workspace for 
research 
partners
Four 
interconnected 
towers
London Sites 
require 10% 
Renewables
Use BIPV on 
elevation, use 
CCHP
Science 
buildings seen 
as formal and 
distant
Use modern 
design and  
local 
engagement
Planners not 
happy with 
design – massing 
and fit
Redesign 
with curved 
roof
PV 
generation 
reduced
Design 
Aesthete
Green Guardian
User
Design 
Aesthete
Roof
Façade
Where to 
site inverter
Allocate 
Room on 
Roof
Inverter
Panels
Solution Actor
Technological 
Frame
Artefact Problem
Key
 
Figure 8-1: Technological frames mobilized in episode 1 (initial scheme), Synergy Court 
The analysis above illustrates how the technological frames of Green Guardian, User, Design 
Aesthete and Generation Maximiser were all mobilised by the actors during this episode, and 
how many of the actors related to the technology through more than one frame.  This shows 
how conflicting goals between actors using different frames gave rise to problems and how 
solutions were developed through different mechanisms - re-alignment of frames (the new 
design satisfying both the aesthetic requirement and the energy generation requirement), the 
Chapter 8: Case study 3 – Synergy Court 
216 
 
establishment of a particular frame as dominant (the need to maximise generation) and the 
disappearance of a frame when the requirement has been satisfied (client removes the user 
frame from the episode once the requirement for interactions between researchers had been 
met).  
 Episode 1: co-development 8.2.3
This first episode illustrates how rather than the BIPV or the building being fixed, the BIPV 
system accommodated the building and vice versa.  The summary of co-development during 
the whole case study is given in section 7.8.2, but two important elements of the co-
development of building and technology occurred in this episode of the project.   
i. The initial four tower design for the building and the Part L requirement for renewable 
energy generation led to the design of a roof and façade mounted BIPV system of a 
particular generation capacity.   
ii. The rejection of the building design and the development of the rounded winged roof 
changed the configuration of the BIPV to include it in the roof louvres and reduced the 
available generation potential.   
8.3 Episode 2: pre-tender design and tender 
The second episode follows the development of the detailed system and building design and 
begins at the point where the curved roof design was detailed. 
 Episode 2: narrative account 8.3.1
The roof shape was designed using parametric modelling and the position of the PV louvres 
was fixed based on that design. 
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We used parametric modelling…actually the roof, whilst it looks complicated, in its 
nature is relatively simple. It’s a continuous arc that is then pitched in section, and 
from that we developed the series of parameters that helped us to inform where the 
louvres on the roof go, and in turn where the PVs could be installed. 
Architect (SL01) 
In order to meet the 1% generation target, the architect (SL) and M&E design consultant (FS) 
had to optimise the azimuth (angle) of each PV fin in the roof.  This was achieved using an 
algorithm developed by the architect’s firm which maximized the achievable output of 
electricity. 
[We] essentially wrote a script that allowed us to tweak any point of the roof and it… 
allowed us to test a lot of options and …develop a scheduling of where the PVs could 
go, how much area we were getting, what the relative angles were...it was such a form, 
part of the form of the building, [that] we had to give the engineers the exact angles of 
everything, and what way they were facing, because from that they were then able to 
calculate the output from the array. 
Architect (SL01) 
The architect (SL) and M&E design consultant (FS) agreed the final layout of the PV roof fins 
and the resultant generation figure.  This generation output was used as the basis of the 
revised planning submission.  At this point the layout and generation figures were locked into 
the design. 
So at that point the actual, the planning condition was written around: you have to 
produce this amount of power from that array. 
Architect (SL01) 
Once the outline design had been completed, the main contractor (BP) was appointed by the 
client and took responsibility for dividing the project into tender work packages.  The M&E 
design contractor (FS) designed and outline PV package which included the calculated fin 
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lengths and angles, standard monocrystalline technology and a conventional string 
arrangement, to generate 221 MWh of electricity.   
We were looking at it as a standard stringed system with two, three, four, twenty, I 
can’t remember how many inverters, but as it was being looked at, at the time, as a 
stringed system. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
The M&E design contractor (FS) included the BIPV element of the design (including the 
bracketry system to hold the PV fins at the required angles) in the general roof louvre work 
package and allocated the electrical portion of the BIPV system to the general electrical work 
package.  Five firms were invited to tender for the roof louvre package.  One louvre supplier 
(FD) read the work package and became concerned that the required generation figures could 
not be met by the standard arrangement indicated in the work package.  The louvre supplier 
(FD) used different computer packages to calculate the likely output from the PV fins and it 
became clear that there was a mismatch in standard data used.  The M&E designer consultant 
(FS) summarised the difference by alluding to differences in the unit of measurement:  
So it’s a kilowatt hour requirement for the PV array, but with FD and LE, what they 
work to is a peak design, so they were unwilling to commit to a kilowatt hour per year 
because [it’s] based on weather data from an idealised year. So depending on what the 
weather conditions were for the year you may or may not hit the target…Also we’d 
used a certain software tool to work out what it [the PV] could produce, and they were 
using an alternative tool and …they do give you quite a different result, so there was a 
bit of to-ing and fro-ing, … 
M&E design consultant (FS02) 
The louvre supplier (FD) attributed the difference between the tender figures and their 
calculated output to several things: the input data in terms of global position and azimuth; the 
efficiency of cell output once laminated into glass; and the weather data used.  The eventual 
louvre supplier (FD) calculated that the maximum achievable output with the arrangement 
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specified would be 188MWh (in contrast to the 221MWh calculated by the M&E design 
consultant (FS). 
We started looking at how do you calculate it, and...on the market there’s various tools 
available for calculating PV outputs, [but] the weather data they use, changes from 
one to the next, ..and that can change the output you predict by 5 or 10%,…how does 
anyone know what you’re actually going to get, it’s complete guesswork; and I 
calculated it on 4 different systems, …they said the minimum efficiency is 15%, cell 
efficiency; or power efficiency is calculated on the area of the cells against the area of 
the panel,…but actually because it’s laminated and various module efficiencies [this] 
reduces the actual output to 12%.” 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
Over a period of four months the louvre supplier (FS) produced ten documents showing what 
they felt could be achieved and reported back to the main contractor (BP) that the required 
output could not be achieved using the arrangement in the specification.  This view was 
supported by the three other tender firms - the fifth firm declined to quote.   
During this period the louvre supplier (FD) had extensive discussions with the PV laminate 
supplier (LE) who made several suggestions about how the system could be improved to 
increase generation potential.  The PV laminate supplier (LE) suggested that the louvre 
supplier (FD) specify a new technology cell - the “Q” Cell - and use micro inverters on each 
PV louvre, rather than the more conventional standard inverters. 
During the process, we told him what the problems were, we told him what we want to 
do - which was basically get 20% more…And we said, you’re the specialists in PVs, 
how can we improve?...and he pointed us to a Cambridge start-up company…and we 
worked with them, to come up with a solution using micro-inverters. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
The louvre supplier (FD) had discussions with the main contractor (BP) and design contractor 
(FS) and suggested that rather than using the specified system, the BIPV specification be 
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changed to allow new Q cell technology and micro-inverters, which would increase the 
achievable generation to just below 200MWh.  The louvre supplier insisted that significant 
pre-contract design would have to take place before a suitable system could be specified.    
The main contractor (BP) was very reluctant to accept the change in specification and the 
louvre supplier (FD) had to work hard to convince the main contractor to listen. 
We had [M&E consultant] occasionally, it was mainly done through [main 
contractor], ourselves, we had people like [PV laminate supplier] came down, because 
there was almost an unwillingness, from some parties, to listen to what we were 
saying, even though we had carried out two or three other PV projects previously, this 
was the first time with micro-inverters and we had to bring in a number of specialists. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
The main contractor (BP) accepted what they said, but asked all the companies to quote based 
on the original arrangement so that the quotations could be compared.  The suppliers 
complied with this request, but entered caveats in the tender document to indicate that the 
generation figures would not be achieved.   
In response to the problem of achieving only 188MWh of the specified required output of 
221MWh, the main contractor called a tender meeting to discuss the issue.  At the tender 
meeting the louvre supplier (FD) presented the micro inverter system and suggested that the 
main contractor (BP) and architect (SL) accept a change to the design and use micro inverters 
as a way to achieve the required output.  The concept was presented to highlight advantages 
in efficiency, buildability and safety. 
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We made the decision - this is the best way for us to present it as a package…it’s a 
system that maximises the output of every single panel, the wiring actually is simpler, 
because when you’re on normal PVs, you’re working at very low voltage and high 
currents, which is very dangerous, so [if you] put it straight back to 240 volt 
everywhere, so it’s normal building wiring, no special requirements for it, that 
simplifies that…Because of the structure, we could just wire down each hoop to a 
collection point at the bottom, and then along the building in a very simple manner, 
and for the electrician’s involved, it’s just for them mains voltage; OK it’s quite large, 
but it’s nothing compared to some of the cable sizes in the rest of the building for the 
supply of the building, and it just seemed to us the most logical way to do it. So that’s 
what we presented at our tender in our package. 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
The architect (SL) saw that this was largely a positive change: 
There was a very interesting shift when we went to tender in that FD wanted to use the 
micro inverters, which was I think a good move in the end because it meant that they 
were far more tune-able and if you lost one you didn’t lose a whole array. It saved a 
whole room. 
Architect (SL01) 
The main contractor (BP) accepted that generating the required amount of electricity would 
not be achieved by conventional inverter string configuration and decided to award a pre-
construction service agreement (PCSA) to the louvre supplier (FD) so that a system using 
micro-inverters could be designed.  The main contractor (BP) understood that the cost of the 
new system would be higher than the conventional one, but agreed to the new design because 
of the need to achieve the target generation figures.  The main contractor was insistent that the 
generation potential of the new system should exceed 200MWh.  The louvre supplier (FD) 
summed up the situation: 
We were saying, and everybody was saying, you can’t achieve it. So it obviously had 
an effect on FS’s, what they’d put forward, and so we’ve said that you would need to 
do more work. If we want to increase it, we’d need to do some big studies and a lot 
more work. The long and short of it was, we secured PCSA. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
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This episode concluded with a pre-contract design order (PCSA) being awarded to the louvre 
supplier so that the BIPV design using micro inverters could be detailed. 
 Episode 2: technological frames 8.3.2
The following analysis illustrates how tensions between actors in different technological 
frames led to conflicts between the groups during this episode.  Figure 8-2 shows how the 
network of actors, technological frames, problems and solutions played out during the pre-
tender and tender design episode and the following description presents the main highlights of 
the episode. 
Once the project team had understood the importance of optimising PV generation, the 
Generation Maximiser frame was very evident at the start of the episode.  This is illustrated 
when the architect (SL) and M&E consultant (FS) developed new software to optimise the 
angles of the roof, and also as the companies tendering for the BIPV contract tried to fulfil the 
generation required in the tender documents.  The Council’s planning officer mobilised the 
Green Guardian frame by maintaining the requirement for the 1% generation figure.  As the 
work packages were defined for tender, the main contractor (BP) identified with the Cost 
Watcher frame.  Once the tender documents were released, two frames - the Design Optimiser 
frame and the Generation Maximiser frame - dominated the way that the actors related to the 
technology.  Frequent conversations with the PV laminate supplier (LE) were used to improve 
elements of the design and to check cell spacing and borders to maximise generation.  
Towards the end of the episode many of the actors mobilised the Generation Maximiser 
frame, as the louvre supplier’s (FD) calculations showed that the tender design could not yield 
sufficient generation and that an alternative would be necessary.  Initial actors sharing this 
frame were the louvre supplier (FD) and PV laminate supplier (LE), but they were joined by 
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the main contractor (BP) and the M&E consultant (FS) as the gravity of the situation was 
brought to their attention.  The louvre supplier (FD) adopted the Risk Minimiser frame by 
refusing to guarantee the generation figure required in the tender document.  It is interesting 
to note that the tender document itself (in the form of a contract) played an important part in 
making clear the potential risks of not meeting the contract requirements.  
Tensions between actors sharing a frame occurred when both the M&E consultant (FS) and 
the louvre supplier (FD) within the Generation Maximiser frame disagreed over the method of 
calculating the generation potential of the system.  Both actors were focussed on maximising 
the output from the system, but were in disagreement about the methods to be used in the 
calculation, although their objectives and attitudes to the technology were similar.  The 
architect (SL) was invested in the model that had been written specifically for the project, 
whilst the louvre supplier (FD) used a tried and tested commercially available package and 
outlined problems with the weather data and efficiencies used by the architect and M&E 
design consultants.  
As in episode one, there were times when actors from one frame began to see the technology 
through other frames and could then present their ideas in such a way that the idea became 
acceptable to those already using the other frames.  An example of this is when the louvre 
supplier (FD) offered a system of micro-inverters at the tender meeting with the main 
contractor (BP) and M&E contractor (FS).  The louvre supplier (FD) was part of the 
Generation Maximiser group, but understood that the main contractor was interested in 
buildability and site safety which fitted within the Design Optimiser frame.  He consequently 
presented the solution in such a way that the main contractor (BP) could accept it. 
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The analysis above illustrates how with the exception of Design Aesthete and User, all of the 
technological frames were mobilised by the actors during this episode, and how many of the 
actors related to the technology through more than one frame.  The use of technological 
frames has again shown how conflicting goals between actors using different frames gave rise 
to problems and how solutions were developed through different mechanisms.  This episode 
also shows that problems can arise between actors using the same frame, for example, the 
louvre supplier and M&E contractor using different programmes to calculate generation 
potential.  
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Figure 8-2: Technological frames mobilized in episode 2 (tender), Synergy Court 
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 Episode 2: co-development 8.3.3
During this episode of the project, one major and one minor element of co-development 
between the building and the BIPV system were apparent. 
i. The inclusion of a curved roof reduced the PV generation potential of the initial 
system.  Rather than adopting a standard configuration of strings of PV louvres 
connected to a series of inverters, the new system developed by the louvre supplier 
used individual inverters on each PV louvre which fed to a series of AC combiner 
boxes and then to a distribution panel.  This change had knock-on effects for the 
building in terms of wiring and cabling changes, which resulted in the need for more 
containment and bracketry, as well as changes to the energy management system.   
ii. The room initially allocated for the inverters became redundant and the cost and 
complexity of the roof work package increased.  
8.4 Episode 3: pre-contract design  
This episode covers the period of the pre-contract service agreement (PCSA) awarded to the 
louvre supplier to design and cost a system using micro-inverters prior to a contract for the 
BIPV system being awarded. 
 Episode 3: narrative account 8.4.1
The PCSA was put in place in January 2012 with a remit to develop a detailed design of the 
new BIPV system.  The scope was described by the louvre supplier: 
We worked under a pre-contract service agreement, whereby we had to come up with, 
effectively, the full design of the louvres, the system, method statements, finalised the 
output that we were still going to be estimating, and a final cost for doing the project 
in a certain programme. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
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The louvre supplier (FD) used the tender roof layout as the basis for the design and carried 
out detailed design around this.  
As far as we were concerned, the roof design had effectively been pretty much cast in 
stone. The number of louvres, the type of louvres in the various positions, all of that 
had been, not the design of them, but the type that they wanted there, were listed 
out…so we knew what we were bidding for. 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
The buildability of the design was revisited by the louvre supplier (FD) who altered the rib 
design supporting the roof fins, but had to maintain the complex individual orientation and 
sizing of each louvre.   
We effectively rationalised it to what we thought was a buildable, simple design.  A 
cost effective design and a simple design that worked for the whole system…the 
architect’s got five ribs on a louvre, in fact seven ribs on a louvre, we changed it to 
three, it will simplify the design and making that work for all types of louvres [is 
important] because every louvre’s a different length, mathematically…and every 
louvre has a different orientation to the sun, which is where, probably the biggest 
challenge came for us. 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
To increase the generation, the PV laminate supplier (LE) suggested that the PV cells be 
specified as square in shape rather than the more conventional hexagon.  This would be more 
expensive, but would increase the area and so the generation potential of each cell. 
We had to find a better cell, which was I think called a Q cell…most cells are, 
hexagonal or octagonal, we’ve got full square cells, to increase the output of the area 
They were more expensive, but the additional output was something like 4 watts, to 
4.43 watts it was about a 10% increase but …we needed everything that we could get. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
The PCSA package included design of the wiring from the micro inverters to the distribution 
panels.  The outputs from each louvre micro inverter had to be wired to reach the distribution 
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panel, from where it could be delivered to the main building supply system.  There were 427 
micro inverters in the system and rather than running each wire from the micro inverter to the 
distribution panel, the louvre supplier (FD) designed a system where the micro inverters were 
divided into 2 vertical streams, one for each side of the elevation.  The wires from each micro-
inverter were connected to junction boxes (in groups of 4) and from there to a series of 
combiner boxes (20 in total).  These boxes provided a means of electrical isolation for each 
louvre and collected the output from the connected inverters.  From here the output from the 
combiner boxes were collected into two cables and thence to two distribution panels.  The 
main contractor described the system as follows:  
On one blade [louvre] of 6m you’ve got the micro inverter [at] one end, one at the 
other end, then we’ve got a central point, we’re bringing the wiring down, so we’ve 
got the containment in It’s a plug and play system, just plug them in and join them up 
and down to your universal, into the junction boxes, and bring it down the beam to a 
combiner box at the bottom on each hoop steel; and they in turn have got 12 this side 
and 8 the other, and the 12 will go to a central inverter room to one cabinet, and the 8 
on the other side will come back to the other cabinet. 
Main Contractor (PB02) 
The louvre supplier (FD) described how the work was to be divided between themselves and 
the electrical contractor (CAT). 
We did everything from the module, the inverter down to the AC isolator, we provided 
the AC isolator [and] the distribution boxes, but CAT did the wiring between them. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
In addition to the wiring system, the louvre supplier (FD) had to consider the energy 
monitoring system (EMS) - both in terms of measuring the PV output and in terms of 
monitoring the condition of the 427 micro inverters.  One of the unanticipated benefits from 
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using micro inverters was that the micro inverter supplier was keen to develop a web 
monitoring system and this innovation was included in the specification.   
“The other beauty about the micro-inverters was it had its own reporting system, 
which was all wirelessly done, and you can monitor pretty much what every module is 
doing, at any time of the day, you can build that up over time … It gives you historical 
data and it also is pretty good for fault finding. If one head was faulty, and one was 
cracked, broken, wasn’t generating, it didn’t affect any of the other modules around it. 
…So it had a lot of serious plus points, the downside, if there is, if we can call it a 
downside, it obviously involves more inverters and more cost.” 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
The use of micro inverters improved the system efficiency by reducing losses from wiring 
because losses from AC wires are smaller than those from DC wires.  This advantage helped 
to boost the final generation figure from 188MWh to 204MWh.  
The figures were conservative, we’re basing it on the lowest cable losses. You’ve got 
a cable that’s, in some cases, going from the whole way down here all the way back to 
here, it’s hundreds of metres long…that was also one of the benefits of inverting it 
here, that you get much less loss…you minimise the losses with AC. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
By the end of the PCSA the louvre supplier (FD) had produced a design specification for the 
system which they were happy to guarantee.  The new system increased the cost of the BIPV 
from £1m to £1.25m.  The more difficult issue to resolve was the gap between the initial 
specified figure of 221MWh agreed with the local planning authority and the revised figure of 
204MWh guaranteed by the louvre supplier.  After negotiation with the planning office and 
because the revised figure was within 10% of the original figure the planners agreed the lower 
generation target and the main contractor agreed the change in specification and increase in 
project cost of the BIPV system.  The louvre supplier (FD) confirmed that it was the shortfall 
in generation potential rather than the increase in cost which caused most concern. 
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I would say the item that took the longest to resolve, and people to accept, was that it 
was going to be a reduced output, we managed, with micro-inverters ...to get it up to 
204, but we …still said, that was an estimated output because there are so many 
variables. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
Once the specification and design for the BIPV was agreed, the contract was issued to the 
louvre supplier on the basis of a turn-key operation in the second quarter of 2012.  The louvre 
supplier (FD) viewed the BIPV system in the same light as supplying a motorised louvre 
system and so wanted to supply it as a complete system rather than as component parts.  This 
gave the louvre supplier control over the final generation figures and gave the client a single 
point of contact for all enquiries.  The approach was unique to the louvre supplier and 
differentiated them from other BIPV suppliers. 
In general we want to do a turn-key where we provide the louvres, the PVs, the 
inverters, the cabling all the way back to the inverters, and the final connection would 
be by somebody who is really qualified to make that mains connection. Because it 
gives the client one company to talk to if there is an issue afterwards. With a façade 
contractor, it would be, well, we only did that, we can’t be responsible for any issues. 
And then anybody who did the wiring or the inverting on that would be saying, oh it’s 
nothing to do with me, we just did the wiring. A turn-key operation, it gives the client 
a contractor, everybody some comfort in knowing that there’s one company to go and 
speak to… We see it as a bit of a niche. Other people don’t want to do it, we’re very 
happy to do it, we have the skills to do it, we have the experience. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
 Episode 3: technological frames 8.4.2
In this episode the Design Aesthete frame did not appear and the Green Guardian frame was 
subsumed into the Generation Maximiser frame.  The other technological frames (Design 
Optimiser, Generation Maximise, Cost Watcher, Time Sentry and Risk Minimiser) were 
mobilised by the actors; tensions between them surfaced at a number of points (Figure 8-3).   
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The main contractor (BP), louvre supplier (FD) and PV laminate supplier (LE) viewed the 
technology through the Generation Maximiser frame, to work through a solution to achieve 
the required generation level.  Although the maximum achievable generation figure calculated 
by the louvre supplier fell below the required 1% figure, the main contractor saw that without 
major cost implications and redesign (Cost Watcher frame), the limit of generation had been 
achieved.  The planner recognised that the design was within 10% of the target and that this 
was unlikely to be improved without revisiting the design, and therefore approved the revised 
generation level.   
Once the revised generation figure had been agreed, the social artefact of the contract became 
important and actors mobilised different frames in their response.  To minimise the risk of not 
achieving the generation figure, and to improve chances of gaining a competitive advantage in 
winning the contract, the louvre supplier (FD) saw the contract through the frame of Risk 
Minimiser and proposed a turn-key contract for the BIPV system, something that the main 
contractor (BP) had not anticipated.  This had a knock-on effect on the electrical contractor 
(CAT) who stood to lose part of the anticipated contract content (Cost Watcher).  All three of 
the actors were keen to finish the PCSA episode of the project and proceed to the awarding of 
contracts and the start of detail design (Time Sentry frame).  The Design Optimiser frame, 
which was not particularly mobilised in the first episode, was used in this episode as 
illustrated by the louvre supplier developing the web-based EMS reporting system with the 
micro inverter supplier. 
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Figure 8-3: Technological frames mobilized in episode 3 (PCSA), Synergy Court 
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In this episode the need to maximise generation (Generation Maximiser frame) continued to 
dominate the problem solving, and the Risk Minimiser frame drove the louvre supplier to 
offer an innovative turn-key contract to the main contractor.  In addition to tension between 
actors mobilising different frames to achieve different goals, tension between the actors also 
came from the presence of the contract as a social artefact which represented and reinforced 
the Generation Maximiser frame.  
 Episode 3: co-development 8.4.3
Three instances of co-development occurred in this episode of the project. 
i. The louvre supplier rationalised the louvre design so that all the louvres had three ribs 
rather than seven.  This made the manufacturing process simpler, and meant that the 
BIPV louvres had to be constructed this way too. 
ii. The EMS system for the building had to be changed to accommodate the web 
monitoring system for the micro-inverters.  
iii. The least visible but arguably the most important element of co-development story 
occurred when the contracts were awarded.  Rather than the usual division of work 
packages along electrical and mechanical lines, the louvre supplier forced a turn-key 
solution for the BIPV contract.  This changed the way that the electrical element of the 
work was divided between the louvre supplier and electrical contractor, and materially 
affected how the BIPV system was integrated into the building. 
8.5 Episode 4: detail design 
This episode continues from the completion of the pre-contract design order (PCSA) for the 
micro-inverter BIPV system and the awarding of the BIPV contract to the louvre supplier. 
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 Episode 4: narrative account 8.5.1
The main contractor (BP) recognised that there was an interface between the work packages 
for the louvre supplier (FD) and electrical contractor (CAT) and met with both contractors 
before the tenders were let, to agree the electrical demarcations. 
We had to literally follow the cable the whole way from the sun to the panel to the 
inverter, the whole way down through the system to work out exactly who was doing 
what. We wrote FD [louvre supplier], we wrote CAT [electrical contractor] on it, and 
we wrote exactly who was doing each piece along the way until we got to the 
switchboard. 
Electrical contractor (CAT01) 
This clarification helped, but there were problems with finalising the location of the combiner 
boxes and establishing the cabling routes.  The louvre supplier (FD) was not prepared to 
include wiring from the combiner boxes to the distribution room as part of their quotation as 
the wiring routes between the two were not clear. 
We said our responsibility stops at the end of this box, you can wire across, because at 
that time, they didn’t know how they were going to get the cables from A to B, 
particularly as you had to go across the atrium from one half.  
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
The location of the combiner boxes was agreed between the louvre supplier (FD) and the 
architect (SL), taking into account the structure of the building and also the need to be able to 
isolate the units easily in case of maintenance. 
Because you want them to be accessible., because within it they’re fused, there’s 
obviously a big On-Off switch on the front of it, so if somebody had to go do some 
maintenance you could just go to that box on the floor, turn it off…because obviously 
with PVs, if there’s sunshine, and this is permanently live…[if] I am now isolated at 
this point, it makes it completely electrically safe. 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
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The louvre supplier (FD) worked with the PV electrical supply chain to work out electrical 
components, wiring and combiner box details.  Innovation occurred at several levels:  
a) the combiner boxes were purpose-made for the project:  
The combiner boxes are purpose-made for the job, we’ve designed them ourselves, 
in conjunction with others. We have our own in house electrical people so we can 
do a certain amount ourselves, …it’s got all the normal connectors inside, all pre-
made…as an extra into it, we put a 240 volt socket into it so that if you do need to 
[is] plug your laptop in to do a test, you can do it there and then. 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
b) Junctions, wiring and connectors were designed specifically for the project so that they 
could be “plug and play”, thereby minimising installation time.  
[We] designed those plugs from commercially available plugs…we were speaking to 
the people who made the cables, and said we’ll need a long cable, so they premade us 
a cable with one end open, because at that point, we didn’t know where our combiner 
box at the bottom was going, so they would make us a cable that was 15 metres long 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
Working with the supply chain became an important element to the louvre supplier (FD) and 
allowed then to innovate.  This was summed up in one conversation: 
Making sure that we have a supply chain that can provide us with what we want,…we 
need to have people who can make that module for us and they’re going to make it 
and it’s going to be made as we need it, and it’s going to be the right standards, 
whether it’s BS or EN or whatever, and we’re only as good as our supply chain 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
Using the micro inverters meant that the designated inverter room on the roof of the building 
became redundant, so the louvre supplier and architect agreed that the distribution boxes from 
each string of combiner boxes would be sited in the room and the rest of it used for other 
plant equipment. 
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They still used the inverter [room], because you have the two distribution cabinets - 
these cabinets are about two thirds of the size of that [inverter], and within there 
you’ve got, meters, you’ve got G59, you’ve got other isolators, you’ve got surge 
protection, a whole bunch of other things, so that’s it. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
The louvre supplier (FD) worked with the micro inverter company to develop a web-based 
monitoring system for generation output and inverter performance,  The system was initially 
designed by the micro inverter company to give information on domestic installations, but the 
two companies worked together to develop it for use in Synergy Court.  The two companies 
also developed the method of labelling and testing the louvres, so that each louvre had a 
unique identity on the maintenance system and that its state of operation (i.e. “off” or “on”) 
and its output could be monitored.  This system was also used to test that each PV panel 
generated a signal to the system and that the system identified each panel individually.  
So each one of these [louvres] is addressable…we know that “A” louvre is in position 
“A”, so once this louvre is defined to go to this position, it has to be fitted there; you 
can’t fit it elsewhere; and then when the system is switched on, the computer then says 
yes, I’ve got all these outputs, I’m receiving data from them all, and if one’s not 
received, we know exactly where it is, straight away. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
The architect (SL) was keen to use a coloured finish on the PV cells to fit with the grey of the 
aluminium used on the other louvres, but the louvre supplier resisted the change because this 
would have led to a loss of performance and increased cost.  A commercial decision was 
taken by the main contractor (BP) that blue cells would be used.  
The architect initially wanted grey cells, and they were willing to pay a 20% increase 
in cost, for 20% loss of performance to have grey, in the end, someone put a 
commercial head on, and banged their head against a wall and said no, we’re not 
doing it.  
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
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Detailed attention was paid to the design of the aluminium louvres to match the PV panels 
and the architect (SL) decided to perforate some of the non PV louvres.  
We’ve got perforated aluminium sheets, and the pattern chosen for the perforation, 
because the cells are 156 square, like that, the perforated pattern was matched at 
156mm pitch, to match this, so it ties in. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
Before the units left the factory they were tested and certified for output with the main 
contractor.  The timing of the testing was in January and low light levels meant that it was 
difficult to prove the output from the panels against the expected figure. 
We did some factory acceptance testing, we laid them on the ground, we pointed them 
roughly in the right direction, we connected it all up, and proved to [the architect, 
design consultant and main contractor] that it works...It was very difficult because we 
did it in January, when there was hardly enough sunlight to, the worst month to try and 
do it. 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
Part of the detail design work was to develop an innovative way of installing the louvres.  
Rather than being tied to the main project schedule in terms of hoist availability, the louvre 
supplier (FD) developed a way of using the building maintenance unit (BMU) hoist to move 
the louvres.  This meant that the main site hoist was only needed periodically to lift batches of 
louvres to the roof and the louvre supplier was then free to install these at their own pace. 
We’ve came up with a completely different solution, whereas initially they were 
saying tower crane, got to lift 2,400 louvres in, we said no we’re going to make a 
platform, put the platform onto your BMU track, and have a crane, on the track, so it 
would be completely self-sufficient…So instead of having to say, we need 2,400 
tower crane lifts of louvres, we went, we need to move the platform 20 times, and we 
need bulk lifts of 10 louvres, so we need 200 odd lifts, very much reduced, so the 
tower crane’s free for other things and we’re independent. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
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The louvre supplier (FD) also decided to install the louvres using abseilers so that the 
electrical cabling could be connected as installation proceeded.  This was made easy by the 
“plug and play” approach taken in designing the wiring systems. 
The only way to install the louvres is to use abseilers, and therefore with a plug and 
play system, all they’ve got to do is mount it, plug the two of them together, and run a 
cable, which is not skilled electrician’s work, it’s just cable running…and you hadn’t 
got any actual wiring until you can stand on the floor…we didn’t want one person to 
go back and wire them, because that obviously just doubles the amount of time. 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
Attention was paid to the need to keep the PV panels clean and the method of doing this.  The 
louvre supplier (FD) had specified that the PV louvres were made from self-cleaning glass 
laminate and that the louvres could be reached by the cradle of the building maintenance unit 
(BMU).  This was written into the maintenance procedures. 
In calculating your outputs, you have to assume, how often you are going to clean. 
There are two things actually, yes it’ll get dirty, and the output will go down, if you 
wash them with any sort of detergent it will [also] reduce the output, and so the best 
way of cleaning them is to have self-cleaning glass, …so that any cleaning they do is 
from the BMU [building maintenance unit], cradles above and just hosing, that’s about 
all that needs doing.  
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
This episode ended when the detail design for the BIPV system was complete and installation 
of the louvres was about to commence. 
 Episode 4: technological frames 8.5.2
As the three parties - the main contractor (BP), electrical contractor (CAT) and louvre 
supplier (FD) - worked out the boundaries of the work packages, they mobilised the Design 
Optimiser frame to ensure that no parts of the electrical system were left out.  When the issue 
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of cable routing through the atrium to the distribution boxes was discussed, the louvre 
supplier realised that the route would depend on the as yet undecided internal arrangement of 
cable runs, and through the Risk Minimiser frame declined to include this portion within the 
package.  When agreeing the location of the combiner boxes, the architect (SL) and louvre 
supplier (FD) mobilised the User frame to think about how to access and isolate the boxes, 
rather than adopting either the Design Optimiser frame (thinking about the most efficient way 
place to locate the boxes) or the most out of sight location to suit the Design Aesthete frame.  
The User frame was also mobilised by the louvre supplier (FD) and inverter supplier when 
developing the web-based monitoring system and they considered how the operation and 
maintenance of the system would work.   
When designing the “plug and play” wiring system and combiner box design, the louvre 
supplier (FD) considered the technology through the Design Optimiser frame and was 
therefore interested in efficiency of design and installation.  Both the Generation Maximiser 
and Design Optimiser frames were the dominate frames mobilised during this episode.  This 
is reflected in the SCOT diagram (Figure 8-4) which shows that the louvre supplier (FD) and 
PV laminate supplier (LE) worked closely together to maximise the output from the BIPV 
system.  To counteract the 5% drop in efficiency which resulted from the lamination of the 
PV cells in the glass, the louvre supplier specified square rather than hexagonal cells to 
increase the generation area.  The louvre supplier (FD) continued to mobilise the Generation 
Maximiser frame in developing the micro-inverter design and reducing losses by minimising 
the length of DC wiring runs.   
To model the generation output in an efficient way the louvre supplier mobilised the Design 
Optimiser frame and developed an averaging system based on standard cell numbers and 
positions of louvres.  The architect (SL) had wanted to use grey PV cells to match the 
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surrounding aluminium louvres (Design Aesthete), but gave ground when the louvre supplier 
(FD) and main contractor (BP) objected in terms of both cost (Cost Watcher) and generation 
loss (Generation Maximiser).  However, the architect (SL) adopted the Design Aesthete frame 
again when specifying perforations on the surrounding aluminium fins and this time the 
stronger frame of Generation Maximiser was not used to oppose this.  When considering the 
installation of the louvres, the Time Sentry frame was shared by both the main contractor 
(BP) and the louvre supplier (FS).  Being aware of the impact of the hoist scheduling on the 
project schedule and the on the available time-frame for lifting the louvres into position, the 
louvre supplier used an innovative way of adapting the BMU system to reduce this 
interdependence and thus ease pressure on both themselves and the main contractor.   
So we made a full platform that’s steel frame on legs…and we put it onto the BMU 
track at various locations of the building, put the crane onto it, we had two platforms, 
one with the crane, one with the materials, so then we could just work independently.  
It’s the whole part of the package for us…going, we’re giving you the unique design 
of the louvres, we’re giving you a time saving system to install it 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
While considering the cleaning requirements for the BIPV louvres, the louvre supplier (FD) 
and PV laminate supplier (LE) understood that the dirt on the PV louvres would affect 
generation of the cells and specified self-cleaning glass as the laminate substrate (Generation 
Maximiser).  The louvre supplier (FD) relied on the PV laminate supplier (LE) to provide 
recommendations on the appropriate cleaning regime for the louvres (User frame).  
This episode demonstrates that although the need to maximise generation (Generation 
Maximiser frame) continued to dominate problem solving, the Design Optimiser frame 
allowed the louvre supplier (FD) to consider many facets of the design and accommodate 
different frames (considering the User frame when siting combiner boxes, and using square 
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rather than hexagonal cells to slightly increase generation (Generation Maximiser)).  Being 
able to understand different technological frames gave the louvre supplier opportunities to 
develop innovative solutions to tensions between the different frames as illustrated by the 
development of the BMS hoist system. 
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Figure 8-4: Technological frames mobilized in episode 4 (detail design), Synergy Court 
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 Episode 4: co-development 8.5.3
Two clear examples of co-development of the building and the BIPV system occurred during 
this episode of the project.  Both were minor, but the first undoubtedly affected the 
appearance of the building and also had an impact on the manufacture of some of the non-PV 
roof louvres. 
i. Some of the non-PV louvres were perforated to give the roof an aesthetic look of 
homogeneity.   
ii. The BMU system was adapted to allow for local hoisting of the louvres during 
construction.   
8.6 Episode 5: construction  
This episode continues from the detail design of the BIPV system and the start of the 
installation of louvres. 
 Episode 5: narrative account 8.6.1
Once installation of the BIPV system began, the electrical work caused particular problems 
for the installation team.  The team consisted of the louvre supplier (FD), the electrical 
contractor (CAT) and the main contractor (BP).  The issue of cable support or containment 
became pressing as the architect worried that the black cables would show against the grey of 
the aluminium louvres.  Various solutions were suggested: changing the cables from black to 
grey; painting the cables grey; and finally, using grey containment or cableways to cover over 
the cables.  The louvre supplier (FD) described the situation:  
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We had issues convincing the client and the architect about containment, we had 
issues with the colour of the containment because he didn’t like to see cables, he 
didn’t like to see containment, didn’t want to see galv he didn’t want to see anything 
apart from the louvre.  So they drew the louvre in the building and then they didn’t 
design the M&E around it. 
Louvre supplier (FD02) 
The eventual solution was developed by the site representatives of the three firms and the 
process is described below. 
[So who did that design of containment?]…We did it, we developed it and went 
through the hardship of convincing them [said by Main contractor]…We decided how 
we were going to do it, how we were going to get the wires, where we were going to 
put the containment. [said by electrical contractor]….We discuss it and, and we do a 
sample, and they said, yeah, that’s all right. So these boxes here, we ended up putting 
them on level eight, so we ended up making a system, a structure to fit, put the feed 
on, so the cable come down the hoop and went into that box and then came back up 
wherever applicable and back into this space [said by main contractor]. 
The development of the containment system defined the position of the combiner boxes and 
their position changed from the original place at the base of the ribs to the position dictated by 
the containment run. 
That’s why the combiner box is there. So we come in, further down, that one wasn’t 
actually fitted at the time, now it is. You can just see the wire. 
Louvre supplier (FD02) 
The frustration of the decision-making process was described by the main contractor, as the 
architect insisted on grey cables and containment, and the PV laminate supplier (LE) and 
main contractor (BP) insisted on black cables and grey sprayed containment. 
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[The architect] wanted grey, same colour as the steel. He threw his toys out of the 
pram and said I don’t want any cables, I don’t want any containment…we went 
through a couple of options and said, look, we can’t do any better than this, if you 
want to change anything you need a different system…He wanted sprayed cabling 
which was colour coded to meet the Rahl number of the steel, which was impossible, 
because it would degrade over time. Option two was, stick with the black cable and, 
spray the galvanised trunking, which we ended up doing. So the architect, he had to 
live with it unfortunately. 
Main contractor (PB02] 
As the installation work preceded, the gaps between the detail design and the actual build 
became clear.  The difficulty of finding cabling routes from the combiner boxes to the 
distribution cabinets surfaced, as did the difficulty of satisfying the architect’s aesthetic 
requirements which, when seen from the perspective of the scale of the building, seemed 
unrealistic. 
There was no design for where that goes; it’s quite tricky to put that in the building 
because it’s in mid-air. There was no design to say how we’d get the cable from the 
inverter down the building, because he goes, I don’t care, I don’t care how you do it, I 
just don’t want to see it. As if he stands in the street and looks up and sees the cable, 
and can see the cable there. 
Main contractor (PB02) 
The discrepancies between the plan and reality were articulated by the installation team: 
There’s always gaps [said by electrical contractor]...Yeah, that’s right, you get 
something left out, they never match up, ever [said by main contractor]…The finite 
detail isn’t always there especially to that level…[electrical contractor]. 
Installation team (BP02, FD02, CAT01) 
As a result of not having pre-determined cable runs, and the uncertainty of positions of 
combiner boxes and containment, wastage occurred in terms of lengths of cables specified by 
the louvre supplier (FD) who was not in charge of deciding cable and wiring runs.  
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We had quite a bit of wastage on it to be honest because they were guestimating where 
and how it was going to be run.  
Louvre supplier (FD02) 
As the combiner boxes and distribution cabinets were installed, overlap between the louvre 
supplier’s (FD) work and that of the electrical contractor (CAT) started to emerge.  The meter 
provided by the louvre supplier (FD) was incompatible with the system for the building and 
needed to be replaced.  Other issues of interfacing had to be discussed and refined. 
I looked at the meter and spoke to our EMS [Energy Management System] provider 
and they [said], well we can’t interface with that meter, we won’t be able to extract the 
data from it, we will need third party pieces of kit. So then we got that changed, 
There’s an EPO [Emergency Power Off] system within the switchboard so if there’s a 
problem you could knock off the power within the room, but we then have to interface 
that with this as well, because this is generating its own electricity. So we’ve had to 
interface that with their panel as well, and give them the various details that they need. 
Electrical contractor (CAT01) 
The installation of the panels did not pose any particular safety issues for the abseilers, but did 
cause concern when the electrical contractor (CAT) realised that the bare trailing leads from 
the louvres were live and needed to be made safe. 
As soon as you get that plugged in, it generates straightaway, obviously, as soon as the 
sun gets on it...And we had them sort of dangling there in the breeze and we put 
terminal blocks on them to, and taped them, because we were worried about if it got 
wet and someone’s going to zapped as they walked past it.  
Electrical contractor (CAT01) 
As the installation progressed, the impact of the schedule, and the attention of the Quantity 
Surveyor (QS) waxed and waned at different stages.  This was articulated by the louvre 
supplier (FD) and amplified by the electrical contractor (CAT). 
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At the moment they’re not looking at it. They looked at it when we first started putting 
them in …All lovely, that’s exciting, they’re going on, and now that’s gone off the 
radar again. It’ll only come back on when it starts getting tested.  
Louvre supplier (FD02) 
So in terms of overruns both in time and budget, because it’s [the PV] not critical 
nobody really watches it.  
Electrical contractor (CAT01) 
At the end of this episode most of the PV louvres had been installed and the electrical cabling 
to the distribution boxes was complete, but the system could not be commissioned until after 
all the other electrical work for the building had been complete.  This was anticipated to be in 
early 2016. 
 Episode 5: technological frames 8.6.2
As installation of the electrical part of the system started, two technological frames were 
mobilised.  The architect (SL) (and client) mobilised the Design Aesthete frame, viewing the 
containment of the BIPV cables as aesthetically undesirable and aiming to minimise the 
visual impact.  The louvre supplier (FD), main contractor (BP) and electrical contractor 
(CAT) mobilised the Design Optimiser frame, viewing the containment as a non-negotiable 
necessity to support the wiring and cables.  The louvre supplier (FD), electrical contractor 
(CAT) and main contractor (BP) worked together to develop a solution for containment of the 
wires which would satisfy the aesthetic demands of the architect (Design Aesthete), whilst 
making the solution buildable (Design Optimiser).  This process of negotiation and the 
demonstrable understanding by the actors of each other’s frames is evident in the interview 
extracts in 7.6.1 and shows how project actors understood how different members of the team 
related to the technology differently. 
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Figure 8-5: Technological frames mobilized in episode 5, Synergy Court 
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The main contractor (BP) was frustrated by the lack of information available to carry out the 
design, and the conflicts between aesthetics and design were resolved through a pragmatic 
suggestion of spraying the containment trunking to match the steel.  The installation of the 
louvres and wiring outstripped the finalisation of the cable and wiring runs, which meant that 
the length of wiring from each louvre to its combiner box had not been confirmed.  The 
louvre supplier (FD) was keen to progress with the installation (Time Sentry frame) and so 
“guestimated” the length of wiring needed before laying off each cable.  This resulted in 
wastage when the cables were later run to the combiner boxes, as the length had been over-
estimated.  The electrical contractor (CAT) mobilised the User frame when he became aware 
that the laid off cables were live and posed a hazard to the construction personnel working 
near to the cables.  As the louvre supplier (FD) and electrical contractor (CAT) tried to 
resolve compatibility issues between the G59 meter and cabinet they were both engaged with 
the project through the frame of Design Optimiser, focussing on getting the system working 
efficiently and ironing out interface issues. 
The analysis above and in Figure 8-5 illustrates how during this episode two technological 
frames dominated: Design Aesthete and Design Optimiser.  The tensions between the goals of 
the actors mobilising these two frames were heightened by the frame of the Time Sentry 
which was embodied by the schedule (a social artefact).  Whilst negotiations between the 
Design Optimiser and Design Aesthete frames allowed an acceptable solution to the 
containment problem to be found, the tension between finding an acceptable route for cabling 
(Design Optimiser and Design Aesthete) and the need to adhere to the installation schedule 
(Time Sentry) led to the quick fix solution of laying off longer than necessary lengths of 
cables, which resulted in unnecessary wastage. 
Chapter 8: Case study 3 – Synergy Court 
249 
 
 Episode 5: co-development 8.6.3
In this episode there were two examples of co-development between the building and the 
BIPV system:  
i. The main example is the addition of containment and the knock-on effect of its visible 
aspect.  The containment had to be made as small as possible and an additional 
process of matching the colour to the aluminium and painting was needed.    
ii. A secondary occurrence was when the G59 meter in the distribution box had to be 
replaced in order to be compatible with the EMS system for the building.  
8.7 Summary 
This final section of the chapter brings together the five episodes to examine the case as a 
whole - exploring the technological frames and RSG’s; the co-development of the BIPV and 
the building as the project proceeded; and the issues and challenges which were specific to 
this project. 
 Technological frames and RSGs 8.7.1
The preceding analysis for each episode illustrated how all the technological frames were 
mobilised by the actors in the project.  It went on to explore how tensions between the actors 
mobilising different technological frames played out while the actors had to deal with the 
problems, and the way that they found solutions to these problems.  This section summarises 
the pattern of technological frames used and explores the way that actors mobilise different 
frames at different times throughout the project. 
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The Generation Maximiser frame is the most frequently adopted frame in this project, with 
almost all project personnel being drawn into the frame at some over the course of the project.  
It is also evident that this frame was the most used when problem solving was needed.  There 
were very few examples of the Risk Minimiser frame being mobilised within the project, a 
notable difference from the other two case studies.  It could be argued that the need to focus 
on maximising generation potential drove a degree of positive innovation by seeking to 
minimise the risk of not achieving the generation target.  The Cost Watcher frame was not 
particularly in evidence in this case study - their concerns were mainly overridden by the need 
to maximise generation and the additional £250,000 needed for the design of micro-inverters 
was not a factor in decision-making.   
Analysis of all the project episodes shows that many actors changed the technological frame 
through which they viewed the technology over the course of the project.  The most obvious 
example of this was the architect moving from Design Aesthete to Generation Maximiser at 
the start of the project.  The architect’s initial aim of designing a building to fit in with the 
architecture of the surrounding area was overtaken by concerns with generation potential and 
meeting the local authority planning requirements for renewables generation.  Initially the 
architect described how the aesthetics of the building drove his design, but subsequently 
described how the generation potential of the building soon took over as the main driver.  
The actors mobilised different frames at different times of the project and pattern of shifting 
frames for actors is illustrated in Figure 8-6 below.  Actors (the right hand column) moved 
between frames as the project progressed (the time element of the project being represented 
on the horizontal axis at different project stages).  During the concept phase of the project, the 
planner was the sole member of the Green Guardian frame, whilst the architect, louvre 
supplier and M&E contractor all shared the concerns of the Generation Maximiser frame.  
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This was the only time that the architect did relate solely to the Design Aesthete’s frame, and 
this is a distinctive feature of the case study compared to the other two.  The louvre supplier 
largely used the Generation Maximiser frame, but mobilised the Cost Watcher and Design 
Optimiser frames as well.  In the tender design episode, the louvre supplier developed 
solutions for BMU and for installation hoist mechanisms, while being very aware of cost 
implications and in getting the correct pricing into the tender.  The joint focus of the electrical 
contractor, main contractor and louvre supplier in maximising generation potential was a 
unifying force in their problem solving, and drove their solutions towards increasing output 
and minimising system losses.  
Unlike Future Green, at Synergy Court the architect’s focus as both Generation Maximiser 
and Design Aesthete was equally balanced - his concerns were to optimise both the aesthetics 
of the building and the output from the PV system.  The initial rejection by the planners of the 
building design, and then the lower projected electricity output, made him aware from early 
on in the concept design that the two were very interdependent.  The predominant frame in 
Synergy Court was that of the Generation Maximiser and this frame united the project team in 
identifying common areas of concern.  The architect understood the relationship between the 
angle of the louvres and generation potential.  The M&E engineers understood the differences 
between their calculations and those of the louvre supplier.  The electrical contractor 
understood the importance of efficient cable runs and the louvre supplier had to innovate in 
the quest to achieve the necessary output.  The members of Design Optimiser and Time 
Sentry frames in particular were very fluid, with nearly every actor being part of each of these 
over the course of the project, but at different times.  The dominance of the Generation 
Maximiser frame was constant throughout the project, but the actors mobilising the Design 
Optimiser frame followed the stages of the project, as the responsibility for design moved 
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from the mechanical design engineer to the main contractor and then to the louvre supplier as 
installation started.  In this case the Time Sentry frame did not have a major impact on 
decision-making and the louvre supplier almost de-coupled the PV system from the project 
schedule by developing his innovative installation solution.  The dominance of the Generation 
Maximiser frame in this case study drove the co-development of the building and PV system, 
and allowed normal contractual risk aversion to be replaced by innovative design in a variety 
of areas.   
When mapped onto the conventional project stages (Figure 8-6) some shifts in the dominance 
of a technological frame occurred at transition points; for example, where the project changed 
from concept to pre-tender design or from design to installation.  The architect dropped the 
Generation Maximiser frame as soon as the PCSA was agreed, whilst the Electrical Engineer 
moved away from the Design Optimiser frame to adopt the Generation Maximiser frame 
when a proposal to introduce micro inverters changed the basis for design.  These shifts could 
be accounted for by several factors: the natural change in focus of the project actors as the 
project moved from concept to installation (the changes could be termed inflection points); 
the ongoing stabilisation of certain elements of the design (for example the generation 
potential for the micro inverter system); and the shifts in the nature of the problem (as the roof 
became an aesthetic design issue and then became a constraint for the PV system).  The next 
chapter will explore these factors further by comparing the different case studies. 
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Figure 8-6: Movement of actors between technological frames as project proceeds 
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 The co-development of the BIPV and the building 8.7.2
The discussion of the five episodes which marked this case signalled a number of key 
moments of co-development.  The discussion which follows explores the co-development 
story of the building and the technology in greater detail, and how this mutual articulation 
occurred.  The three types of co-development identified in the previous two case studies 
(lock-in, homogeneity of appearance, and mutual adjustment and adaptation) also occurred in 
this case, together with unfolding innovation as the BIPV was integrated within the building.  
Figure 8-7 illustrates the co-development story by showing the interconnectivity between the 
elements of the building and BIPV.  The analysis which follows describes the co-development 
of the BIPV panels and the building from the perspective of key design decisions and the 
socio-technical network which supported these.  The diagrams which follow were derived 
from a SCOT framework of analysis, which focussed on the problems experienced by the 
actors over the project and the range of solutions used to resolve these.  Enlarged sections of 
the diagram figure are used to illustrate specific points in the discussion which follows.  
Figure 8-7 shows how the process of co-development occurred over the project and illustrates 
the key stages of the story.  Each rounded, shaded box represents a decision or action which 
shaped either the building (the top line of boxes) or the BIPV (the bottom line).  The 
unshaded square boxes mark key points in the co-development story.      
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Figure 8-7: Co-development diagram Synergy Court 
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Lock-in 
The lock-in of building shape and BIPV design during the planning and tender stage was the 
most significant part of the story of co-development.   
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Figure 8-8: Co-development - lock-in 
As Figure 8-8 indicates, the client’s initial desire to have a research centre with four 
interconnected towers, and the council’s planning policy which required renewable energy 
generation, locked-in both the inclusion of PV technology and the target figure for electricity 
generation.  The four towers gave a generous roof area to mount PV panels, and the upper 
south elevation of two towers allowed inclusion of a conventional BIPV system on the façade, 
which boosted the generation potential.  The potential generation figure from this 
configuration was calculated and submitted as part of the planning proposal.  At this point the 
target generation figure for the building was locked into the project, but no one on the project 
team realised the significance of this lock in at the time.  The louvre supplier project sales 
manager (FD01) illustrated this point of lock in: 
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The planners were sold that output metaphorically…[they say] we’d like some 
renewable on this building, …[The M&E consultant says] we can achieve this look. 
Planners say, yeah, we’ll have that, and that goes in the plan. Had they said a lower 
figure that would have been approved, I’m sure, absolutely sure. 
Louvre supplier (FD01) 
The rejection of the four interconnected tower block design led to the appointment of a new 
architect and a building with sweeping curved roofs made from louvres, which hid the tower 
structure and blended the project into its environment.  At first glance this was a case of 
interdependence of appearance, but in fact was lock-in.  The new shape defined the available 
space for the BIPV, but locked-in both the area available for PV generation and the use of 
BIPV rather than roof-mounted panels.  The subsequent decision by the planner to accept the 
new design, but insist upon the higher generation figure from the old design, heralded a series 
of mutual adjustments and adaptations.  The requirement to generate more electricity and 
maximise the output from each roof louvre meant that louvre lengths were made as 
continuous as possible, with each one oriented to an optimal angle in order to avoid shading 
from the neighbouring louvres and the building.  The effect of these adjustments was to give 
the building roof a distinctive texture and look, and also meant that any louvres which were 
not PV louvres had to match the overall design.  Once the project went for tender, the BIPV 
louvre suppliers could not guarantee that the required output could be met using conventional 
configurations, but as the generation figure was locked-in, new ways of meeting the target had 
to be found.  The louvre supplier suggested using Q cells and micro-inverters, which resulted 
in the main contractor issuing a PCSO which deviated from the normal project procedure and 
resulted in increased contract costs.  The challenge of meeting the generation targets within 
the constraints of the curved roof shape led to a series of innovative modifications for the 
BIPV system - from the use of micro-inverters to the design of plug and play cables and the 
development of a web monitoring system.   
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We took on board the architect’s intent, and effectively rationalised it to what we 
thought was a buildable, simple design. A cost effective design as well, both for the 
PV element, which is only 20% of the louvres, and the rest of the louvres as well, we 
wanted a simple design that worked for the whole system.  
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
The final co-development piece of this phase was the insistence of the louvre supplier that the 
BIPV work package include electrical wiring, supply of micro inverters, combiner boxes and 
distribution panels.  This required change to the projects work package content, and 
adjustments to the electrical work package in particular. 
Homogeneity of appearance 
The second series of co-development events relate to interdependence of appearance of the 
BIPV and the building, and is shown in Figure 8-9.  The decision to incorporate BIPV in 
some of the roof louvres gave the architect concerns about the homogeneity of the roof.  To 
mitigate this he added perforations to the non-PV louvres in order to imitate the pattern of 
cells on the PV louvres. 
The colour of the PV fins was blue, rather than the grey of the aluminium louvres and the 
architect tried to change these to grey.  However, on finding that grey panels were less 
efficient than the blue ones, he agreed that the blue colour would be specified, which gave the 
roof a degree of lack in homogeneity externally.  Similar concerns to conceal the cables 
internally meant that the containment channels for the PV wiring were painted grey and that 
their cross section was minimised to reduce visibility.  This resulted in congesting the cables 
within the containment channels and making installation work more difficult. 
Chapter 8: Case study 3 – Synergy Court 
259 
 
Key
Roof fins perforated 
to match PV effect
Need wiring runs 
and path from sub-
collectors to 
distribution boxes 
Blue external cells 
Request grey PV 
cells, but result in 
reduction of output 
so rejected
Request grey cables 
but rejected
Use grey 
containment 
trunkingand reduce 
size of braketry
More congested 
cable ways
Visible black cablesBuilding
BIPV
Incorporate BIPV in 
fins 
decision or 
action which 
shaped either the 
building or the 
BIPV system
key point in 
the co-
development 
story
 
Figure 8-9: Co-development - homogeneity of appearance 
 
Mutual adjustments of the building and BIPV (wiring and cabling systems) 
The co-development of the electrical wiring and cabling systems, and the integration of the 
BIPV into the energy management system is the third example of significant co-development.  
Figure 8-10 shows the mutual adjustment of the electrical system and energy management 
system (EMS). 
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Figure 8-10: Co-development - mutual adjustment 2 
The inclusion of micro inverters in the project was identified as the only way to reduce system 
losses and achieve the target generation potential.  The ramifications of this decision were not 
anticipated and had two major impacts - firstly on complicating the wiring configurations 
(each inverter now had to be wired to the sub-collectors and so to the distribution panel, rather 
than being connected in series to the distribution panel) and second, the energy management 
system would have to incorporate monitoring of all 410 micro inverters.  The splitting of the 
electrical package between the louvres supplier and the electrical contractor meant that the 
site of the combiner boxes and distribution panels needed to be decided before details of the 
wiring runs were fixed.  The positioning of the combiner boxes was a pragmatic decision 
which was taken on site just after the louvres were installed.  The louvre supplier was ahead 
of the electrical contractor in terms of installation work and so had to estimate the length of 
wiring needed from louvre to combiner box, and this led to significant wastage in terms of 
cabling. 
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The electrical contractor had no idea how to wire from the sub-collectors (which were on 
several floors) to the distribution panels (which were in the roof) and so had to develop the 
scheme.  The louvre supplier describes the dilemma of the electrical contractor:  
We knew where the box was here, we knew where the box was there, but we had no 
idea how to put the cable between the two…Because there’s an atrium, and they don’t 
want four cables that are going to be a bundle this size going right through the middle 
of the atrium.  Well each cable here, it was 100 volt cable, so it’s only about 30mm 
diameter, each one, and there will be 10 of them coming from each side, and with 
cables you have to put them a certain distance apart. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
This series of mutual adjustments and adaptations occurred throughout the installation process 
as the two sets of work packages came together.  The inclusion of the micro inverter 
monitoring into the energy management system is a further example of mutual adaption and 
change, as the BIPV system has to be compatible with the building’s EMS system, and so a 
way of identifying each micro inverter was delivered.  
The system then had to be re-adjusted when the electrical contractor had to re-specify the type 
of meter required so that it was compatible with the EMS system and the louvre supplier had 
to refit the meters. 
Most of the detail comes out once you’re here and you’ve spoken to the relevant 
people. The panels that these guys were providing didn’t necessarily work with the 
system that we had, so you thrash out the details….they will provide a panel with a 
meter and we need to interface with that meter, so all the software for the EMS 
system, needs to be able to read the meter. 
Electrical contractor (CAT01) 
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Procedures of working 
The analysis above highlights one other feature of co-development, which involves the way 
that inclusion of the BIPV impacts and is impacted by the normal procedures of working.  
Figure 8-11 illustrates this co-development.    
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Figure 8-11: Co-development - process 
The inclusion of BIPV in the project led to departures from the “normal” project procedures.  
In keeping with the main contractor’s normal procedures, contractors were invited to tender 
for the various work packages, and there was some negotiation over whether the louvres 
should be part of the façade contract, or separate to it.  The louvre supplier’s insistence that 
the generation targets were impossible to meet effectively stopped “business as usual;” and 
forced the main contractor to think about a new way to specify and procure the system. A 
turn-key contract for the louvre supplier to design and install the BIPV system, including the 
electrical work, meant that changes to the content of other work packages were required.  This 
led to confusion and rework on cable runs and meter fitting, both of which impinged on the 
electrical contract for the building and meant that the wiring had to fit around the building, 
and around the atrium in particular.  Longer than necessary cable runs in general cause system 
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inefficiencies, but these were reduced by virtue of the micro inverter system because AC 
systems in general lose less per meter of cable than DC systems.  
This series of mutual adjustments and changes to the project procedures and processes led to 
two outcomes.  First it allowed a space within the mechanism of the PCSA to develop an 
innovative solution that could be packaged together.  This included a novel plug-and-play 
system of cabling and the web monitoring system.  It also led to the development of the BMU 
cradle system to de-couple the installation of the louvres from the general hoist schedule of 
the project.  Secondly it gave rise to an innovative and time saving installation procedure 
using the BMU hoist to reduce reliance on the site crane.  This development only came about 
because the louvre supplier had to consider installation of both louvres and the electrical 
work, and wanted to come up with a way to improve the efficiency of the installation of both 
of these elements.   
In summary, each of the four examples of co-development in Synergy Court illustrate the 
three types of co-development identified in the previous case studies (lock-in, 
interdependence of appearance and mutual adjustment and adaptation), together with 
examples of unfolding innovation as the BIPV was integrated within the building.  These 
mechanisms, and reflections of their importance on innovation, are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
8.8 Issues about BIPV and the challenges which it poses for project teams  
In line with the other two case studies, there were several issues which have particular 
relevance for construction projects.  This analysis shows five main issues surrounding the 
adoption of BIPV in the building which were present throughout the project: unfamiliarity 
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with the technology, the presence of a PV expert; the motive for the inclusion of BIPV; the 
effect of social artefacts; and construction project practices.  
The architect and M&E designer were relatively unfamiliar with BIPV, but because of 
planning requirements were forced to think about generation potential at a very early stage of 
the project.  Unfamiliarity with modelling packages and standards for BIPV created an over 
reliance by the architect and M&E consultant on new software, which led to several 
unanticipated consequences with profound implications on the subsequent direction of the 
project.  The louvre supplier explained how errors in calculating generation potential came 
from a lack of understanding of PV technology. 
Mainly the biggest mistake that they made was [they] used their own programme for 
calculating output, and no-one could understand why…and their system took weather 
data that’s used for air conditioning, and therefore it was giving much higher outputs , 
and it didn’t take into account the project’s in London. It assumes the project’s in a 
place like Cornwall where you would get better yields. It was crazy.” 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
This was compounded by a lack of understanding of how to apply efficiency calculations 
which meant that the M&E consultant overestimated the efficiency of the system by between 
three and five percent.  The louvre supplier described how this discrepancy occurred.  
Yes the cell has got a 17% efficiency, but once you encapsulate it in glass, it will 
[drop to 12%] once you measure it on the output side. 
Louvre supplier (FD04) 
These inaccuracies at the concept stage of the design meant that the louvre supplier refused to 
guarantee the output required in the specification and proposed a different system using 
micro-inverters and “Q” cells, which in turn led to the placing of a PCSA and in the end 
resulted in a twenty-five percent increase in the package price.  
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Unlike the other case studies, in Synergy Court there was a perceived PV expert on the 
project - the louvre supplier.  In reality, the louvre supplier was gaining expert advice and 
support from several sources (the PV laminate supplier, the micro inverter supplier and the 
cable supplier).  This was a clear strategy adopted by the louvre supplier and used as a point 
of difference in winning the bid.  In articulating the reasons for adopting this approach, the 
louvre supplier mentioned in particular the way that this approach gives the client one clear 
point of contact. 
In this case the two factors which drove the design of the building and BIPV system were: i) 
gaining planning consent in an area of sensitive architectural considerations and ii) achieving 
the planning authority required generation output from the BIPV system.  The motive for 
achieving the generation target kept the project team focussed on achieving that goal and this 
made it possible for novel, more expensive solutions to be introduced and for the BIPV to be 
integrated fundamentally into the building.  This focus on generation and output could be said 
to have put the louvre supplier and electrical contractor in the driving seat in terms of adaptive 
innovation - for example, about whether blue or grey cells could be used, or that containment 
would be used to support cables.  
In this case study, unlike the others, considerable attention was paid to the technological 
assemblage of the BIPV system, under the umbrella of maximising generation potential.  The 
louvres were considered in terms of their generation capacity.  Maximising cell placement, 
specifying new “Q” technology, and specifying square rather than hexagonal cells were all 
part of the consideration for the system.  As part of the focus on generation potential, the 
electrical part of the system was developed to maximise conversion efficiency, minimise 
system losses and monitor output.  This commitment to install a system that delivered the 
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required electricity was demonstrated not only by the louvre supplier, but by other members 
of the project team. 
No, there was an output defined, and this is going way back. 
Main contractor (PB02) 
They set four louvres up, and we put a flash on and see what the output was. It was a 
case of, does it meet, tick, yes, if it failed it’d have been a big problem. 
Main contractor (PB02) 
That’s it, it’s all about the output at the end of the day. 
Louvre supplier (FD02) 
So when we came onboard we knew we had to hit a certain output and to get to that 
output we had to prove that we could incorporate that many PVs. 
Architect (SL01) 
So, we’ve tested the system, well a mock-up part of the system, and I think everyone 
was fairly confident that, once it’s on site it should deliver what everyone wants it to. 
M&E consultant (FS02) 
The most evident social artefact throughout the project was the part L planning requirement 
for 1% renewable energy generation.  It played a huge role in shaping the co-development of 
the building and the BIPV, and remained in everyone’s mind throughout the project.  The 
project schedule absorbed the PCSA and the rework associated with cable runs and 
compatibility of meters, and the innovative use of the BMS hoist to reduce call on the site 
crane-age meant that installation was effectively de-coupled from the schedule and could 
carry on at the pace dictated by the abseilers.   
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These four issues were present in the other case studies and will be discussed in greater depth 
in the following chapter. 
Construction Practices 
The three themes of contracts, continuity and collaboration; and changes to specification 
which were apparent in the first two case studies were also present in this case study, but in a 
slightly different way. 
The louvre supplier was invited by the main contractor to tender for either the whole façade 
package or for the roof louvre package, and the other contractors were offered a similar 
choice.  This demonstrates an initial willingness by the main contractor to take a flexible 
approach to defining work packages and allowing firms to decide on their areas of expertise, 
and then working out how to knit this patchwork together.  Similar flexibility was 
demonstrated by the willingness to consider changing the specification and introducing micro 
inverters - arguably the imperative to achieve particular generation figures helped to establish 
this flexibility.  Once again the main contractor demonstrated flexibility in the approach to 
work package allocation, by allowing the louvre supplier to supply a turn-key contract on the 
BIPV system, even though this impacted on the electrical work package. 
The louvre supplier used a long-standing collaborative relationship with the PV laminate 
supplier to discuss possibilities for achieving the required generation, but was very happy to 
establish new relationships with the micro inverter supplier and the wiring supplier.   
But that sort of information is where [the PV laminate supplier] are a huge help to 
someone like us. It’s not our forte to be honest…we see them as someone who has 
huge knowledge of PVs and PV systems, and we use that expertise. 
Louvre supplier (FD02) 
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The person who was their senior technical person ..was literally sat in with us and then 
we had half a dozen of their engineers sitting in…And we worked with them, to come 
up with a solution using micro-inverters, so we’re changing, we’re inverting it to AC 
at the point of generation, so that was then being linked down to AC. 
Louvre supplier (FD03) 
Change orders in this case study were discussed in a positive light, parties recognising that 
what was specified at the start of a project was often changed when the project was built, and 
a more collaborative approach was taken in working out the next best way forward.  
Because FS wrote the spec [about two years ago] and it’s extremely vague…it 
developed itself over four years and by the time they actually come to install it the 
spec is chalk and cheese. So once we literally got the schematic, went through it… and 
wrote the responsibilities.” 
Main contractor(PB02) 
In a similar way to previous case studies, where wiring improvements and inverter 
developments improved generation potential, the new “Q” cells in this case study allowed the 
supplier to meet the target generation and were factored into the bid before they were on the 
market.  
Now we had, we were given some confidence because I think the output on cells at 
that point was less than what was about to come on to the market. The efficiency of 
the cells, I think, they keep going on up all the time…But certainly things were 
happening which would help us. 
Louvre supplier (FD01) 
These challenges for construction practices when new technology is introduced are common 
to all three case studies and are discussed in the following chapter.   
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 Cross Case Analysis and Discussion  Chapter 9:
The literature review (Chapter 3) established the need to understand more about integration 
and the dynamics of adoption.  The analysis of the three case studies (chapters 6, 7 and 8) 
indicated that these two themes were important in accounting for differences in outcome 
between the three projects.  This chapter’s further exploration of these themes across the three 
projects will be used to inform the next chapter’s re-engagement with literature on innovation 
adoption.  In this discussion the dynamics involved in the mutual articulation of the 
technology and buildings highlight particular challenges for construction projects and 
renewable technologies, as increasingly complex, innovative technologies are integrated into 
buildings.   
9.1 Case study comparison  
Although the three case study projects were all procured using Design and Build contracts and 
were constructed over the period 2012 - 2015, the outcomes of all three were very different.  
The following section discusses the different motives for the specification of BIPV and the 
different procurement decisions taken for each case study, and summarises the consequences 
of these.  Table 9-1 summarises the motives, procurement strategy and outcome for each of 
the case studies. 
Vogue Terrace 
Local planning requirements in 2010 did not establish particular generation targets for 
renewable energy; instead they called for a sustainability review which included consideration 
of renewable technologies.  BIPV was specified on Vogue Terrace both to satisfy these 
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planning requirements and to provide an up-to-date appearance of the building.  In terms of 
procurement decisions, the client specified that the same contractors be used as on previous 
phases of the project (which had not incorporated BIPV into the building).  This decision 
locked-in the fact that the façade contractor had no previous experience of using BIPV.  This 
lack of experience of BIPV led the façade supplier to refuse to include BIPV in their work 
package; which forced the main contractor to re-distribute the BIPV portion of the work 
package across other work packages.  The resulting decoupling of the BIPV and façade led to 
the further division of the BIPV contract into visible (the panels and bracketry) and the 
invisible (the wiring, inverters and cabling) sections.   
As part of this de-coupling of the BIPV system, the PV panels were free issued to the façade 
supplier and the electrical portion of the system was put together as a separate wiring 
package.  Unfamiliarity led the main contractor to delay issuing the wiring tender, which led 
to unanticipated knock-on problems for the integrated design of frames, bracketry, and 
wiring.  The result was that the BIPV was treated as a bolt-on installation, with the BIPV 
louvres being bolted to the glazing units and the wiring running vertically and externally up 
the building to the roof mounted inverters.  The electricity generated by the BIPV system was 
not part of the planning requirements, only roughly estimated and was never measured.  
Future Green 
Future Green used BIPV to win funding from the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), to make a sustainability statement, and to attract tenants to the building.  The 
requirement for funding was that the building achieved at least BREEAM Excellent and an 
EPC rating of at least “B”.  These certification schemes set the minimum PV generation target 
as a square meterage requirement, rather than as an output of kilowatt-hours (kWh).  The unit 
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of measurement (square metres) reinforced the function of the BIPV as being a green 
statement rather than to generate electricity.  In terms of procurement decision, the main 
contractor apportioned work packages as though the BIPV system was “just a set of 
windows”.  Accordingly, the BIPV system was divided into two parts - the panels being part 
of the façade contract, whilst the electrical part was included in the M&E contract for internal 
work. The content of these work packages was developed by an M&E consultant who 
included a considerable design portion of work in the work packages.  The main contractor 
was not aware of the requirement for design portions in either of the contracts and so did not 
check that these designs were developed.   
The façade contractor subcontracted worked with the glazing supplier to develop the frames 
for the façade (including the BIPV panels) and the BIPV panels were assembled into the 
frames on site.  Delays occurred on-site as the site project team (main contractor, façade 
contractor and glazing supplier) worked out how to get the PV glazing panels into the façade 
frames and how to get the PV wires inside the building.  The M&E contractors had not read 
the design portion and consequently had not considered how to configure wiring the strings of 
PV panels and had not sized or purchased the inverter.  The overall result was that the BIPV 
windows made a strong, visible “green” statement but that their functionality was severely 
compromised - they were essentially opaque, generated very little electricity, and the letting 
manager found them to be a barrier to attracting tenants.   
Synergy Court 
Synergy Court was planned as a flagship research centre.  Local, negotiated planning 
requirements demanded that 1% of the electricity requirements of the building be generated 
from renewable technology on-site.  BIPV was included on the building to meet these 
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conditions and as part of the client’s sustainability strategy.  The external shape of the 
building, and therefore the area which could be used for PV generation, was fixed in the 
initial discussions with the Council’s planning office.  This external shape made meeting the 
target generation figures very difficult and required detail design of the BIPV system before 
the work package contracts could be let.  The work packages initially had the BIPV louvres 
included within the roof louvre contract and the electrical work within the general electrical 
contract.  Because of the particularly stringent generation target, the façade contractor 
suggested an innovative design using micro inverters and sub collectors, and insisted that the 
electrical work was included within the louvre work package as a turn-key contract.  The 
result of this procurement decision was that the BIPV system became an integral part of the 
building and was a flagship technology within the flagship building.  The generation potential 
of the BIPV system was designed to meet 1% of the building’s energy needs and was 
connected to the building’s energy management system, allowing web monitoring of the 
electricity generated. 
 Vogue Terrace Future Green Synergy Court 
Motive For 
BIPV 
- Modern aesthetics 
- Sustainable strategy 
- Funding requirement  
- Sustainability 
statement  
- Planning 
requirement (1% 
of building energy 
use to be generated 
by renewables) 
Generation 
Target 
- None - 50 m2 PV - 221 MWh 
Procurement 
Strategy 
- Previous supply 
chain 
- Decoupled work 
packages 
- Free issue PV panels 
- PV wiring 
 
- De-coupled work 
packages 
- Visible (PV windows) 
- Invisible (electrical) 
- Changed from de-
coupled work 
packages to turn-
key BIPV design 
Outcome - Bolt-on BIPV 
- Reduced generation 
- Sustainable statement  
- Semi-opaque windows 
- Minimal generation 
- Innovative and 
integrated BIPV 
- On-target 
generation 
potential 
Table 9-1: Summary of motive, procurement strategy and outcome for each case study 
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The following analysis will explore the types of integration which occurred and the dynamics 
of co-development in more detail. 
9.2 Types of integration of the technology and the building 
The literature review established the need for integrated technologies to be integrated within 
the local context and suggested that challenges of integration could be considered in several 
different ways: supply chain integration (Wolstenholme, 2009); project team integration 
(Briscoe & Dainty, 2005); and information and process integration (Rothwell, 1994).  
Analysis of the case studies gave empirical, micro-level data which allowed a better 
understanding of three of these types of integration during the adoption process.   
i. Integration of technology; how the parts of the BIPV system were considered as a 
whole rather than as individual components and how the BIPV system was integrated 
within the fabric of the building. 
ii. Integration of the project team; how the relationships between actors, the role of the 
systems integrator and the presence and locus of BIPV expertise affected the adoption 
of BIPV. 
iii. Integration of project processes; how the relationship between key project tasks 
influenced the adoption of BIPV.  These tasks included:  tendering; specification and 
design; procurement; installation; and commissioning.   
 Integration of technology 9.2.1
With BIPV there are two systems of technological artefacts to consider: the interaction of the 
elements of BIPV technology (the panels, inverters, wiring and metering systems); and the 
interaction between the BIPV technology and the building components within which it fits.  
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The integration of the BIPV technology as a system occurred in only one of the case studies.  
In Vogue Terrace the electrical and mechanical components of the BIPV system were 
developed separately.  Both were loosely specified at the tender stage of the project by the 
main contractor’s M&E designer, but the detail design never considered them as a matched 
system.  In addition, at installation the components differed significantly from the original 
design, and this reduced the generation potential of the system.  In Future Green, the design 
team focused on the BIPV glazing panels at the expense of the electrical system.  The result 
was that no-one considered the system as an integrated whole. The BIPV glazing panels were 
the focus of attention and although the electrical component of the system was included 
within the electrical design specification at tender, this design work was never completed and 
the inverter design and wiring routes were only developed at installation.  Synergy Court 
began as a project where mechanical and electrical components were specified within separate 
packages, but the technical difficulties in achieving the required generation from the louvres 
brought the whole BIPV system under review.  This review led to the specification and 
development of micro-inverters and the detail design of all wiring and control components 
within a central BIPV package.  This project was the only example of an integrated approach 
to installation of BIPV.  The difference between these case studies draws attention to the 
difficulty of reappraising the whole BIPV system performance once project work packages 
have been set.   
Two common ways of dividing project work between the project team had major effects on 
the integration and performance of the BIPV system.  Dividing the BIPV system between 
mechanical and electrical disciplines had the effect of distributing responsibility for different 
parts of the BIPV system across multiple work packages and complicated both design and 
installation.  Also, work packages were often defined and tendered for before detail BIPV 
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system design took place.  This locked-in the component technology and its configuration 
before other available integrated options could be considered.  
The second area of technological integration to consider is that of the BIPV system and the 
building. Although it might be intuitive to assume that the specification of an integrated 
renewable technology would automatically lead to the co-design of the BIPV system and the 
building, the data does not support this.  Instead the case studies showed that the BIPV and 
building were designed independently, only coming together at the points at which parts of 
the BIPV system physically joined the building - referred to here as “integrating interfaces”.  
An example of this was on Future Green, where one integrating interface was the point where 
the BIPV wires meet the glazing frames.  Another example was in Synergy Court, where an 
integrating interface occurred where the wiring from the collector boxes joined the 
distribution panels for the building.   
Vogue Terrace used BIPV as brise-soleil, which was specifically designed to be bolted on to 
the windows using brackets. The main contractor and façade supplier purposely separated the 
design of the BIPV brise-soleil from the design of the façade work package and viewed the 
two as a bolt-together assembly.  The only artefacts that shared design input from both the 
electrical and façade designers were the glazing bracket and frame. Neither of these two 
artefacts had been considered to be part of the BIPV system, but because the wiring had to be 
hidden, they became an unexpected integrating interface.  A similar conjunction of frame and 
wiring occurred in Future Green, but this occurred so late in the project (at installation) that 
the frames were seen as a barrier to getting the wires into the building, and were drilled 
through to facilitate the process.   
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The level of integration of the technology and the building in Synergy Court at first glance 
appears to be an exemplary counterpoint to the other two case studies.  The BIPV technology 
was procured through one supplier who designed the louvres, wiring, inverters and metering 
as one integrated system to deliver a particular amount of electricity.  On closer inspection 
this apparent integration masks the early divergence of building and BIPV design which 
occurred when the architect introduced the new curved roof onto the building.  This change 
prompted the dramatic change in technology and procurement decision, as the main 
contractor and louvre supplier realised that the new roof design meant that the target 
generation figures would be difficult to achieve.  In this case the façade supplier took the 
integrating interfaces (for example louvres and brackets, or inverters and wiring) into account 
at the time of design.  This meant that the co-development of the BIPV system and the 
building took place in an incremental and non-disruptive way. 
This discussion of integration of technological highlights two main points.  First, the 
technological integration of the BIPV system, both with itself, and within the building, was 
heavily affected by the timing of work package definition and the division of work within the 
packages.  Secondly, timely consideration of the integrating interfaces between the building 
and the BIPV improved technological integration.  
 Integration of teams 9.2.2
A comparison of the three cases highlights five aspects of project team integration which 
impacted on the adoption of BIPV.  These were: previous relationships between contractors; 
mechanisms used in the project to drive integration; decision-making by contractors; attitude 
towards the technology; and the perceived location of expertise.  Whilst these aspects of 
project team integration are mentioned in broader literature concerned with project team 
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dynamics (discussed in Chapter 3), this discussion focuses specifically on their impact on 
differences in the incorporation of BIPV across the projects. 
Previous relationships  
In each of the case studies, previous relationships between suppliers and project team 
members affected the integration of BIPV.  The client for Vogue Terrace had specified that 
the same contractors be used on the final phase as had been used in the preceding two.  This 
meant that the project supply chain was fixed in advance and also locked-in the lack of 
experience with BIPV.  The existing relationship between the façade supplier and the main 
contractor led the main contractor to accept the façade supplier’s refusal to supply the BIPV 
system without critical appraisal.  The acceptance by the main contractor that the BIPV 
system should be de-coupled from the façade contract had major effects on the project later 
on.  In Future Green, the architect and glazing supplier had worked together before.  This was 
a factor in the architect’s decision to accept a substitute technology from the glazing supplier 
without exploring the technical implications.  It was only later that the architect realized that 
the change in technology would impact both the appearance of the building and the 
functionality to the BIPV system.  In addition, the previous relationship between the façade 
supplier and the glazing supplier appeared to lull both parties into a false sense of security that 
each was designing the BIPV system, when in fact neither was doing so.  A parallel dynamic 
can be found in Synergy Court where the architect and design engineers worked so closely to 
develop a programme to calculate the potential output of the PV louvre panels that they both 
failed to check that the standard parameters used in the programme were in line with those 
used elsewhere.  What seems to be true in all of these cases is that previous good working 
relationships between contractors masked the early identification of problems and resulted in 
Chapter 9: Cross case analysis and discussion 
278 
 
the adoption of short-term, apparently easy fixes rather than an appreciation of the overall 
impact of decisions.  
Mechanisms to drive integration 
A common theme in the three cases studies is the occupational position of the BIPV systems 
integrator.  The term “BIPV systems integrator” refers to the actor who finally came to terms 
with the integrated nature of the BIPV technology and who then drove its integration in the 
project.  Each project had an actor who fulfilled this function, but their occupational position 
varied, as did the stage within the project at which they engaged with this role.   
In Vogue Terrace, the separation between the building and the BIPV system largely stemmed 
from the façade supplier’s desire to avoid the risk of supplying a novel technology, and the 
main contractor’s willingness to free issue BIPV panels to the façade supplier for cost and 
time reasons.  The architect adopted the role of systems integrator, by liaising with the PV 
laminate supplier to develop the brise-soleil panel and with the façade consultant to explore 
ways to bring the wires inside the building.  Subsequently the electrical contractor (who was 
brought in late in the process) also filled this function; it was his understanding of the total 
BIPV system that brought the team together to develop a solution to this issue.  The systems 
integrator function in Future Green was largely absent, until taken on de-facto by the main 
contractor when problems began to appear as installation started.  In Synergy Court the louvre 
supplier insisted on taking on the function of systems integrator, believing that this was a way 
to guarantee meeting the generation target and of ensuring that the BIPV system and building 
formed a cohesive whole.   
There is a growing literature on the need for an integrator role to deliver sustainability 
(Rebelo et al., 2013).  Often this role is ascribed to the project manager, but this discussion 
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shows that the function shifted through the project span, residing in different actors at 
different times and for different reasons.  This discussion also suggests that the function of the 
systems integrator is an informal role within the project and that it is one which moves 
between actors within a project.  The way that the integrator role played out across the project 
was different for each case study and this may account for many of the differences in project 
execution.  The case studies showed the importance of the systems integrator and revealed 
some of the dynamics involved in how the role developed in the projects.  However this was 
not the thrust of the research and further analysis and research would be needed to explore 
this area further.  
Decision-making and problem solving 
Following from the observation that the systems integrator is a shifting function within a 
project team, it follows that the alliances of contractors involved in decision-making around 
the integration of the BIPV system and the building also change.  What is interesting is that 
this pattern was different in each case study and did not necessarily follow the systems 
integrator function.  Although each case study used a Design and Build contract, each one 
operationalised the contract differently by dividing risk and responsibility in different ways.  
After tender Vogue Terrace was run by the main contractor and the architect was novated 
across to work for the main contractor. This made the main contractor the formal point of all 
decision-making, but gave rise to fragmented communication and decision-making.  The 
architect could only communicate with the BIPV laminate supplier though the main 
contractor, and the façade supplier had to raise issues with the main contractor, rather than 
have direct discussions with other contractors (for example, with the BIPV louvre supplier 
when establishing the positions of fixings and connectors, or with the electrical supplier when 
discussing the cable and connector sizes and configurations).  This indirect approach to 
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problem solving gave the main contractor absolute control, but resulted in delayed decision-
making and a desire to “fence off” parts of the design to mark limits of responsibility.   
Future Green had no procedure of novation and the architect and M&E design contractor 
remained outside the main contractor’s organisation.  Decision-making was fragmented: the 
architect and the glazing supplier made decisions regarding technology and layout; glazing 
supplier and façade supplier made decisions about location of wires and connectors; and the 
main contractor and M&E contractor agreed location of wiring runs and inverter.  This 
resulted in many independent decisions being taken without regard to the wider issue of 
integrating the BIPV system and the building.  The responsibility for the integration of the 
systems contractually rested with the main contractor, but a lack of an understanding of the 
BIPV system meant the impact of each seemingly small decision was not recognised.   
Vogue Terrace and Future Green both had a fragmented problem solving approach, which 
revolved around risk minimisation for each contractor.  In the case of Vogue Terrace, this 
changed when the electrical contractor came on board the project and acted as the systems 
integrator, and facilitated integrated problem solving between the contractors.  Future Green 
did not have a systems integrator until late on in the project and this meant that problem 
solving occurred on site, at the point of installation. 
Synergy Court had a clear and consistent system integrator in the form of the louvre supplier 
and this gave shape and consistency to decision-making.  The louvre supplier, laminate 
supplier, inverter supplier and wiring suppliers formed one loop to develop integrated 
specifications for each component of the BIPV system.  The main contractor, louvre supplier 
and main electrical contractor formed another loop which took decisions about the mechanics 
of how to integrate the BIPV system within the building.  It would appear that Synergy Court, 
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uniquely amongst the case studies, used an integrated approach to solve problems before they 
became issues, but this degree of integration was only achieved after a PCSO had been issued 
to correct the mis-specification of the BIPV system at the tender stage.  In construction 
projects PCSOs are usually avoided by the main contractor as they are considered to add cost 
to projects.  It could be argued that in Synergy Court the PCSO enabled system integration 
and was of benefit to the project, allowing generation targets to be met.  
This discussion suggests that the function of the systems integrator not only gave energy and 
direction to the integration of the technology within the building, but was also central to 
decision-making which considers the building and BIPV system as a whole.  It is this 
integrated decision-making which marks the differences in outcomes of the three projects.  
Attitudes to technology 
When considering the team’s relationship to the technology and the effect that this might have 
on the integration of the technology, it can be seen that the project teams in each of the three 
cases had very different attitudes to BIPV and that these permeated all levels of the project.  
The Vogue Terrace team viewed the technology as “nothing special” - a technology that had 
been used before and posed no significant challenges to the standard ways of working.  BIPV 
was seen by the Future Green team as a token technology with a negligible contribution to 
energy generation, and as such the challenges of integrating the technology and the building 
were dismissed as trivial.  The focus of generation targets for the Synergy Court team meant 
that the technology took on a “must have, must perform” meaning.  This focussed the team 
view of the technology as a challenge which needed to be understood and which required 
careful integration within the building.  These differing views towards the technology reflect 
the motive of the actors and the degree of integration of the technology and building. 
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Location of expertise 
Finally, when considering the integration of the team, the  case studies differed in the locus of 
perceived expertise.  The Vogue Terrace team considered that the BIPV expert was the BIPV 
laminate supplier.  The BIPV laminate supplier believed that there was a BIPV system 
designer in another part of the project - who in fact did not exist.  In contrast, the Future 
Green team saw the expert as the glazing supplier - who used the BIPV laminate supplier to 
validate the layouts, but who actually had no expertise in BIPV system design.  In Synergy 
Court, the louvre supplier saw himself as the BIPV expert, recognising that the project needed 
one and that it was in his own interest to fulfil this role.  Understanding his own limitations in 
knowledge, the louvre supplier then drafted in experts in BIPV laminate technology, micro-
inverter technology and wiring technology to address these limitations.  This understanding - 
that expertise has value, and that although it might come from different sources, it can be 
coordinated to deliver an integrated solution - served to give the louvre supplier a competitive 
advantage and provided clarity of decision-making. 
This discussion shows both that team integration played a key part in the adoption of BIPV 
and that it is far from straightforward.  The prior relationships between actors and the working 
relationships between actors heavily influenced the way that problems were anticipated and 
solved. The role of the systems integrator was often an informal role, but had a key impact on 
the team dynamics. The relationship of the team to BIPV affected the way that the team 
approached the design and installation of the BIPV system.  Finally, the presence and locus of 
BIPV expertise shifted through the project team and often did not reside in one single team 
member.  When it was both present and stable, it brought clarity and focus to the team and 
added value to the contract.  
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 Integration of project processes  9.2.3
The final section on exploring integration is concerned with specific factors which emerged 
from a comparison of processes such as selection of the supply chain; definition of work 
packages; development of design criteria; and division of responsibilities during installation.  
Each of the case studies used the same stages as set out in design and build contracts, but each 
implemented them differently.  Issues of prior commitment to certain service providers, 
timing of the involvement of certain providers and division of work package content resulted 
in significant differences in the outcome for each case. 
The supply chain for Vogue Place has already been discussed.  In terms of process, rather 
than appointing a contractor to design the PV system, the main contractor decided to buy the 
panels directly from the PV laminate suppler and “free issue” them to the façade contractor.  
This reinforced the separation between BIPV and the building façade and discouraged 
integration of these.  In addition, the procurement process favoured by the main contractor 
was to delay issuing of tenders and contracts until as late as possible into the build, so that 
packages could be optimised for the best returns to the contractor.  The façade contract was let 
early on in the project, but the wiring contract was one of the last packages to be defined - the 
building was almost watertight before the wiring system was designed.  This led to problems 
in finalising the design of the façade brackets and very late decisions on wiring runs.  The 
separation of the BIPV electrical contract led to a lack of integration of the BIPV system itself 
and with the building.   
In the case of Future Green, there was no pre-determined supply chain, but the supplier of the 
BIPV glazing panels was fixed by the architect prior to tender.  This made the selection of the 
façade supplier more likely because of an existing close working relationship between the 
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façade supplier and the glazing supplier.  Similar to Vogue Terrace, the early lock in of 
suppliers meant that experience of BIPV was lacking which subsequently reduced the level of 
integration of the BIPV system and the building.  As soon as the main contractor at Synergy 
Court appointed the louvre supplier to provide a turn-key BIPV system, a new supply chain 
was set in train by the louvre supplier around the development of an innovative BIPV system 
which would deliver the generation target.  It would appear that this new supply chain 
benefitted the implementation of BIPV more than the use of an existing supply chain, with its 
associated limitations. 
The pre-tender and tender stages of construction projects involve the division of responsibility 
for elements of the building between suppliers through work package definition.  The case 
studies highlighted different ways that work packages were defined, which affected the 
adoption of BIPV.  In Vogue Terrace, the split between the visible part of the BIPV (the 
panels) and the invisible (the electrical element) was largely determined by the façade 
supplier, who declined to include the BIPV element within the façade contract.  It is striking 
that in Future Green a similar split occurred between the visible and invisible element of the 
BIPV system, but in this instance the tender process meant that work packages were drawn up 
by an external M&E contractor and then awarded by the main contractor.  The effect of this 
distribution of responsibility was that the M&E contractor loaded design portions into the 
work packages which were neither read by the tendering contractors, nor checked by the main 
contractor.  This meant that the whole BIPV electrical system was left un-designed until 
installation and also led to a total lack of integration of the BIPV components.   
A similar division of work packages might have arisen at Synergy Court, had there not been 
an issue with meeting generation targets. It was the insistence of the louvre supplier that there 
was a problem, and the subsequent awarding of the PCSO, which led to the BIPV system 
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being awarded as a turn-key operation to the louvre supplier, thereby ensuring a high level of 
BIPV system and building integration.  It would appear that whilst there is not necessarily one 
single best way to divide up work packages, a clear understanding of the interfaces and 
content of each package is needed if BIPV is to be successfully incorporated into a building. 
Another project process which affected the adoption of BIPV was the development of the 
design criteria for the BIPV system.  Although there was no specific electricity generation 
target for Vogue Terrace, the commitment to use PV technology gave an early focus to 
achieving some electricity generation.  An outline BIPV system was developed by a design 
consultant well before tender, giving some degree of BIPV system integration from an early 
stage. In sharp contrast, the client and architect at Future Green adopted a sizing approach 
which was based on a minimum square meterage of panels rather than a specific generation 
target.  The emphasis on square meterage focussed the design team’s attention on the visible 
aspect of the BIPV system, leaving the electrical part unconsidered.  Synergy Court had a 
clear, negotiated generation target of 1% of the buildings energy usage.  The target was 
challenging and focussed the design efforts around achieving it, thereby pulling the electrical 
and mechanical elements of the design into focus.  The difference in the design criteria used 
on the projects also influenced the way the BIPV system was commissioned.  Whilst all three 
projects required the BIPV laminate glass to be flash tested at the factory, only the louvre 
supplier at Synergy Court understood what these figures meant and how they compared to the 
design requirement.  In Vogue Terrace the façade supplier insisted on an additional test on 
site to confirm that the units were operational before installation.  Final commissioning was 
carried out by the wiring contractor who had no clear performance criteria to check against.  
The commissioning of the BIPV system at Future Green was carried out by the main 
contractor who turned the system on and checked that some electricity was being generated.  
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The commissioning process for Synergy Court was more complex, with an additional 
performance test being carried out at the louvre suppliers’ factory to demonstrate the 
efficiency of the inverter system.  This attention to performance, and the importance placed 
on meeting contract levels of output, ensured that the BIPV system and building were 
integrated.  This discussion indicates that the design criteria used on each project had a major 
influence on the way that the technology was integrated into the building.  
The variation in the way responsibilities were divided between contactors during the 
installation of the BIPV system was different in the case studies and affected how different 
elements of the BIPV system were integrated into the building.  The façade supplier in Vogue 
Terrace viewed the BIPV technology as a source of risk in terms of damaging the integrity of 
the façade system.  The façade supplier insisted that the BIPV brise-soleil panels were 
delivered to their factory where they were fitted into pre-fabricated frames.  The BIPV units 
and the window units were packed into separate stillages and shipped to the construction site 
where they were assembled by the façade supplier’s installation team just prior to erection. 
The BIPV units were fixed to the outside of the window units using pre-positioned brackets.  
The façade supplier would only guarantee the weather-proofness of the façade if the window 
units were fitted without the electrical wiring.  The electrical contractor had to complete his 
work last and guarantee the integrity of coverings lifted and replaced during the electrical 
installation. This approach served to make the components of the BIPV system totally distinct 
and militated against both BIPV system and building integration.   
In contrast, the façade supplier for Future Green arranged for the glazing supplier to ship the 
BIPV glazing units directly to site, where they would be installed by the façade supplier’s 
fitters.  This meant that the units arrived on site with freely dangling electrical leads which 
had not been designed into the frame and which had no pre-defined method of penetrating to 
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the inside of the window frames.  The resulting problem solving ultimately ensured that the 
BIPV units were integrated within the building, but largely as a retro-fit and with a three week 
delay in finishing of the internal fixings.   
The installation of the BIPV assembly in Synergy Court was very different. The louvre 
supplier wished to be able to install all the louvres at his own pace and so developed a novel 
means of using the building BMU hoist to move louvres into position for a team of abseilers 
to install.  This installation system meant that the dependence on the site hoist schedule was 
reduced to a few mass-liftings of louvres onto the roof into a stock-pile for the BMU hoist to 
position.   The other notable difference in installation was the very clear communication 
between the louvre installer and the main electrical contractor and main contractor, making 
sure that boundaries of electrical work were clearly defined and anticipated.  Both of these 
processes contributed considerably to the integration of the BIPV system within the building.  
It is clear from this analysis that procurement processes and design constraints influence the 
eventual installation outcome of the BIPV system.  Echoing the comments in the integration 
of design processes, it would appear that regardless of how work packages or contracts are set 
up, integration at the time of installation needed flexibility from the electrical, façade and 
BIPV suppliers and this is made harder by a rigid application of the work package boundaries.    
Two further factors which had an influence on the integration of the BIPV system and the 
building are the suppliers’ perception of risk from the technology and the effect of social 
artefacts.  In the case of Vogue Terrace, the façade supplier perceived a risk to the façade 
integrity from the incorporation of BIPV and so excluded it from the façade package.  This 
attitude to risk acted as a barrier for integration of the technology with the building.  In the 
case of Synergy Court, the risk of not meeting the generation target acted as a driver for the 
louvre supplier to develop innovative solutions and integrate the BIPV system components.  
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In Future Green, problems of installing the PV panels, frames and wiring risked delays to the 
project schedule and this risk acted as an impulse for problem solving, rather than as a driver 
for innovation and integration.  Similarly, the schedule considerations in Future Green and 
Vogue Terrace made the team take decisions which precluded bold and innovative choices, 
whilst in Synergy Court the need to meet generation targets over-rode schedule considerations 
and allowed for a PCSO to be issued and worked on.  In addition, the schedule served as a foil 
against which to develop an innovative hoist system, so that integrated installation would not 
be unduly influenced by external considerations.  A discussion of the effect of social artefacts 
will be developed further in section 9.3.1. 
This cross case analysis demonstrates that integration cannot be characterised in simple terms, 
but is complex and includes elements of technological integration, team integration and 
process integration.  Differences in the levels and types of integration of the case studies can 
explain the different project outcomes.  
9.3 Dynamics of adoption: technological frames, decisions and co-development 
The discussion above focussed on characterising the integration which occurred during the 
case studies and the way that these different types and levels of integration affected the 
adoption of BIPV.  This section explores the dynamics of adoption in terms of the 
technological frames mobilised, the decisions taken and the types of co-development that took 
place within the case studies, and uses these to consider stabilisation mechanisms which fixed 
particular design features of both BIPV and the building. 
The analysis earlier highlighted three types of co-development which occurred in each case 
study: lock-in; homogeneity of appearance; and mutual adjustment and adaptation, together 
with examples of innovation as the BIPV was integrated within the building.  Each of these 
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types of co-development followed from a series of decisions taken during problem solving 
during the projects.  As described in the previous chapters, the three co-development types 
are: 
 Lock-in: Where a decision is taken which sets or “locks in” particular features or 
characteristics of the technical system, which in turn force subsequent choices. 
 Homogeneity of appearance: where aesthetic considerations and physical constraints 
of the building impose constraints on the BIPV system and vice versa. 
 Mutual adjustment and adaptation of design: where the integration of the BIPV system 
and the building invite or force accommodations to each other. 
These types of co-development and examples of each have been discussed in detail in 
previous chapters.  The discussion which follows uses a comparison between projects to 
explore these types of co-development in more detail and to understand how the changing 
dominant technological frames influenced them.  
Lock in 
This type of co-development type often resulted from discrete decisions being taken as actors 
maintained a single dominant technological frame without seeing or understanding the frames 
of the other actors.  Lock-in is evident in all three case studies, and is most evident at the start 
of each project.  In Vogue Terrace, the client adopted the Risk Minimiser technological frame 
when taking the decision to retain the existing project team and did not anticipate any knock-
on effects which might have been evident if the Design Optimiser frame had also been 
mobilised.  This decision led to a lock-in of experience (or inexperience) with the technology, 
which in turn, led to the rejection of a turn-key BIPV package and a de-coupling between the 
BIPV system and the façade.   
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The client in Future Green mobilised the Cost Watcher frame to gain ERDF funding and this 
locked-in the use of PV technology.  Later the client’s desire for a visible statement of 
sustainability (Green Guardian frame) dominated the decision-making and locked-in the use 
of BIPV even though other less visible, cheaper technologies were available.  The architect 
chose thin film technology whilst mobilising the Design Aesthete frame and this decision 
locked-in the sizing of widows and glazing panels.  In Synergy Court the client’s desire for 
the design to have four interconnected towers (User frame) locked-in the PV generation 
figure, whilst the new curved roof-shape (Design Aesthete) locked-in the available generation 
potential for the BIPV system.  
In all of these examples, decisions were taken without reference to other technological frames 
or in opposition to other technological frames.  The dominance of a single frame resulted in 
the co-development type of lock-in.  In two cases, lock-in resulted in innovation - the louvre 
supplier in Synergy Court developed an innovative BIPV system using Q cells and micro-
inverters, whilst the façade supplier in Vogue Terrace developed an innovative bracketry 
system to house the BIPV wiring.  Lock-in can force a direction of design which may conflict 
with one or more of the frames of the project actors, thus forcing a design innovation to 
counter this. 
Homogeneity of appearance 
Homogeneity of appearance is different from lock-in and results in less innovation and rather 
more incremental adjustments.  This type of co-development occurs where the appearance of 
the BIPV technology and the building are interconnected and a series of decisions are taken 
which influence the appearance of one or both of these.  The decisions are often taken by 
actors mobilising two frames - that of the Design Aesthete and one other, often the Design 
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Optimiser.  The clearest example of this in Future Green was when the architect mobilised the 
Design Aesthete frame to select thin film technology and the glazing supplier mobilised the 
Design Optimiser frame to suggest suitable glazing sizes.  The architect was able to bring 
together these two frames to design windows which took into account limitations of the 
technology but which were also aesthetically acceptable.  For Synergy Court, the blue PV 
cells within the BIPV louvres made the BIPV louvres conspicuous on the building roof, 
which was unacceptable to the architect (Design Aesthete frame).  Grey PV cells were ruled 
out by the louvre supplier on grounds of reduced generation (Generation Maximiser frame) 
and the architect decided to match the technology and provide aesthetic homogeneity by 
adding a pattern of perforations to neighbouring non-BIPV roof louvres.  In the case of Vogue 
Terrace, the architect worked with the design consultant to reduce the number of PV brise-
soleil louvres (Cost Watcher) while still retaining an aesthetic balance of PV and non-PV 
louvres on the façade (Design Aesthete).  This new layout meant that the layout of the 
building elevation was complicated by grouping of PV and non-PV units which later 
complicated wiring schemes.  Unlike decisions shaped by lock in, these incremental 
adjustments to the building and BIPV system appeared to happen without many of the actors 
being aware of them, although the results of those decisions had major effects on the 
appearance of the building and in some cases the performance of the BIPV system. 
Mutual adjustments and adaptations 
Co-development by mutual adjustments and adaptations of both the BIPV system and the 
building describes a type of co-development which results from the physical intersection of 
the technology and the building and tends to follow an integrated decision-making mode, 
where different actors mobilising different technological frames come together to resolve 
problems.  In this type of co-development the Design Optimiser frame was often dominant, 
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but what is also noticeable was that the actors involved in the decision-making were able to 
see the problem through different technological frames and align these frames to find a 
solution.  The process of arriving at a solution tended to be collaborative in nature and either 
gave rise to a “least-worst” option being adopted or resulted in innovation.  In Vogue Terrace, 
the need to physically house the BIPV cables gave rise to an innovative channelling and 
bracketry solution with hidden cable ways and an integrated capping system.  This allowed 
for the cables to be retro-fitted by the wiring contractor once the façade contracts had been 
completed.  In Synergy Court, the need to lay the cables off as the louvres were installed led 
to the development of a series of collector box stations with plug-and-play junctions.  Less 
beneficial examples point to more ad-hoc decisions taken to minimise the impact of schedules 
or risk, which caused unanticipated knock-on effects later in the project.  In Vogue Terrace, 
the seemingly arbitrary decision by the PV laminate supplier to increase the laminate 
thickness by 1mm led to heavier bracketry design.  This change in loading on the fixing bolts 
went unnoticed by the façade supplier and the bolts were not stiffened.  Ultimately this 
resulted in distortion of the fixing bolts after installation.  In Synergy Court, the timing of 
electrical contractor works led to the louvre supplier having to make assumptions about the 
locations of collector boxes and to over-estimate the lengths of cables “to be on the safe side”.  
The same ad-hoc decision-making was evident in Future Green when the glazing units arrived 
on site and a way of accommodating the flying cables had to be found.  Collaborative or 
integrated decision-making finally provided an acceptable way of drilling through the frames 
to get the cables inside the building, but this had a number of knock-on effects, including 
delays, re-work and risk to the water-tightness of the frames.  There was little other evidence 
of this decision pathway in Future Green - possibly because the BIPV was only really seen as 
window panels and never seen as an integrated system.   
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This discussion shows that the co-development types of lock-in, homogeneity of appearance 
and mutual adjustments corresponded to different decision modes.  Lock-in was seen to be 
associated with innovative or radical decision-making, allowing innovation to occur.  The co-
development mode of homogeneity of appearance gave rise to incremental decision-making 
which allowed discrete episodes of co-development to occur.  Finally, the co-development 
modes addressing mutual adjustment gave rise to collaborative decision-making, which let co-
development flow as the elements of the BIPV system and building influenced each other, 
sometimes resulting in innovation. 
Within each case study analysis the role of the social artefact was evident in the process of co-
development and the following section explores this interrelationship further.  
 The role of social artefacts 9.3.1
In all three cases social artefacts had a major effect on the co-development of the projects.  In 
both Vogue Terrace and Synergy Court planning policy shaped the initial development of the 
schemes and the mutual constitution of the technology and building.  The Merton Rule 
combined with the local planning strategy for building design drove the generation output 
target and the building shape for Synergy Court.  In Vogue Terrace, the need for a 
sustainability strategy to achieve planning consent drove the decision to use photovoltaic 
technology on that project. Both of these resulted in the ultimate direction of the buildings.  
Future Green’s use of PV technology was driven by meeting funding requirements rather than 
planning requirements, For both Future Green and Vogue Terrace the client decided that 
BIPV (rather than roof mounted PV panels) would give a statement of sustainability to the 
building, whilst for Synergy Court, the use of BIPV became fixed when the outline of the 
building roof became stabilised and roof mounted panels became impossible to fit.  
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Contract definition and work package specifications had major impacts on the co-
development of the BIPV technology and the buildings.  In Vogue Terrace the fixed 
procurement method constrained the content of the work packages.  In Future Green the work 
packages and design portions defined artificial boundaries between the BIPV components and 
the building, which effectively held back co-development until the components arrived on 
site.  In contrast, the tender documents used in Synergy Court served to drive a guarantee of 
output and put in train a series of co-developments which brought about an innovative and 
integrated project.  
The project schedule was a third social artefact driving co-development, providing a point of 
consensus between actors as problems had to be solved to allow the project to proceed on 
time.  With Vogue Terrace this allowed innovation in respect of the cableway design to be 
developed, and in a smaller way the installation schedule focussed the suppliers in Future 
Green to find a way to get the cables inside the frames in Future Green.  The schedule 
constraints in Synergy Court drove the innovation of using the BMU hoist for the louvre 
installation.   
Social artefacts can therefore be seen to be important factors in the co-development of the 
BIPV system and the building and can force lock-in or facilitate innovation.  The case studies 
showed the influence of social artefacts in the decision-making process as they framed the 
technological view of the Cost Watchers, Time Sentries and Risk Minimisers.  However 
further analysis of the effect and interrelationship of these social artefacts fell outside the 
scope of this research and further analysis and research would be needed to explore this area 
more.  
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9.4 Summary 
This cross case analysis has explored key themes of integration and the dynamics of co-
development and has highlighted some of the differences between the three cases.  Integration 
cannot be characterised in simple terms, but is complex and includes elements of 
technological integration, team integration and process integration.  The mobilisation of 
different technological frames by the project actors influenced the way decisions were taken 
in the projects and affected the co-development of the BIPV system and the building.  Project 
processes (like work package specification and installation) and the role of social artefacts are 
not obvious influences, but both have been shown to affect the adoption of BIPV.  The 
following chapter moves on to interpret the case study analysis and re-engage with the 
literature on innovation adoption, to address the specific research question of how the mutual 
articulation of a building and the technology develops as BIPV is incorporated within a 
building. 
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 Discussion Chapter 10:
This research explored the micro-level dynamics surrounding the adoption of innovative 
technology in three buildings.  The three case studies and the comparative analysis which 
followed showed that adoption of BIPV within a construction project is more than a single 
moment; rather it is a complex process around which much can be observed, but about which 
there has not been significant empirical enquiry or theoretical development.   
The cross case analysis (Chapter 9) utilised two general themes to reflect on the data from 
each case study - integration and the dynamics of co-development.  Examination of the 
integration process highlighted three distinct types of integration: technological integration; 
team integration; and process integration.  Each gave different insights into the adoption 
process.  Exploration of the dynamics of co-development showed three types of co-
development - lock in, homogeneity of appearance, and mutual adjustment - each of which 
resulted from different ways of making decisions.  Analysis of the co-development of the 
building and technology drew attention to the role of social artefacts in during the adoption of 
innovation. 
This chapter moves from an analysis of the three specific cases to a re-engagement with the 
literature on the adoption of technology.  The review and discussion in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
identified a broad range of literatures which are relevant for the understanding of the adoption 
of innovative technology.  The review began by exploring research into the performance gap 
and showed that the adoption of innovation could not be accounted for by a purely 
technological view of adoption, and established a link with literature on the process of 
innovation.  It went on to explore the adoption of innovation from the perspective of the 
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process innovation approach and finished by linking six characteristics of innovation adoption 
from the process of innovation approach to themes of processes innovation within 
construction management literature at the level of buildings.  The following discussion 
outlines the findings from the case studies and explores how these contribute to the previously 
discussed literatures.  The chapter concludes with a reflection on the contribution of this study 
to research into the adoption of integrated technologies. 
10.1 The complexity of innovation adoption: the contribution of the performance 
gap and the importance of the local context. 
The case studies have shown that the adoption of BIPV cannot be contained within a single, 
simple model and is far more complex than a single stage in an innovation model would 
suggest.  When considering integrated technologies, a better understanding of the mutual 
constitution of the technology and its context is needed. 
This research has demonstrated that that BIPV technology is not only affected by its local 
context, but also shapes that context.  Slaughter (1998) identified that system innovations  
were different from the four types of innovation developed by Henderson and Clark (1990).  
Slaughter (Slaughter, 2010a; Slaughter, 2010b) drew attention to the importance of 
understanding the commitment of resources needed to assist adoption and suggested that 
attention be paid at the initiation of the project to the implications of innovation on the project 
supply chain.  The case studies reinforce Slaughter’s call for early consideration of innovation 
and its effect on adoption, but show that this is in tension with standard project stages and 
processes.  In addition analysis of the case studies has shown that the performance of the 
assemblage of the innovation should be considered, rather than just its impact in the project 
process.   
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The literature review established that local planning requirements and building certification 
schemes like BREEAM may lead to unexpected consequences for the adoption of sustainable 
technology (Russell and Thomson, 2009; Schweber, 2014).  The analysis of the case studies 
supported this view.  Instead of adding clarity and focus to the adoption process, the effect of 
policy and certification was mixed.  In two of the cases resulted in fragmented adoption, with 
BIPV systems being installed which did not make any significant contribution to electricity 
production.  A surprising aspect of the three case studies was the lack of consistent design 
criteria for the BIPV systems.  BREEAM and EPC certification required only a particular 
square meterage of panels for Future Green, whilst the requirements for Vogue Terrace were 
vague - only that renewable capability be included.  In contrast, the challenging specific 
generation target of Synergy Court focussed the design efforts around achieving the required 
output, thus focussing attention on both the electrical and mechanical elements of the design 
to produce an efficient BIPV system which delivered the required output.   
As these examples suggest, the relationship between adoption and planning and regulation is 
not simple.  The case studies support observations that the requirements of certification 
schemes like BREEAM can sometimes obscure their original purpose of encouraging 
sustainable building (Schweber, 2013) and do not necessarily improve adoption.  The 
availability of Feed-in-Tariffs for electricity generated by the BIPV systems did not have any 
effect on adoption in the case studies.  Not one of the actors on any case study mentioned 
Feed-in-Tariffs at all, which would seem to contradict some authors (Lowe, 2007; Yang & 
Zou, 2015) who argue that Feed-in-Tariff and other financial incentives would increase 
adoption of green technologies by driving the delivery of efficient systems to maximise 
income from the electricity generated.  This difference might be accounted for in part by the 
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particular nature of commercial building projects where the client is very rarely responsible 
for post occupancy energy use. 
The systemic nature of BIPV makes its adoption particularly challenging.  The technology is 
comprised of different components which make up the BIPV system and relies on a process 
of component selection, matching and configuration to provide an electrical output.  To a 
large extent, the efficiency of the BIPV system depends on the degree to which the 
components have been matched and configured (Chapter 2).  The plethora of options for 
component choice and configuration allows unique solutions to be developed for each 
application, but also means that there is no single accepted convention in terms of component 
selection, matching and configuration.  In terms of adoption, this lack of standardisation 
creates problems of understanding and communication across the project team.    
The case studies showed how the bespoke nature of BIPV allowed for multiple configurations 
of design and appealed to users with multiple requirements.  Vogue Terrace used BIPV brise-
soleil to provide aesthetics and shading, Future Green used BIPV as glazing and to provide a 
visible statement of sustainability and Synergy Court used BIPV roof fins to generate 
electricity.  It has been suggested that better design of components, both in terms of technical 
improvements to performance (Sozer & Elnimeiri, 2007), standardisation of interfaces 
(Pagliaro et al., 2010) and better reliability (Laird, 2009b) will facilitate adoption.  However 
the bespoke nature of high end commercial buildings and the variety of ways in which BIPV 
is integrated into buildings makes these component focussed factors less useful in analysing 
adoption of BIPV.   
In two of the three cases (Vogue Terrace and Future Green) the only BIPV systems design 
was carried out at the scoping stage of the project and this was only in very outline form - 
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establishing how many inverters would be needed and what square meterage of PV cells 
would be required.  Before detail design could be undertaken (more than a year later), the 
project manager had split the BIPV system into its mechanical (PV cells and laminate) and 
electrical (wiring, inverters and control system) components, and the BIPV system was never 
designed as an integrated whole.  Even if technological advances in individual components 
had been made, the team would still have had difficulties in matching components, optimising 
output and anticipating problems because of the way in which the projects are delivered.  It is 
interesting to reflect that there is very little literature which focusses on designing efficient, 
integrated BIPV systems, and that the current focus on improving individual components can 
only go part of the way to facilitating adoption.  Section 11.6 reflects on the importance of 
identifying integrating interfaces early in projects before work packages are assigned to 
ensure that the distribution of work packages reflects the demands of integrated technologies. 
The literature review established that adoption of technology is not a simple, one-way process 
of adoption and that analysis of the “performance gap” (differences between design 
performance and achieved performance of technology) can be used to understand some of the 
difficulties involved (Gorse et al., 2012; Dainty et al., 2013; Fedoruk et al., 2015).  Authors 
who discuss the performance gap assume that targets for technologies or innovation 
performance are clear and have been concerned with either technical robustness (Yang, 2015), 
correct installation of technologies (Gorse, 2012) or optimising construction processes (ZHC, 
2014, Dainty et al., 2013).  Analysis of the three case studies supported using the performance 
gap to understand adoption, demonstrating that misunderstandings about the technology and 
lack of clarity around design and performance targets affected adoption.  Data from the case 
studies showed that this lack of clarity extended to the commissioning and testing of the BIPV 
system.  Adoption was complicated in the case studies by confusing generation targets, ill-
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thought out commissioning procedures, and varying weather conditions over the period of 
commissioning.   
It is particularly difficult to establish the output of BIPV systems other than in laboratory 
controlled conditions - electricity generation depends on ambient conditions and varies from 
day to day, season to season and year to year.  A BIPV system commissioned in the summer 
months would have very different output figures for the same system commissioned in the 
winter.  In the case studies commissioning generally took place, or was expected to take 
place, over the period of a few days and the time of year for commissioning varied.  Only one 
of the BIPV systems (Synergy Court) was installed with any form of on-line performance 
monitoring software.  The other two case studies just had on/off lights on the inverters and a 
built-in display on the export meter showing instantaneous output and accumulated 
generation.  Both the inverters and export meters in Vogue Terrace and Future Green were 
hidden, either on the roof or within the building, and were not part of the BMS system.   
Although indirectly connected to the process of adoption, these points contribute to research 
on performance gap by showing that the process of understanding performance gap is not as 
simple as “just” measuring achieved results against predicted values.  Neither the target 
generation figure nor the way of measuring achieved performance is straightforward.  In 
research little attention has been paid to the initial lack of target generation figures on projects 
and to the difficulty of measuring the achieved output - over what period and by whom. 
In addition to issues with performance gap and system design, BIPV has to be integrated 
within the multiple elements of a building and so is a “system within a system”. The case 
studies showed that this two-fold nature of BIPV proved challenging both in terms of system 
design and for its incorporation in construction projects.  The bespoke character of BIPV 
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would suggest that the BIPV system and the building would be designed together.  However, 
the data did not support this and pointed to an independence of design which often came 
together only at the point at which the technology was integrated within the building.  This 
demonstrated that the integrated characteristics of the BIPV technology were often obscured, 
as the technology was treated as a series of components which had to be accommodated 
within the building.  For example the inverters needed to be housed on the roof of Vogue 
Terrace,  the wires from the windows in Future Green had to be drawn into the building  and 
the frames of Vogue Terrace has to accommodate the BIPV wiring.  What was missing in two 
of the three case studies (Vogue Terrace and Future Green) was firstly, recognition and 
understanding of the integrated nature of BIPV and second, any one individual who both 
understood the nature of the technology and championed it.  This observation contrasts with  
literature on innovation leadership which focusses on the importance of the role of innovation 
champions in driving innovation through an organisation (Nam & Tatum, 1997; Gambatese & 
Hallowell, 2011), but which does not identify the need to consider the nature of the 
innovation itself.  Section 10.3.4 expands on this link to leadership in innovation literature.  In 
many ways these observations on the lack of front end design of integrated systems applies to 
all the systems in the building or which form part of the building and this highlights the 
complexity of modern buildings, the increased challenges for the designers and their difficult 
task of spinning many plates at one time. 
10.2 Processual view of innovation adoption  
Process innovation research analysed innovation adoption in terms of a number of social 
patterns  (Van de Ven et al. 1989) but analysis of the case studies has given a view of the 
adoption process which includes the dynamic relationship between the materiality of the 
technology and the building, and the social interactions of the project team.  Findings have 
Chapter 10: Discussion 
303 
 
shown that although process innovation research is primarily considered in terms of 
developing tools for managers of innovation, the approach can be used to frame innovation 
adoption as a more socio-technical process.  
10.3 Adoption of innovation in the context of construction projects 
A second key contribution of this study concerns the specificity of construction projects as a 
context for technology adoption.  The study draws attention to  the limitations that standard 
project procurement processes place on the adoption of technology. 
 The nature of construction projects and implications for adoption of BIPV 10.3.1
Turning to the dynamic nature of the adoption process, the literature review established that 
there is a link between the integrated nature of technological innovation and an ongoing 
process of accommodation as the technology is incorporated into its local context.  The 
preceding sections have outlined the characteristics of both BIPV and construction projects 
and shown how they influence adoption.  It is perhaps implicit that the coming together of 
these complex systems of components multiplies the issues and complications in shaping 
adoption.  It is therefore too simplistic to consider the building as a simple fixed system into 
which BIPV fits.  A building comprises many systems (HVAC, lighting, electrical supply, 
services etc.) which are all brought together through project management.  BIPV is just one of 
those interrelated systems, but brings particular challenges because its performance is dictated 
by the building configuration.  What is clear in the case studies was that the points of friction 
- where the interconnectedness of the BIPV system and other parts of the building occurred - 
were not apparent from the outset of the project, but were stumbled upon at unexpected points 
as the projects proceeded, often coming as a surprise to the project team.   
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In terms of the research question posed at the start, it is clear that adoption of new technology 
is a complex process which results in a three-way mutual articulation of the BIPV system, the 
building and the project team which manages the process.  Analysis of the case studies has 
shown that three different types of co-development of the BIPV system and the building 
occurred and that the way that technological frames were mobilised by the actors determined 
how decisions were made during the projects and how these co-development types came 
about.  Integrated decision-making occurred when actors had the flexibility and awareness to 
mobilise multiple technological frames and often resulted in the development of innovative 
solutions which simplified adoption.  On the other hand, actors making limited use of 
technological frames made more discrete decisions, without reference to the effects of the 
decisions on either the BIPV system itself or on the building, and these decisions resulted in a 
rather disjointed and ad-hoc adoption process. 
The case studies supported the view that the complexity of construction projects masks 
instances of innovation as projects proceed (Winch, 2003; Reichstein et al., 2005; Harty, 
2008).  There were many examples of innovation in the case studies. The louvre supplier at 
Synergy Court advocated the use of micro inverters, the façade supplier and glazing supplier 
for Future Green worked out how to accommodate frames and wiring, and the architect for 
Vogue Terrace experimented with a white interlayer on the BIPV louvres.  These examples 
from the case studies support Winch (2003) in his assertion that the construction sector does 
adopt innovation and they point to many examples of discrete adoption happening at different 
times within a project.  The challenge for construction is to bring these discrete innovations 
into view and use integrated decision-making to facilitate adoption of innovation.  
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 The management of projects, change and decisions 10.3.2
Project Processes and Procedures 
This section focusses the discussion on the mechanics of project work in terms of project 
processes. This draws attention to the limitations that standard project procurement processes 
place on the adoption of technology.  
The literature review established that ideals of project management include timely work 
package definition and tender, increased collaboration and continuity, and a fixed project 
schedule (Cooke-Davis, 2002).  These particular ways of working did not support the 
adoption of BIPV and analysis of the case studies explored the tension between these ideals of 
project management practice within the industry and the adoption of innovative technology.   
Conventional mechanical and electrical demarcations created artificial barriers between parts 
of the BIPV system.  Another negative effect of standard project practice was the joining and 
leaving of project actors throughout the project.  In Vogue Terrace the main contractor 
involved in the initial design phase was a different person to the main contractor responsible 
for managing the detail design and construction stages, and the façade supplier at the tender 
stage was a different person to the façade supplier responsible for delivering the design.  
Changing project personnel as a result of standard Design and Build practices meant that the 
rationale or history behind decisions was lost and knowledge was siloed amongst project team 
members.   
The analysis of the case studies drew attention to the relationship between standard 
construction project procurement processes and the adoption of BIPV.  All three case study 
projects were based on Design and Build contracts with clear project stages and processes.  In 
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two of the case studies these standard processes - of developing work packages and selecting 
firms to tender - had a negative effect on the design and integration of the BIPV system into 
the building.  Early division of design work between mechanical and electrical disciplines, 
and the very early development of work packages before detail BIPV system design had taken 
place, made it difficult to integrate all the elements of the BIPV system and for an assessment 
of the whole BIPV system performance to take place.  Similarly, the process of tender and 
awarding of contracts relied on previous relationships and understanding affected the ability 
of the contractor to deliver the work package, in one case resulting in a redrafting of the work 
package to suit the expertise of the contractor.  These practical findings contrast to more 
theoretically based literature on the awarding of contracts in construction projects which tends 
to focus on construction project management and law (Clough et al., 2000; Murdoch & 
Hughes, 2002), risk allocation (Loosemore & McCarthy, 2008), or analysis of delay and 
dispute (Fenn et al., 1997).  The effect of issuing the contracts for the BIPV was evident at the 
design and installation stage, where the siloed way of working within work packages created 
artificial boundaries between parts of the BIPV system and the building.  Façade installers did 
not consider the way that wires would penetrate the façade until close to installation and the 
siting of cable runs and inverters was not considered by the main contractor until the main 
electrical work was carried out.  It would seem that the contracts generated artificial 
boundaries between the contracts which were not picked up by the project design coordinator 
role.  These artificial boundaries became evident at points of friction, where different parts of 
the BIPV system intersected with each other or with other parts of the building. 
One additional tension between project stages and adoption is illustrated by the unwillingness 
of suppliers to engage heavily in projects before contracts are signed.  This reluctance springs 
from the fear that they will give away their specialised knowledge without gaining the 
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contract.  In Vogue Terrace the PV laminate supplier did not engage fully with the architect 
before contracts were signed and in Synergy Court it was only the PCSO that allowed the 
louvre supplier to design the BIPV system.  It appeared that the standard project processes 
discouraged suppliers from putting detailed design of the BIPV system into the early stages of 
the project because of the uncertainty of winning tenders and potentially giving information to 
competitors.  These findings add a more practical element to construction literature on pre-
tender design which focusses on the gap between pre-tender and post tender design by 
researching the accuracy of pre-tender cost estimates (Skitmore & Picken, 2000, McCaffer et 
al., 1984) or the study of post contract award design changes (Cox et al., 1999).   
This use of contracts to guard against risk rather than to enable the project is highlighted by 
Sage et al (2010) and the empirical evidence from two of the case studies supports this 
observation.  In Vogue Terrace the façade contractor privileged risk to the façade integrity 
over supply of an integrated BIPV system; in Future Green the electrical design portion for 
BIPV was put into the main M&E contract so that inadequacies of early design were passed 
along the supply chain.  Challenging the status quo and changing the way that work packages 
were allocated only occurred in one of the case studies (Synergy Court) when the louvre 
supplier identified a risk of not meeting generation targets. It was the insistence of the louvre 
supplier that there was a problem, and the subsequent awarding of the pre-contract design 
order (PCSO), which led to the BIPV system being awarded as a turn-key operation to the 
louvre supplier, thereby ensuring a high level of system and building integration.  Slaughter 
(Slaughter, 2010a; Slaughter, 2010b) drew attention to the importance of understanding the 
commitment of resources needed to assist adoption and suggested that attention be paid at the 
initiation of the project to the implications of innovation on the project supply chain.  The 
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case studies reinforce Slaughter’s call for early consideration of innovation and its effect on 
adoption, but show that this is in tension with standard project stages and processes. 
The final part of this section considers two issues, both related to contracts: content of the 
work package contract, and the effect of the contract on the eventual BIPV system 
performance.  Gruneberg et al.’s (2007) suggestion that performance-based contracting (PBC) 
could ensure that operational benefits of integrated technologies are achieved and might 
facilitate the process of adoption is supported by the analysis.  In two of the case studies there 
were differences between what was specified in the work package by the main contractor (or 
his agent), what was put into the tender document by the supplier, and what was delivered at 
installation.  In Future Green the main contractor asked the M&E consultant to draw up the 
work packages for both the electrical and mechanical parts of the BIPV system.  The 
electrical work package contained a substantial design portion clause, but the package detail 
was not read by the main contractor prior to being given out to tender.  The supplier submitted 
the tender back to the main contractor, but had not read the requirement for the design 
portion.  The main contractor awarded the contract but was not aware of the detail requested 
in the original call for tender, or its omission that from the tender bid.  The supplier did not 
carry out the design portion and consequently the electrical system was not designed and the 
inverter was not ordered.  The only time the contracts were examined was when the design 
omission was noticed at installation.   
None of the case studies had contractual arrangements in place for final commissioning of the 
BIPV system and the monitoring of its performance.  Future Green had an on/off method of 
commissioning that did not require any performance data from the BIPV system.  Vogue 
Terrace had not defined a commissioning schedule and at Synergy Court the louvre supplier 
was to have completed installation and moved off site long before the commissioning of the 
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BIPV system was to occur.  These examples illustrate some limitations of current contractual 
arrangements and indicate that changes to these processes should be considered when 
integrated technologies are specified on projects. 
It is clear from the analysis of the case studies that the procurement process influenced the 
eventual installation outcome of the BIPV system and that the current system of 
commissioning contracts did not support optimisation of BIPV system performance.   
Change Management 
In construction literature change management is largely analysed in terms of a hindrance to 
projects in terms of cost over runs and reduced project efficiency (Love et al., 2002; Joskow 
& Rose, 1985).  The case study analysis in this research appears to support a more positive 
interpretation of change and the potential upsides to deviations from the original project 
specification (Shipton et al., 2014).  Given the long lead times of construction projects, rapid 
technological changes of components in the BIPV system occurred as the projects proceeded.  
These technological developments made a contribution to the efficiencies and outputs of the 
BIPV system and in some cases made it possible for the system to operate at all.  In Vogue 
Terrace, advances in wiring technology and inverters made it possible to fit the BIPV wires 
into the brise-soleil frames and site the inverters on the roof.  In Synergy Court, the use of 
micro inverters meant that the generation targets could be met.  It could be argued that 
flexibility to adopt technological innovations positively enabled progress, rather than being a 
herald of inefficiency and poor management.   
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Decision making 
Analysis from the three case studies highlights the influence that types of decision-making 
had on the adoption of BIPV and on the type of innovation itself.  Integrated decision-making 
in Synergy Court led to a radical innovation in terms of the adoption of a micro-inverter 
system.  The discrete decisions made in Future Green resulted in very neatly spaced PV cells 
which obscured the view from the windows and which generated very little electricity.  
Larsen (2005) explored how different concepts of adoption resonated with the empirical data 
at different stages within a project and this appears to be mirrored in the different types of 
decision-making at different stages within the case studies.  In the case of Future Green, the 
integrated decision-making mode used at the beginning of the project allowed the team to 
focus on the issue of sustainability as a whole.  This led to a holistic solution with clear 
specifications for the proposed BIPV system.  However, when the thin film PV technology 
proved to be unavailable, the architect adopted a discrete decision-making mode and agreed to 
the substitution of monocrystalline cell technology, without linking the decision back to 
issues of generation or functionality which resulted from this decision.  The main contractor’s 
use of the discrete decision-making mode in deciding work package allocations set the scene 
for the fragmented development of the BIPV system and a series of problems at the interfaces 
of both the BIPV system and the contractors.  The integrated decision-making mode helped to 
address the local issues on site, and encouraged innovative problem solving.  However, it 
could not alter the effect of the earlier discrete decision-making mode, which had locked-in 
opaque windows and low generation outputs from an early stage for the project.   
From the discussion of the literature on decision making in Chapter 3, it is clear that despite 
research which acknowledges the need to understand decision making which occurs in 
complex project networks (Taylor & Levitt, 2007), there is a paucity of empirical research 
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which looks at the effects of decision making on the technical innovation itself.  This 
empirical research of the adoption of BIPV shows that as well as the need to recognise the 
key roles of individuals within project networks (Keast & Hampson, 2007b) and the  
complexity of communication within projects (Chinowsky et al., 2008; Bakht & El-Diraby, 
2015), that different decision modes directly affect both the performance of the technology 
and subsequent chains of decisions making.   
The understanding of the decision-making modes and the resulting co-development of the 
building and BIPV also contributes to research on the dynamics of innovation in projects, and 
to the discussion of innovation types and their effects.  Garud and Karnoe (2003) explored the 
idea of decision pathways being divided between breakthrough and bricolage, postulating that 
continual development of ideas (bricolage) was more likely to support innovation over the 
longer term than a series of jumps in technological solutions (breakthrough).  The findings 
from this research suggest that the mutual articulation of the building and BIPV is a form of 
bricolage and that different types of co-development support different types of innovation.   
Analysis of the three case studies has shown that innovation occurred during co-development 
of the BIPV system and the building, and was often the result of a need to solve problems 
associated with lock-in.  Innovation was almost always associated with a coming together of 
experts to address the problem, which resulted in the exchange of views and the development 
of new solutions.  In the context of the adoption of BIPV it is sometimes difficult to judge 
when an innovation is just that, and not merely a development.  Although not a new question 
(it has been much debated in wider innovation literature (Ruttan, 1959; Sexton and Barrett, 
2003)), this distinction can blur the recognition that innovation occurred in each case study.  
The preceding analysis adds to the empirical evidence that innovation does not stop at 
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adoption (Fleck, 1988; Williams and Edge, 1996), but continues as the BIPV system is 
incorporated into the building 
 Shifting performance criteria 10.3.3
The empirical evidence from the three case studies clearly shows that shifting performance 
criteria for the project actors have an important impact on the adoption of technology.  Use of 
SCOT and the identification of technological frames highlighted the way in which project 
actors used different criteria to assess the technology and to make decisions at different times 
of the project.  Process innovation research showed how criteria shift in a project in terms of 
different interests of project personnel (Van de Ven et al., 1989), but the case study findings 
show that these different perspectives are not contained within individual roles, but are taken 
up and then dropped by each actor at different times in the project. The issue that this 
observation raises is how to establish the visibility of criteria associated with the innovation’s 
performance, rather than the more obvious goals of project delivery and cost.   
 Leadership of innovation 10.3.4
The need for increased capability and support for innovation adoption (Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975; Heinstein et al., 2013) is easy to see, but analysis of the data highlights the 
distributed nature of knowledge across many actors (for example architect, M&E designer, 
suppliers and main contractor).  Each had a role to play in the design and adoption of BIPV, 
but their knowledge and capabilities about the technology varied widely. 
This observation about the distributed nature of knowledge about BIPV amongst the project 
team introduces the role of innovation champion.  The literature review established that the 
role of a champion to push through adoption of an innovation was important, but that opinion 
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was divided over whether the role should be located within the project team (Nam & Tatum, 
1997) or within the client organisation (Gambatese & Hallowell, 2011).  This research shows 
that in each case study, rather than there being a single innovation champion, there was an 
informal role of BIPV systems integrator.  This term refers to the actor concerned with 
developing the BIPV system as a whole and resided in a different location within the project, 
shifted between project actors and came to the fore at different stages of the project.  
Building on the idea that the systems integrator is a shifting, informal role within a project 
team, it also follows that there does not have to be a single BIPV champion watching over the 
successful integration of the BIPV system.  Rather than having one champion who pushes the 
innovation’s adoption (Gambatese & Hallowell, 2011), the observations from the case studies 
suggest that innovation adoption relied on multiple actors informally taking up the challenge 
at different times.  The actor assuming the role of systems integrator took ownership for 
bringing together actors responsible for particular aspects of the BIPV system or building 
design and resolving problems in the project.  The other project team actors perceived that the 
systems integrator was now an “expert” who had the requisite knowledge to guide decision-
making and so they had no need to develop an understanding of the BIPV system themselves.  
As the person fulfilling the task of systems integrator changed through the projects, so did the 
perceived locus of expertise and so responsibility for the BIPV system design moved through 
the project team without anyone actually formally assuming responsibility.  In this way, by 
the end of two of the case studies the BIPV systems had been implemented without ever 
having been designed. 
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 The temporary and evolving nature of project teams 10.3.5
Process Innovation research has pointed to both the issue of evolving project teams and to the 
possible negative effects in terms of loss of knowledge and relationships (Angle & Van de 
Ven, 1989).  The SCOT analysis of the case studies allows clear interpretation of the effect on 
the building, technology and project team as new actors become involved with the project.  
Other parts of the discussion have highlighted issues of continuity and collaboration, but in 
summary the effects can have positive outcomes in terms of allowing new knowledge and 
solutions to be included.    
 Managing the supply chain 10.3.6
The literature review established that the supply chain of a construction project has a 
complicated series of relationships and obligations which are typically bound through 
complex contractual arrangements (Sinclair, 2012).  Within the formal systemic arrangements 
and interdependencies, there are informal systems, relationships and procedures which further 
complicate adoption.  The following section discusses the dynamics of adoption across the 
supply chain and the challenges of integration.   
Each case study had a different way of allocating responsibility: both formally (through 
project processes); and informally (through informal alliances or with mechanisms like the 
systems integrator).  The dynamics at work across the supply chain could be considered using 
the concept of relative boundedness (Harty, 2010), which recognised that the envisaged 
outcome of an innovation is often different to the result achieved and that these differences 
can to some extent be accounted for by the varying degrees of interdependence within the 
supply chain.  The case studies provide insights into additional ways that relative 
boundedness might be considered, by showing that standard project processes themselves 
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may bound decision-making and change the outcome of an innovation.  An illustration of this 
is that in Vogue Terrace the tender process was bounded - it was tightly defined and 
controlled by the project manager - and this set the direction for the de-coupling of the 
mechanical and electrical elements of the installation. In the case of Synergy Court, the 
planning process imposed a bounded decision-making process which locked-in the generation 
targets and set the direction of subsequent co-development.  Harty recognised the complexity 
of the adoption process in construction projects and called for the collection of more empirical 
evidence. This research provides some of that evidence and demonstrates how the 
interdependencies between technological innovation and its context come together to shape 
both the technology and the building. 
The case studies contradicted the idea that close working relationships and integrated 
processes and procedures aid the adoption of innovation (Egan, 1998; Wolstenholme, 2009).  
The BIPV case studies illustrated some negative effects on the supply chain of long-term 
relationships, collaborations and alliances.  In Vogue Terrace the previous relationship 
between the main contractor and the façade supplier seemed to give the façade supplier an 
“easy pass” to decline to include the BIPV system within his work package.  In Future Green, 
the easy working relationship between the façade supplier and the glazing supplier allowed 
design difficulties to be glossed over without being addressed, and the past collaboration 
between the architect and glazing supplier made the architect accepting of the new technology 
without questioning its effect.  It was only in Synergy Court, where the louvre supplier 
insisted on changing the status quo by supplying a turn-key BIPV system, that a new supply 
chain was formed which delivered an innovative design.   
What was clear in the case studies was that previous good working relationships between 
contractors prevented the identification of problems early in the project and this resulted in a 
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degree of unintended collusion to fix issues quickly, rather than to appreciate the overall 
impact of decisions. These findings mirror authors who have highlighted two issues which 
challenge supply chain integration: the reliance of collaborative projects on informal 
relationships within the supply chain (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000a); and the propensity of 
principal contractors and clients to form longer-term relationships with each other rather than 
with subcontractors (Briscoe & Dainty, 2005).  In the case studies it was the formation of new 
relationships within a supply chain which served the adoption of BIPV better than established 
ones. 
10.4 Implications for adoption of BIPV and other sustainable technologies 
The previous sections have discussed the impact of the fragmented and systemic nature of 
construction projects on adoption and have highlighted the complexities that these 
characteristics have on the dynamics of adoption in projects, the complications of supply 
chain in adoption and the effect on adoption of project practices, process and procedures.  The 
findings above support a number of points which extend to the adoption of other renewable 
technologies in general.   
A number of aspects of the BIPV system posed challenges in construction projects.  These 
included: the failure to appreciate the integrated nature of the technology; the tendency of the 
building project team to privilege visible aspects of the BIPV system over the electrical 
system; and the implications of initial design decisions for the incorporation and generation 
potential of the technology.  The analysis has highlighted the way in which failure to 
anticipate and plan for the effect of particular decisions on other aspects of the interdependent 
systems posed problems for the team and potentially compromised initial technical and design 
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goals.  Greater awareness of the challenges which BIPV posed would have allowed for better 
planning and fewer unintended consequences. 
The case of BIPV directly challenges a number of basic assumptions which inform research 
into innovation in general and sustainable innovation in particular.  In much of the literature, 
innovation, product development, commercialisation and adoption are treated as distinct 
stages in a linear process (e.g. Rothwell, 1994).  Although both social and technical aspects of 
a technology influence adoption (Lees & Sexton, 2013), they are often treated as radically 
distinct, with researchers focusing on one or the other.  Finally, technology as products are 
depicted as uniform, standardized, stable physical artefacts with a clear manufacturer and 
expert knowledge (Jelle & Breivik, 2012).   
BIPV challenges all of these assumptions.  The bespoke systems characteristics of BIPV and 
the local context into which it is incorporated means that innovation and product development 
continue well into commercialisation and adoption.  Similarly, in the case of BIPV 
considerable innovation and development occurs on site as construction of the building 
unfolds.  Finally, in the case of BIPV, there is no single product and there is no BIPV expert.  
Instead, BIPV expertise resides in diffuse pools of different types of knowledge and these 
silos very rarely come together in cohesive product development or design efforts.   
These observations pose important challenges for the adoption and upscaling of BIPV.  Key 
issues include product standardisation and the integration of the building process.  In the UK, 
as long as commercial construction remains a bespoke sector, BIPV can be expected to retain 
its bespoke character.  That said, the variety of motivations for using the technology and 
requirements are not infinite.  One way forward might be to develop a suite of BIPV systems 
to respond to different types of customer and building needs (for example, developing options 
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for high generation potential, aesthetic high transparency applications, and integrated façade 
panels), accompanied by much clearer communication of the technical issues involved as well 
as of the trade-offs between different considerations.   
It is helpful to reflect on whether BIPV is an exceptional case or whether it highlights features 
common to other sustainable technologies.  Whilst possibly extreme in its bespoke systems 
character, the examples of ground source heat pumps and district heating systems suggest that 
it is far from unique (Holden & Abhilash, 2014). The technical complexity of the system 
means that: 
 clients and developers tend to focus on the visible features of the system;  
 innovation continues well into adoption;  
 its incorporation spreads across multiple work packages, often at the expense of 
standard contractual structures and procedures.   
The use of this type of socio-technical analysis in the consideration of other sustainable 
innovations would demonstrate the integrated and socio-technical nature of the technology 
and would allow the debate on product development of sustainable innovations to move 
forward.  It is only once a more dynamic understanding of innovation adoption is applied that 
a clearer view of the nature of integrated sustainable innovation can be developed. 
10.5 The application, contributions and limitations of the SCOT approach  
The final part of this discussion focusses on the application, contributions and limitations of 
SCOT as an analytical approach in this research.  The section reflects on the challenges of 
operationalising the approach and then goes on to identify the contributions and limitations of 
the approach in this research. Section 10.5.2 identifies how the approach brought the 
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dynamics of adoption into focus, allowed an understanding of how decisions are made and 
demonstrated the effects of those decisions on both the artefacts and the actors.  The section 
finishes by reviewing some limitations of the approach which were established during the 
analysis of this research. 
 Reflections on using the approach 10.5.1
Although a seemingly simple approach, its application proved to be surprisingly labyrinthine 
and fraught with complexity.  SCOT is a micro-level approach which relies on interviews and 
documents to generate information – much information!  The SCOT diagrams appear simple 
– with only four concepts to map (artefact, technological frame, problem and solution) - but 
there is no toolkit for deriving a mapping of the development of the assemblage.  In practice 
dilemmas about which information to include, how to map the changing constituencies of the 
technological frames, seeing the validity of groupings and logics and linking different phases 
of the projects made the approach troublesome.  Considerable thought and consideration was 
needed to establish ways of communicating the case studies.  Co-development diagrams were 
invented and developed to summarise the different streams of development.  A0 sized SCOT 
diagrams were drawn to develop an over-view of the project to link phases and the varying 
accounts of actors, and drawings were annotated with boxes which identified which actors 
were in each technological frame at each point of decision making.  An additional challenge 
in terms of construction projects was to map the shifting composition of technological frames 
as the project moved through the different project stages (from concept to construction) and to 
capture the dynamic nature of these changes.   
The challenges of operationalising the approach were considerable, but the very clear 
concepts of artefact, technological frame, problems and solutions were also strengths.  By 
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having this concept clarity, it was possible to keep the important things in mind and to pay 
attention to the unfolding nature of adoption and its implications on the artefacts, assemblages 
and actors.  The diagrams allowed the story to be told through the multiple interviews and 
allowed for different threads of the stories to be taken up and followed to their conclusions.   
 Contributions of the SCOT approach 10.5.2
The preceding section reflected on how the SCOT approach was operationalised and outlined 
some of the strengths of the approach in this research.  During the analysis of data three 
particular contributions of the approach became clear. 
Dominant Frames 
The SCOT approach is used to address how technology develops though a series of decisions 
taken by actors to address problems.  The actors are involved in different ways according to 
their beliefs or frames.  Despite a shift in project management literature from problem solving 
to problem structuring (and the development of a soft skills approach) (Crawford et al., 2006; 
Dainty et al., 2003; Olson et al., 2001), most scholars assume that actors with the same job 
title share the same views and prioritise similar issues.  For example, project managers are 
depicted as prioritising efficiency, engineers prioritise functionality and architects are 
concerned with aesthetics.  The SCOT approach demonstrated that this is too simplistic and 
that in fact groups coalesce around interests which transcend simple job titles.  An example of 
this in the case studies was the Generation Maximiser group which comprised of architects, 
designers, planners and engineers.  Membership of groups within the projects shifted and 
changed with rhythms that sometimes followed the standard project stages (initial design, 
tender, detail design etc.) but sometimes followed a different pattern.  This change in 
membership supports construction and project management research which identifies 
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different patterns of cooperation between project team members at different times within a 
project (Olson et al., 2001).  At various times in the project the dominance of some groups 
was amplified by project stages (for example Design Optimisers dominated the solution of 
problems at the detail design stage).  However at other times the dominance came from a 
source which was not obvious and which then disappeared, making the logic of decisions 
harder to follow.  An example of this is when decisions were taken that seemed to follow 
from an unwillingness to engage with the technology but were actually based on a desire to 
minimise risk.  These findings support research which moves away from the study of problem 
solving in favour of exploring the way that different project actors bring different perspectives 
to problem solving (problem structuring) (Franco et al., 2004) and makes a new contribution 
in highlighting the way that these perspectives shift during the project.  Using SCOT to map 
out these project dynamics helped to draw out an understanding of the process of adoption. 
Crossing the boundaries of standard project stages 
One other major contribution of the approach was to deconstruct the standard project stages 
and to explore what occurred within each episode and how actors’ different interests waxed 
and waned through the project.  These findings are in tension with models of project 
management which show a linear progression of project stages and clearly defined stage gates 
(Cooke-Davis, 2002; Phillips, 2008).  The analysis showed that the composition of groups 
sharing the same technological frame changed over the duration of the project, with actors 
joining and leaving at certain times and with some frames dominating at certain times within 
the project.  The surprising absence of a group being concerned with generation maximisation 
shows that it is not always the seemingly obvious groups which dominate decision-making 
and shape the technology.   
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This insight into construction and project management contributes directly to literature which 
develops the themes of soft skills needed to manage projects (Dainty et al., 2003; Olson et al., 
2001; Crawford et al., 2006) and allows project teams to have a better understanding of the 
dynamics occurring within the team.  It is clear that SCOT allowed for a fine-grained 
exploration of the dynamics of each case, showing how actors become involved in different 
ways with different interests and how the technology developed through a process of 
negotiation to stabilisation. 
Case Study Comparison 
A classic use of the SCOT approach is to explore how an artefact arrived at technical 
stabilisation over a period of time.  In a similar way to the comparison methods used in 
process innovation approach (Van de Ven et al., 1989), the case study comparison has 
highlighted similar patterns in the adoption process across the three case studies.  The case 
study comparison of this research has provided a template to explore the detail of the front-
end design of a construction project which is a departure from the standard problematic 
addressed by SCOT research.  The comparison also gives a new perspective to project 
management knowledge about the micro-dynamics and their effects in construction literature.  
This is in contrast to more theoretical models of stage gate management (Ajamian & Koen, 
2002), fuzzy front end design protocols (Kagioglu et al., 1999) and problem structuring 
(Franco et al., 2004). 
 Limitations of the approach 10.5.3
As the analysis of the data using the SCOT approach continued three particular areas of 
difficulty became evident.  These limitations centred around the concepts of stabilisation and 
closure, the nature of artefacts and issues around the development of technological frames. 
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Stabilisation and closure 
The analysis of decision-making within the case studies built on the idea of stabilisation and 
closure outlined in the SCOT approach (Chapter 4).  Stabilisation is used to describe the 
process by which the design of artefacts becomes more fixed, whilst closure refers to the 
mechanism by which the interpretive flexibility between groups decreases through negotiation 
and conflict (Bijker et al., 2012).  The processes of stabilisation and mechanisms of closure 
have been acknowledged by Bijker (2009) to be under developed, but two closure 
mechanisms have been identified as part of the approach: “Rhetorical closure” occurs when 
social groups see the problem as being solved and the problem effectively disappears.  A 
second mechanism - “redefinition of the problem” - occurs when the solution to a new 
problem and overrides other considerations.  This research was concerned with identifying 
how the building assemblage and technology reached stabilisation and closure, but the formal 
SCOT approach gave very little guidance on how to establish these mechanisms.  Given the 
number of decisions taken and the complexity of cause and effect, it was difficult to establish 
precise processes and mechanisms.  However this research did find empirical evidence for the 
two concepts.  By identifying discrete and integrated decision making modes as processes of 
stabilisation it was possible to identify the ensuing path of problems and solutions which gave 
rise to closure.  The two mechanisms of rhetorical closure and redefinition of the problem 
were found, however it was not possible to link particular processes of stabilisation to 
particular mechanisms of closure.  Rhetorical closure was instanced in Vogue Terrace by the 
development of a solution of cableways to satisfy aesthetic and technical concerns, although 
this solution actually masked the problem of the BIPV system being effectively bolted onto 
the project.  Redefinition of the problem occurred in Synergy Court, where the need to 
achieve generation targets - which was understood by actors in each technological frame - 
overrode other considerations of cost or risk, with the use of innovative micro-inverters being 
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seen by the groups as the only solution.  It would seem that the co-development type had 
some bearing on the mechanism of closure.  Co-development by mutual adjustment gave rise 
to rhetorical closure where the assemblages were adjusted until the actors in each 
technological frame were satisfied, whilst co-development by lock-in gave rise to redefinition 
of the problem - where a need for the solution of a problem overrides other considerations. 
The identification of decision-making modes and types of co-development as stabilisation and 
closure mechanisms contributes to the operationalisation of the approach, but the relationship 
between these two concepts remains elusive. 
The nature of artefacts 
The artefact is one of the basic concepts of the SCOT approach, but the term is ambiguously 
treated.  Artefacts are considered to be both single items of technology and assemblages of 
multiple items.  In either event, the approach assumes artefacts to be easily identified and to 
maintain their identity throughout the process.  As the project progressed, some artefacts took 
on different significance and their meaning within the project team changed.  For example, in 
Vogue Terrace the brackets to secure the BIPV panels began as simple, functional brackets, 
but became a point of integration for the technology and the building and by the end of the 
project were a key component of innovation.  It became difficult to identify if it was the 
artefact itself that was important, or its function – in the case above, the bracket was both a 
fixing mechanism and a way of carrying cables.  This unfolding redefinition of artefacts made 
the use of the SCOT approach slightly problematic as different technological frames were 
applied to the artefact by the different actors as its meaning and significance changed.  This 
made it difficult to maintain consistency of in parts of the analysis.   
SCOT generally considers artefacts as the pieces of technology which are developed, but in 
these case studies some social artefacts like schedules and contracts had an equal if not greater 
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role in the stabilisation and closure of the technological system.  These social artefacts were 
identified during the analysis of dominant frames and were operationalised through the 
technological frames. The Time Sentry frame was essentially constructed around the various 
schedules and the Risk Minimiser frame was constructed around contracts.  One last 
observation was that of conflict between the physical artefacts and the social artefacts such as 
schedules and contracts.  The contract work packages in both Future Green and Vogue 
Terrace divided the BIPV system and made its integration problematic, whilst in Synergy 
Court the conflict between the lifting schedule of the site and the installation schedule of the 
louvres was resolved by the development of the BMS hoist system to allow for local 
manipulation of the louvres.  Using SCOT to operationalise social artefacts was not straight-
forward and is an area where SCOT was less able to provide an understanding of the 
dynamics of decision-making. 
Relevant Social Groups, Technological Frames and SCOT 
The technological frame is one of the key analytical constructs of the SCOT approach and has 
been used in this research in line with Bijker’s outline (Bijker, 1999).  During the analysis of 
the case studies it became clear that the technological frame remains a somewhat ambiguous 
concept particularly in relationship to social artefacts such as contracts and risk.  
Technological frames were introduced by Bijker et al in response to concerns about how 
power between groups can be represented and understood (semiotic theories of power) (Bijker 
et al., 2012;. Klein & Kleinman, 2002), but from the case studies it seems that actors can 
invest artefacts with power which is not necessarily obvious to themselves.  This makes 
analysis of the decision-making motivations and processes in the design process more 
complex than the SCOT approach would suggest.  
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 Conclusion Chapter 11:
The aim of this research is to explore the micro-dynamics around the adoption of innovative 
technology in three commercial buildings and so develop an understanding of what happens 
when innovative, integrated technologies are incorporated into building projects.   
The research uses building integrated photovoltaic technology (BIPV) as an example of an 
integrated technology and examines what happened as BIPV was incorporated into three 
commercial buildings.  It is concerned with the micro-level occurrences and accommodations 
that are made both to the innovative technology (in this case BIPV) and to its complex local 
physical (in this case the building) and processual (in this case the project management 
processes) context during its adoption.  This aim is supported by three objectives: 
 To explore how the building and the technology develop as design decisions are made 
during the project when BIPV is incorporated;   
 To examine what may influence the installed generation potential of the buildings; 
 To explore the implications of this research for the adoption of BIPV and other 
sustainable technologies. 
The analysis documented the mutual constitution of the technology and the building for each 
project and then compared the case studies to explore themes of integration and co-
development across the projects.  These themes were used to move from an analysis of the 
three specific cases to a re-engagement with the literature on the adoption of technology.  The 
discussion explored how BIPV challenged a number of basic assumptions which inform 
research into innovation and construction management literatures.  The discussion chapter 
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highlighted how innovation occurs on-site as construction of the building proceeds and 
explores the implication of this in the adoption of integrated technologies.  
Rather than using formal roles (architect, designer, project manager etc.) and project stages 
(initial design, tender, detail design etc.) to explain adoption, the research found that the 
actors formed informal groups around particular interests and that the make-up of these 
groups shifted and changed with rhythms that sometimes followed the standard project stages, 
but sometimes followed a different logic.  Decision-making was dominated by a particular 
frame at different times, and it was not always the seemingly obvious frames which 
dominated decision-making and shaped the technology.  Decisions which took into account 
the characteristics of the BIPV and the building stemmed from the ability of actors to 
mobilise multiple frames when problem solving and often resulted in innovation.   
This research design viewed adoption as a process, rather than a moment and explored the 
dynamic nature of that process by examining the co-development of the BIPV system and the 
building as the projects progressed.  The micro-level socio-technical analysis showed that 
innovation and product development of both the BIPV system and the building continued well 
into construction and adoption.  The approach used has given a more detailed understanding 
of the complexity of the adoption of innovation in construction projects and points to several 
threads for future research into the adoption of integrated technologies. 
This chapter summarises the key theoretical contributions of this research before moving to 
specific conclusions for each of the research objectives.  It goes on to identify the 
methodological contributions and then summarises practical implications for policy makers 
and practitioners.  Finally, the limits of the research and future areas of research are 
highlighted.   
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11.1 Theoretical contributions  
This section looks at the theoretical contributions of this research to both construction and 
innovation theory, and to the SCOT approach.  
 Construction management and innovation theory 11.1.1
The notable absence of literature surrounding the adoption of technology in buildings and the 
failure of integrated renewable technologies to deliver their promised performance suggests 
that additional research is needed in this area.  The case of BIPV directly challenges a number 
of basic assumptions which inform research into innovation in general and sustainable 
innovation in particular.  In much of the literature, innovation, product development, 
commercialisation and adoption are treated as distinct stages in a linear process (e.g. 
Rothwell, 1994).  Alternatively innovation is treated largely as a process which must be 
managed (Poole et al., 2000; Pettigrew, 2012).  Although both these social and technical 
aspects of an innovative technology influence adoption (Lees & Sexton, 2013), they are often 
treated as radically distinct, with researchers focusing on one or the other.  Finally, 
technology as products are depicted as uniform, standardized, stable physical artefacts with a 
clear manufacturer and expert knowledge (Yang, 2015; Kissi et al., 2012). 
Chapter three pointed to two important omissions in literature. Firstly, there is little micro-
level empirical study which combines both the technological and social elements which occur 
as innovation is incorporated into building or projects (notable exceptions include Harty 
(2008) and Tryggestad & Georg (2011)).  Second, the impact that the process of adoption has 
on the generation potential of the BIPV system is neglected in favour of technical 
developments (Sozer & Elnimeiri, 2007; Laird, 2010) and the importance of policy and 
certification (Pagliaro et al., 2010; BRE, 2015).  In addition, much literature on implementing 
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innovation in construction focusses on strengthening project management procedures (Love 
and Li, 2000; Sun and Meng, 2009; Bourne, 2001; Cooke-Davis, 2002), integrating the supply 
chain (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000; Briscoe et al., 2001) and improving decision making 
(Krishnan et al. 2001; Chinowsky et al., 2008; Bakht & El-Diraby, 2015).  This attention to 
the optimisation of construction processes fails to recognise the bespoke nature of integrated 
technologies and the corresponding challenges for their incorporation into buildings.  It also 
fails to show how different decision modes directly affect both the performance of the 
technology and subsequent chains of decisions making. 
The application of a socio-technical approach and the empirical findings allow comment on 
the incorporation of innovative technology at the project level.  In contrast to approaches 
which seek to model innovation adoption (Slaughter, 1998; Tidd, 2006), prescribe best 
practice (Cooke-Davis, 2002) or instruct managers in the management of innovation (Van de 
Ven et al., 1989) this research has led to a more nuanced, processual understanding of 
adoption.  The consideration of decision making arising from the resolution of problems 
which arose as the technology was incorporated into buildings and the understanding of the 
sociological and technical requirements of the actors in projects teams suggest that there are a 
number of issues in addition to technical or economic considerations which influence the 
adoption of technology and affect its performance.   
One significant area of contribution is to the study of construction project management from 
the “soft skills approach” which recognises the importance of skills needed to manage 
projects (Crawford et al., 2006; Dainty et al., 2003; Olson et al., 2001) and to literature which 
moves from problem solving to problem structuring (Franco et al., 2004).  This research into 
the micro-level adaptations which occur as BIPV is incorporated into a building project 
supports the notion that different project actors bring different perspectives to problem 
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solving (problem structuring) (Franco et al., 2004) and makes a new contribution in 
highlighting the way that these perspectives shift during the project.  In addition, although 
conventionally people with the same job title have been assumed to share the same views and 
prioritise certain issues, this research suggests that this is not the case and that the perspective 
of project actors shifts throughout the project and that this shift is not solely related to the 
project stage. 
The findings within this research also comment on studies which focus particularly on the 
processual view of innovation (Van de Ven et al., 1989) and the interconnections which flow 
across projects and between project actors (Harty, 2008b; Schweber & Harty, 2010).  The 
Social Construction of Technology approach (SCOT) (Bijker, 2009) allowed analysis of 
actors’ interests and their changing relationship with the artefacts which provided a way to 
explore the co-development of the technology and the building, and the adoption process. 
 Contribution to the SCOT approach 11.1.2
Within the SCOT approach identification of relevant social groups, technological frames and 
the development of a network of problems and solutions are well known and often cited 
(Aibar & Bijker, 1997; Walter & Styhre, 2013; Howcroft & Light, 2010).  However the final 
stage of the social construction of technology approach is the development of mechanisms of 
stabilisation and closure which is recognised by Bijker et al.(2012) as being somewhat under 
developed.  The loosely defined SCOT approach has few detailed empirical examples of how 
to conduct a SCOT analysis and this case study analysis adds to that limited store by 
providing a step-by-step approach to operationalise SCOT.  In addition this research makes a 
contribution to the mechanisms of stabilisation and closure by bringing the dynamics of 
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adoption into focus and allowing an understanding of how decisions are made and the effects 
of those decisions on BIPV, the building artefacts and the actors.   
The SCOT approach generally takes into account the development of material technology 
(Bijker, 2009), but in this research it became clear that some social artefacts such as schedules 
and contracts had an equal role in the stabilisation and closure of the technological system.  
The focus of the research on the mutual constitution of the BIPV system and the building 
allowed for consideration of the impact of the local context on the adoption of technology, 
rather than considering the technology as an isolated artefact.  Using SCOT to operationalise 
social artefacts was not straight-forward and is an area where SCOT was less able to provide 
an understanding of the dynamics of decision-making. 
The technological frame is one of the key analytical constructs of the SCOT approach and has 
been used in this research in line with Bijker’s outline (Bijker, 1999).  During the analysis of 
the case studies it became clear that the technological frame remains a somewhat ambiguous 
concept particularly in relationship to social artefacts such as contracts and risk.  
Technological frames were introduced by Bijker et al in response to concerns about semiotic 
theories of power ( Bijker et al. 2012; Klein & Kleinman, 2002), but from the case studies it 
seems that artefacts can be invested with power which is not necessarily obvious to the actors.  
This makes analysis of the decision-making motivations and processes in the design process 
more complex than the SCOT approach and much construction management literature would 
suggest. 
A classic use of the SCOT approach is to explore how an artefact arrived at technical 
stabilisation over a period of time (Aibar & Bijker, 1997; Bijker, 2009).  In a similar way to 
the comparison methods used in process innovation approach, the case study comparison has 
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highlighted similar patterns in the adoption process across the three case studies. The case 
study comparison of this research has provided a template for the front-end design of a 
construction project which is an addition to the standard problematic addressed by SCOT 
research. 
11.2 Summary of key conclusions to the research aim and objectives 
The case studies have shown that process of adoption of BIPV cannot be contained within a 
single model and is far more complex than a single stage in an innovation model would 
suggest.  The prevailing view of adoption of technology within construction management 
literature does not take into account the conflicting interests of project actors and the shifting 
focus of decision taking.  In the cases studied, these conflicts and shifting foci resulted in 
unexpected mutual articulation of the buildings and technology which in two cases has had 
detrimental effects on the generation potential of the BIPV systems.  These findings translate 
to other integrated renewable technologies which are increasingly specified on building 
projects. . 
 The mutual articulation of a building and the technology.  11.2.1
The research showed three types of co-development mechanisms - lock in, homogeneity of 
appearance, and mutual adjustment and adaptation.  Each of these mechanisms resulted from 
different ways of making decisions and gave rise to particular characteristics of co-
development and subsequent performance of the technology.  
Decision-making during the case studies depended on how the project actors understood the 
challenges of adoption.  Integrated decision-making occurred when actors had the flexibility 
and awareness to mobilise multiple technological frames and often resulted in the 
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development of innovative solutions which simplified adoption.  On the other hand, actors 
making limited use of technological frames used discrete decisions making, without reference 
to the effects of the decisions on either the BIPV system itself or on the building, and these 
decisions resulted in a rather disjointed and ad-hoc adoption process which compromised the 
generation potential of the technology.  At times the dominant logic for decision making came 
from a source which was not obvious which then disappeared, making the logic hard to follow 
( for example when decisions were taken that seemed to follow from an unwillingness to 
engage with the technology but were actually based on a desire to minimise risk).  
The friction interfaces or points of friction - where the BIPV assemblage and building 
physically connected with part of the building - were not apparent to the project teams from 
the outset of the project, but were stumbled upon at unexpected points as the projects 
proceeded.  This resulted in unplanned mutual articulation of the technology and building and 
affected the performance of the technology and appearance of the building  
Analysis of the co-development of the building (with all its component technologies and 
parts) and the BIPV system drew attention to the role of social artefacts in the processes of 
adoption.  Contracts, schedules and risk were often un-articulated reasons for decision making 
which obscured technological implications and prevented integrated development of the 
building and technology.  Conclusions about the practical implications for parts of the 
standard construction project procurement process on the adoption of integrated technologies 
are detailed in section 11.4 – Implications for practice and practitioners.  
 Influences on the delivered generation potential of the buildings 11.2.2
The bespoke character of BIPV would suggest that the BIPV system and the building would 
be designed together.  However, the data did not support this and pointed to an independence 
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of design which often came together only at the point at which the technology was integrated 
within the building (integration interfaces).  This demonstrated that the integrated 
characteristics of the BIPV technology were often obscured, as the technology was treated as 
a series of components which had to be accommodated within the building 
Project actors used different criteria to assess the technology and to make decisions at 
different times of the project.  The issue that this raises is how to keep visible the criteria 
associated with the innovation’s performance, rather than the more obvious goals of project 
delivery and cost.  The surprising absence of a group being concerned with generation 
maximisation shows that it is not always the seemingly obvious groups which dominate 
decision-making and shape the technology.   
Innovation adoption relied on multiple actors informally taking up the role of systems 
integrator at different times.  The systems integrator is a shifting, informal role within a 
project team and as the person fulfilling the task of systems integrator changed through the 
projects, so did the perceived locus of expertise.  In this way responsibility for system design 
moved through the project team without anyone actually formally assuming responsibility, so 
that by the end of two of the case studies the BIPV systems had been implemented without 
ever having been designed.  This empirical evidence contradicts much construction 
management and project management literature which puts great store on the stage-wise 
management of projects and concepts such as the “design freeze” (Cooke-Davis, 2002;  
Winch, 2010). 
Instead of adding clarity and focus to the adoption process, the effect of policy and 
certification was mixed and in two of the cases resulted in fragmented adoption, with BIPV 
systems not making any significant contribution to electricity production.  The process of 
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adoption was complicated by confusing generation targets, ill-thought out commissioning 
procedures, and lack of attention to measuring generation output. 
 The implications of this research for the adoption of BIPV and other integrated 11.2.3
technologies 
The bespoke systems character of BIPV and the local context into which it is incorporated 
means that innovation and product development continue well into commercialisation and 
adoption.  The plethora of options for component choice and configuration of integrated 
technologies is both a blessing and a curse: it allows unique solutions to be developed for 
each application; but also means that there is no single accepted convention in terms of 
component selection, matching and configuration.  In terms of adoption, this lack of 
standardisation creates problems of understanding and communication across the project team 
and is likely to be repeated for other integrated technologies.  The technical complexity of the 
integrated technologies means that clients and developers tend to focus on the visible features 
of the technical system, innovation continues well into adoption, and its incorporation spreads 
across multiple work packages - often at the expense of standard contractual structures and 
procedures.   
As with BIPV, the inclusion of other integrated technologies in construction projects will pose 
challenges.  These included: the failure to appreciate the integrated nature of the technology; 
the tendency of the building project team to privilege visible aspects of the BIPV system over 
the electrical system; and the implications of initial design decisions for the incorporation and 
generation potential of the technology.  The analysis has highlighted the way in which failure 
to anticipate and plan for the effect of particular decisions on other aspects of the 
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interdependent systems posed problems for the team and potentially compromised initial 
technical and design goals.   
Considerable innovation and development occurs on site as construction of the building 
unfolds.  With integrated technologies there is no single product and there is no single expert.  
Instead, expertise resides in diffuse pools of different types of knowledge and these silos 
rarely come together in cohesive product development or design efforts. 
11.3 Contributions of the method to the analysis 
The use of SCOT to analyse the incorporation of BIPV on three construction projects has 
made contributions to construction management literature and contributions towards the 
development of the method (section 11.1).   
The Social Construction of Technology approach (SCOT) was used to analyse the process of 
incorporating the technology as a series of problems and solutions which unfolded as different 
actors’ interests were involved with different artefacts of the technology and building.  Eight 
technological frames were found to account for the actors’ interests: Generation Maximiser; 
Green Guardian; Design Aesthete; Design Optimiser; User, Cost Watcher; Time Sentry; and 
Risk Minimiser.  The artefacts under consideration included the individual components of the 
BIPV system (panels, inverters wiring etc.) and the parts of the building with which the 
technology interfaces (façade, roof, electrical systems etc.).  Issues which were examined 
included the changing interests of the actors, the network of problems and possible solutions 
and the effects of the chosen solution on the rest of the project.  The SCOT analysis of actors’ 
interests and their changing relationship with the artefacts provided a way to explore the co-
development of the technology and the building, and the adoption process.  
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The SCOT approach showed that within a project team, groups of actors coalesce around 
interests which transcend simple job title.  Membership of these groups within the projects 
shifted and changed with rhythms that sometimes followed the standard project stages (initial 
design, tender, detail design etc.) but sometimes followed a different pattern.  This 
understanding contributes to construction management literature by offering a new 
perspective how the interests of stakeholders within a construction project evolve over the 
course of a project.  
The SCOT approach allowed the standard boundaries of project processes to be deconstructed 
and allowed the researcher to follow threads of problems and solutions across the whole 
project. As a contribution to construction management literature on innovation, this gave a 
clear view of how the technology and building developed and how this development is 
influenced by the contractual nature of construction projects. 
11.4 Implications for practitioners and practice 
Analysis of the case studies highlighted several practical implications for construction 
professionals.  These implications broadly fall under two banners: project procurement 
processes; and challenges associated with the adoption of innovative integrated technologies. 
Project procurement covers all aspects of the delivery of a project from concept to handover 
and sometimes beyond.  The analysis has shown that current procedures and processes do not 
always support innovation adoption and indeed that they can hold back adoption.  Findings 
from this research conflict with those who argue that more efficient and rigorous 
implementation of project procedures (Cooke-Davis, 2002) and further integration of the 
supply chain assist adoption of innovation (Egan, 1998; Wolstenholme, 2009).  In particular 
the development of work packages prior to tender can divide the BIPV system into separate 
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mechanical and electrical contracts and this de-coupling makes integrated system design 
difficult.  This practice has major implications for many other technologies and the points of 
integration need to be carefully considered.   
Whilst measuring the delivered output from BIPV is complicated, it is often just as difficult to 
determine the theoretical output of the design and this shows that commissioning of BIPV 
systems needs integrated consideration, and suggests that commissioning procedures and 
contracts should take this into account.   
Several key challenges associated with the adoption of integrated technologies in construction 
projects were identified such as: identification of points of friction (friction interfaces); 
definition of work packages; and maintaining the purpose of the technology throughout the 
process of adoption.  These challenges also apply to the adoption of other more established 
systems (such as ground source heat pumps, district heating, chilled beams etc.) but are 
generally less visible because ways of working have been adapted to accommodate them.   
Analysis of the three case studies showed that there is no single accepted way of selecting 
components, matching their outputs and configuring the system.  The lack of guidance in 
system design makes efficient design and consistency of approach challenging and an 
efficient outcome unlikely.  A suggestion would be that practitioners should focus on 
understanding how to use the technology as a system rather than focussing on individual 
components. 
Findings show that BIPV expertise resides in diffuse pools of different types of knowledge 
and that this knowledge and expertise rarely comes together in cohesive product development 
or design. Project managers should consider carefully where the expertise resides, rather than 
making assumptions about the technology.  The research indicates that the informal role of 
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systems integrator plays a key part in the design and installation of the system.  The system 
integrator role can reside with multiple actors though a project but this shifting locus of 
perceived expertise can be a false friend to the project team, giving the impression that 
someone is designing the system as a whole, whilst in reality it is just evolving on an ad-hoc 
basis. 
This research draws attention to the limitations that standard project procurement processes 
place on the adoption of technology.  Particular ways of working brought about by project 
management practices and contract management did not support the adoption of BIPV and in 
particular conventional mechanical and electrical demarcations created artificial barriers 
between parts of the technological system.  In addition, changing project personnel as a result 
of standard Design and Build practices meant that the rationale or history behind decisions 
was lost and knowledge was siloed amongst project team members..   
11.5  Implications for Policy 
This research contradicts authors who believe that Feed-in-Tariff and other financial 
incentives would increase adoption of green technologies by driving the delivery of efficient 
systems to maximise income from the electricity generated (Lowe, 2007; Yang & Zou, 2015).  
In the case studies not one of the actors on any case study mentioned Feed-in-Tariffs at all. 
Attention is drawn in this research to the negative effect that BREEAM certification and 
Energy Performance Certificates for buildings had on the specification of the BIPV systems.  
The effect of the certifications was to introduce a “tick box” mentality which failed to focus 
attention on generation targets.  Only when specific generation targets were stipulated as 
planning requirements did the output of the BIPV system become important.  This conclusion 
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supports assertions by Schweber (2013) and Russell and Thompson (2009) that the effect of 
policy is not always in line with the desired policy outcome. 
In research little attention has been paid to the initial lack of target generation figures on 
projects and to the difficulty of measuring the achieved output.  While targets specified on 
paper versus those achieved in practice are often difficult to measure, check or validate (Gorse 
et al., 2012), the case studies showed that adoption of BIPV was additionally complicated by 
confusing generation targets, ill-thought out commissioning procedures, and varying weather 
conditions over the period of commissioning.  The result of a lack of focus of policy on 
holding design teams to account for meeting predicted outputs is clearly indicated by this 
research. 
11.6 Implications for design 
Analysis of the case studies has shown that there is an additional dimension to be considered 
in terms of the performance of the assemblage of the innovation, rather than just its impact in 
the project process.  It is interesting to reflect that there is very little literature which focusses 
on designing efficient, integrated BIPV systems, and that the current focus on improving 
individual components can only go part of the way to facilitating adoption.  
Early division of design work between mechanical and electrical disciplines, and the very 
early development of work packages before detail BIPV system design had taken place, made 
it difficult to integrate all the elements of the BIPV system and for an assessment of the whole 
BIPV system performance to take place.  Similarly, the process of tender and awarding of 
contracts relied on previous relationships and understanding affected the ability of the 
contractor to deliver the work package.  These findings point towards a need to re-cast the 
specialist trades or specialist engineering relationships within the pre-tender/tender stages of 
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standard management of construction projects.   The SCOT approach did not allow for these 
findings to be unpacked fully and this would indicate a direction for future researchers to 
embrace. 
One additional implication for design is the unwillingness of suppliers to engage heavily in 
projects before contracts are signed.  This reluctance springs from the fear that they will give 
away their specialised knowledge without gaining the contract.  It appeared that the standard 
project processes discouraged suppliers from putting detailed design of the BIPV system into 
the early stages of the project because of the uncertainty of winning tenders and potentially 
giving information to competitors.  This reluctance represents a two-way loss: the project 
design and management teams loose valuable expertise in developing thorough front-end 
design; and the specialist supplier loses an opportunity to influence the design to best 
showcase the technology. 
11.7 Limits of the research and suggestions for further research 
 Limitations 11.7.1
This research has provided a rich source of data for understanding the dynamic nature of 
adoption and of exploring how integrated technology is incorporated into buildings.  The 
SCOT approach allowed for a detailed analysis of problem solving and decision-making 
throughout the process of adoption and showed how the technology and building evolve as 
the project continues.   
Limitations of this research centre on the limited way that the SCOT approach can be used to 
theorise the link between processes of stabilisation and mechanisms of closure.  This research 
contributes to the operationalisation of the concepts of stabilisation processes and closure 
mechanisms by identifying particular decision-making modes and types of co-development 
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which occurred over the course of the case studies.  However the relationship between these 
two concepts remains elusive and so although this research can point to different decision 
making modes, it could not develop the connection further.  A further major limitation of this 
research is the analysis of the decision-making motivations and processes in the design phases 
of the case studies.  The concept of the technological frame remains somewhat ambiguous 
with respect to issues of semiotic power – particularly with respect to the social artefacts of 
contracts and risk – the decision-making motivations and processes were shown to be more 
complex than the SCOT approach would suggest.  Further research using a different 
epistemological approach would be needed to refine the findings of this research in terms of 
decision-making modes, stabilisation and closure in order to make an even more significant 
contribution to construction project management literatures. 
A detailed analysis of social artefacts, project processes and procedures which impact 
adoption of new technology fell outside the scope of the research and some of these possible 
avenues of further work are suggested below.  
 Suggestions for further research   11.7.2
The analysis and findings from this research suggest a number of possible directions for 
future research investigations. These are presented in order of importance and achievability. 
The occurrence and effect of integrated decision-making and discrete decision-making on the 
adoption of technology could be further explored, particularly with regard to understanding 
how stabilisation and closure mechanisms develop.  This could be achieved by conducting a 
more detailed, longitudinal study of a single project, with on-site attendance. 
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The effect of project procedures and practices on the adoption of integrated innovations 
would also be an interesting line of research, building on the finding of this research that 
standard ways of working hindered adoption of BIPV.  This could be conducted by exploring 
project processes in more depth and examining how they constrain or promote adoption 
within the project team.  A comparative case study might give useful insights into how these 
standard procedures could be changed to enable adoption. 
Further exploration of the role of social artefacts (such as contracts and schedules) in co-
development is a third possible direction for research.  Findings from this research suggest 
that social artefacts have a disproportionately large effect on co-development, but equally 
found the SCOT approach to have limits in developing this theme.  A new approach to 
exploring this phenomenon should be explored. 
One of the key analytical constructs of the SCOT approach – the technological frame – is 
somewhat ambiguous in terms of its relationship to the social artefacts and notions of power.  
A more comprehensive understanding of this concept could be developed further by 
considering these relationships.   
A final avenue of future research would be to expand this socio technical analysis to other 
green technologies so as to allow the debate on the adoption of sustainable innovations to 
move forward.  It is only once a more dynamic model of innovation adoption is developed 
that a fuller understanding of the nature of integrated sustainable innovation can be 
developed. 
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Appendices 
A1: Pilot Interview Schedule 
Diffusion of Sustainable Technology – accommodations to building design and practices 
in the adoption of low carbon technologies 
Interview Schedule: Initial Round A 
Date of Interview: 10/12/13      Name ID: LE01A 
Introduce myself and the research 
How I got here, my story 
How the research came about, what interests me 
This is what it’s about 
Background  
How came to be involved in the firm/product? 
How firm came to be manufacturing product/using the product? 
Competitors? 
Issues 
What kinds of issues have come about during adoption? 
What kind of feedback has he had from adoption? 
Ask about projects which come to mind 
What might be interesting about them? 
Why those ones? 
Different actors, client, confidentiality? 
Access: who needs to give consent – gate keepers?   
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A2: Case Study Interview Schedule 
Diffusion of Sustainable Technology – accommodations to building design and 
practices in the adoption of low carbon technologies 
Interview Schedule: Case Study OS 
Date of Interview: 03/06/2015     Name ID: OSFW03B  
Introduce myself and the research 
Background  
Tell me about self – how came to be doing this, firms, type of projects 
How/when came to be involved in the project 
How firm came to be doing project 
Do you have any personal engagement with sustainability? 
Project 
Tell me about the project 
Role on the project 
Other people involved in the project – internal/external to firm – their engagement with 
sustainability? 
Had any members of the project team worked together before? 
Issues 
What were the challenges/issues in general? 
Did technology pose any challenges/issues? 
What parts? Who was involved in the solution? What was their role? Why were they 
involved? 
Did that have any knock-on effects? 
Did parts of the design change as a result of technology used? 
Did using the technology affect/change the way that you worked? 
What would other people who worked on the project say about the technology? 
Particular 
How did the design evolve? What were the key points/decisions, who took them? 
What was the process of arriving at the curved roof? What options were considered? 
How were micro invertors arrived at – who was involved in the discussion? 
(Sub-collectors, wiring routes, BMU, maintenance, replacement, Risk, Experience, 
Commissioning)
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A3: Technological Frames 
 Green Guardian Cost Watcher Generation Maximiser 
 
Goals - Buildings should generate energy 
- Reduction of carbon emissions 
- Building comes in on budget 
- Profit margins maximised 
- Extras are minimised 
- The PV system is as efficient as possible 
- Losses are minimised 
- Generation is maximised 
Problems - Green solutions are often “casualties of 
war” 
- Green solutions generally cost more 
- Renewable solutions are costly 
- Innovations often lead to extra 
costs 
- Weather changes  
- There are many models  
- There are different technologies and layouts 
available and there is an optimal one 
- Authority  
Strategies - Enshrine in planning regs 
 
- Make work packages as 
comprehensive as possible 
- Control extras 
- Minimise innovation 
- Use new technologies/advances 
- Take time to set things out 
- Reduce wiring runs 
Tacit Knowledge - Technology available 
- Planning requirements 
 
- What everything costs 
- Re-jigging packages reduce 
cost 
- Technology available 
- Electricity and electronics 
-  
Testing procedures - Output figures 
- m2 of PV 
- Review meetings - Flash tests 
- Simulations 
Design Methods - BREEAM 
 
- Work packages - Simulation programmes calculate and 
optimise output 
Criteria - Merton, KWh - Final project cost - kWh meets target 
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A3: Technological Frames (continued) 
 Design Aesthete Design Optimiser User 
 
Goals - The PV adds an aesthetic element to the 
build 
- There is a degree of novelty to the build 
- Build-ability of the project  
- The building and PV are designed to fit 
together 
- System can be monitored 
- Electricity is generated 
- System can be maintained 
- Looks good and is pleasant to work in  
Problems - New technologies bring unknowns 
- Wiring needs to go from outside to inside 
- Outline schemes not detailed 
- Experts are wary of detailed involvement 
- Keeping up to date with possibilities 
- No “go to“ expert for the system  
- Knowing what is a show stopper 
- Work parcels make artificial demarcations  
- Details of the interfaces between the parts 
are “dropped” 
- There is no time to make the design 
“perfect” 
- Represented after the event 
- Not part of the initial design team 
- Get what they get 
Strategies - Rely on experts 
- Try to make specs so specific that the 
favoured supplier gets the contract 
- Try to get tied in to the project early 
- Develop “on the hoof” strategies 
- Plan before you start 
- Understand system needs  
- Check overlap of work packages 
- Rely on contractor for representation 
- “Snagging” on handover 
Tacit 
Knowledge 
- Aesthetic contribution 
- Finishes available 
- Standards of finish 
- Past experience - How it will be used 
  
Appendix A 
359 
 
A3a: Additional technological Frames developed during analysis 
 
 
Testing 
procedures 
- Durability - Good design practice - BMS 
Design 
Methods 
-  -  -  
Criteria - Looks good - No Extras - Get what paid for 
 Time Sentry Risk Minimiser 
Goals - Project is delivered on time 
- Delays are minimised 
- Minimise risk of contravening contract 
- Minimise risk of failure 
Problems - Schedule is drawn up before tender packages are 
agreed 
- Design changes cause delays 
- New technology poses risk to the integrity of the usual, known design 
- Departures from the norm may affect ability to deliver on time 
- New designs may have unanticipated knock-on effects 
Strategies - Understand work packages 
- Planning meetings 
- Do not take on anything new 
- Ensure that work packages do not include unknowns 
- Do lots of research  
Tacit Knowledge - Past experience - Contracts, Warranties,  
Testing procedures - Will it affect schedule? - Will I be liable? 
Design Methods - Scheduling packages - Contract 
Criteria 
 
- Completed to time - No claims 
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A4: Coding Node Structure Report 
 
 
Hierarchical Name Nickname Aggregate User 
Assigned 
Color 
Node 
Nodes 
   
Nodes\\Artefact  No None 
Nodes\\Artefact\Cells  No None 
Nodes\\Artefact\cleaning  No None 
Nodes\\Artefact\façade  No None 
Nodes\\Artefact\inverter  No None 
Nodes\\Artefact\wiring  No None 
Nodes\\Background  No None 
Nodes\\Background\Company Background  No None 
Nodes\\Background\Interviewee    Background  No None 
Nodes\\Characteristics of BIPV  No None 
Nodes\\choice of technology  No None 
Nodes\\Contract  No None 
Nodes\\Contract\Stage at shich individual involved  No None 
Nodes\\Contract\Stage at which problem identified  No None 
Nodes\\Contract\Type  No None 
Nodes\\Design evolution  No None 
Nodes\\Familiarity with technology  No None 
Nodes\\Familiarity with technology\Firm  No None 
Nodes\\Familiarity with technology\Individual  No None 
Nodes\\Familiarity with technology\Previous involvment with PV  No None 
Nodes\\Frame  No None 
Nodes\\Frame\Degree of inclusion  No None 
Nodes\\Frame\goals, ideas and tools  No None 
Nodes\\Frame\Meaning  No None 
Nodes\\Impact  No None 
Nodes\\Impact\Design of building  No None 
Nodes\\Impact\Design of PV  No None 
Nodes\\Impact\on Project  No None 
Nodes\\Interfaces  No None 
Nodes\\Interfaces\With building  No None 
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Nodes\\Interfaces\With other parts of PV system No None 
Nodes\\Planning No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\Access No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\arising from building design No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\Arising from process or individual No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\cells No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\contract No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\cost No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\Façade No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\Finding contractors or suppliers No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\generation potential No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\invertor No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\maintenance No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\PV design No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\Schedule No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\Selection of PV No None 
Nodes\\Problems, solutions and negotiations\wiring No None 
Nodes\\Project Details No None 
Nodes\\Project Details\Firm involvement in project No None 
Nodes\\Project Details\Interviewee involvement in project No None 
Nodes\\Project Details\Project description No None 
Nodes\\Project Details\Project history No None 
Nodes\\Project Meanings or rationale No None 
Nodes\\Project Meanings or rationale\BREEAM No None 
Nodes\\Project Meanings or rationale\Reasons for building No None 
Nodes\\Project Meanings or rationale\reasons for pv No None 
Nodes\\project role No None 
Nodes\\Risk No None 
Nodes\\RSG No None 
Nodes\\RSG\Cost Watcher No None 
Nodes\\RSG\Design Aesthete No None 
Nodes\\RSG\Design Optimisers No None 
Nodes\\RSG\Generation Maximiser No None 
Nodes\\RSG\Green Guardian No None 
Nodes\\RSG\Users No None 
Nodes\\Tension No None 
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A5: Sample project information form and consent form 
Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
Diffusion of Sustainable Technology – accommodations to design and practices in the 
adoption of low carbon technologies 
My name is Pippa Boyd and I am a PhD researcher in the School of Construction Management and Engineering 
at the University of Reading.   
I am carrying out a research project to investigate how the specification of a new technology within a building 
project potentially introduces new challenges and problems for the project teams.  I am particularly interested in 
understanding how the incorporation of a new low carbon technology on a build may impact ways of working by 
the project team - both in terms of the way that the building develops and the accommodations made to ways of 
working by the team members.  I am interested in the changes made to the building design as a result of the new 
technology and changes to practices of various project team members within the project as it develops (such as 
the supplier, design consultants, construction personnel and commissioning organisation). 
With your consent I would like to record the meeting and transcribe sections later for analysis. Your 
participation within the research is entirely voluntary. I can turn off the tape recorder at any time during the 
meeting / discussions. Copies of the transcript will be available on request and any changes which you request 
will be made.  The data will be kept securely and destroyed when the research has ended. The data will be used 
for academic purposes only. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time; if this is the case the 
information and discussions given by you during the meetings will not be used during the analysis of the data. 
At every stage, your identity will remain confidential.  Your name and all identifying information will be 
removed from the written transcript.  My supervisors Dr Graeme Larsen and Dr Libby Schweber, and I will be 
the only people who will have access to this data. 
Copies of the completed reports will be available on request. If you have any further questions about the study, 
please feel free to contact me at the above address. 
This project has been subject to ethical review, according to the procedures specified by the University Research 
Ethics Committee, and has been approved. 
Pippa Boyd 
School of Construction Management and Engineering, 
Room 2N16, URS Building, 
The University of Reading, PO Box 225, 
Reading, 
RG6 6AY. 
  
Office: +44 (0)118 378 5264 
E-mail: N.J.P. Boyd@pgr.reading.ac.uk 
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Diffusion of Sustainable Technology – accommodations to design and practices in the 
adoption of low carbon technologies 
Consent Form 
1. I have read and had explained to me by Pippa Boyd the Information Sheet relating to this 
project and any questions have been answered to my satisfaction.   
 
2. I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I have the right to withdraw 
from the project at any time, and that this will be without detriment. 
 
3. I understand that my personal information will remain confidential to the researcher at the 
University of Reading, unless my explicit consent is given. 
 
4. I understand that my organisation will not be identified either directly or indirectly without my 
consent. 
 
5. I agree to the arrangements described in the Information Sheet in so far as they relate to my 
participation. 
 
6. Would you like to review the transcript before used?                                                                     Y / N 
(please circle) 
 
Signed   
Print Name  
Date   
 
 
 
